Tractatus Pneumatologico Philosophicus.
A Phenomenological Epistemology of Paranormality.

Graham Freestone 2019

With a foreword by Emanuel Magno
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Foreword -Emanuel Magno

The chicken or the egg question can only reproduce: what is the chicken and what is the egg? The answer to each is trivial. Say an egg is a world. Is the world an egg? Let us entertain what this book names a phantasy and say yes to that.

An egg does not know of its exterior, or even of its surface. It is safe to say this, since whatever communication it may have with it is below the threshold of recognition. Thus, the egg is an egg, for it is yet to recognize its being as an interface between worlds. And so, consequently, the world does not know it is an egg – nor does it know it is a world.

The more the forming creature inside becomes aware of the outside, the more it wants to hatch out, the more it becomes too big for the egg and the more of that world it uses up. The creature consumes its previous content, and that might as well be the definition of a creature.

The world of the egg is loose, everything inside is soft relative to kind and internal difference. The only hardness proper is the surrounding cask, the enclosure, the end of the egg. And it needs to be so, to protect the solidifying creature. When the pressure from inside grows in proportion and the hardness of the interior looseness presses the solid shell, it breaks it apart. For that, the shell cannot be too hard, or the creature becomes unable to hatch out when it finally wants (as in needs).

How can a world solidify into a creature that then bursts it open and useless? The egg cracks, the animal crawls from inside: what is there? Seeing for the first time, the creature recognizes a bunch of other eggs waiting to be cracked open, many worlds that could serve as food, or pose some danger, or even serve as objects of affection.

Each egg cracks to the crawling of an animal, each animal a unique thing, each cask left hollowed, its interior content consumed and transformed. Each egg, each world,
open to another world by another world. This expresses the mereology of phantasy.

An egg is a bubble, but the bubble is the egg in which the creature never cracks from, it never forms, it was never there to begin with.

The bubble is the anti-egg by being the egg-in-itself, as form, a surface of hollowed fruit, never to come. But where is this fruit that did not come? Where is its creature?

Is a bubble not a world? Can never the world be likened to a bubble?

This is the question this book investigates, but, of course, put in other words. Such words form a net of well-defined original concepts that resonate with one another in a harmonious fashion.

But, before jumping into the jargon-heavy material of the book, before trying to answer such questions and directly deal with such concepts, it is important to elaborate a working illustration, a soft and loose diagram of the major concepts that emerge in the work: they are the Pneuma, the central Pneuminous Accretions, Pneuminosity itself, the Umbratic, Umbra, and Phantasy.

These concepts are not immaterial, even if intangible, nor are they material first-movers in the vein of Superstring Theory, nor, for that matter, do they conflate a Hegelian movement of Spirit, but, instead, they express the abstracted notions stripped of conceptual implications – they are hollow concepts (as the illustrative egg and bubble were stripped of their material implications; but here we go a step further, because the pneuminous itself, for example, is the egg-itself, the bubble-itself, and the air-itself themselves stripped of their conceptual residue).

Hollows express the concepts in their unlimited potentiality, that is, malleable as individual non-units, all-purveying by being nowhere, to become, through accretion (composition, configuration, accumulation) and conditioned by pneuminosity, any unit
anywhere.

**Pneuma and Umbra:**

For the purposes of our illustration, pneuma as *air that is not air* is the perfect counter-metaphor, for it blocks the manifestation of metaphoric images that murk the clarity so fecund in its vagueness, in its darkness.

But said darkness is not a quality of the pneuma, but of the umbra, as we shall quickly illustrate.

The air that purveyed the vacuum, the aetheric, the pneuma that neutralized the already neutralized monistic reality, closing the circle and dissolving paradox into itself, also is *causa sui*. Auto-determination that is co-dependent upon a double named umbra. And, as such, for the pneumonisity there is the umbratic.

If the pneuma is an all-purveying impossibly thin substance that has infinite capacity and plasticity to become anything, and if all that there is is, in fact, pneuma and pneuminous, clearly some interactive problems arise. The pneuma has the quality of the pneuminous, correlate with a notion of luminosity. The totality of things in worlds, and the totality of worlds themselves, form a singular essencial atom, a common matter for all, and that is the pneuma. But the interactive problems remain. What if we do the opposite experiment and, instead of conflate all into a totality, we collapse all into nothingness so we can deal with a particular thing in-itself: say an egg. What attests for that egg without the mereology which produced it? What is a completely hollowed egg? A bubble? So what is, then, a completely hollowed bubble? Air? What about air? And so on and so forth until arriving at the smallest common denominator: not surprisingly, what about them?

The thing in-itself devoid of conditionals for its being is umbratic, the shadow
counterpart of the pneuma, the darkness fitting of the name due to the impossibility of true interaction with such unconditioned thing, for what makes it a thing is the pneuma.

Pneuma and umbra are polarities, for they act as maxima and minima to each other.

Indeed, this book is very Wittgensteinian, it has a lurking shadow of itself that makes itself self-evident by hiding, it all happens in a flash, the corridor(s) open to the dissolution of the monad established by the plurality and this same plurality congealing back into monad, from an impossible substance that is the only possible thing given its shadow.

This impossible air fills the caves of the Abyss invoked. This book is an awakening as well as the investigation of its architecture.

This, the impossible pair pneuma/umbra, is the problematic this book ventures to elaborate.

If the title name sounds familiar, it is because you probably heard it somewhere. It is inspired by Wittgenstein’s first masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. But whereas that one peered into the translucent bubble and saw an egg-like logic and vice-versa, this one contemplates not the recursion between the concepts, but the air itself, the obvious protagonist so trivially present that one is unconsciously tempted to ignore.

The air, pneuma, the Greek air as breath, the conceptual notion that residuated into soul, spirit, mind, much conflated with the immaterial and the too-beyond the reach of our lowly prehensions, thus its triviality.

This book challenges that. It challenges not the triviality, but our notion of triviality, for it is, indeed, there, but means so much more.
It, summarily, first posits this air as different depending of its emergence, that is, on when, where, how, why, etc. it appears or manifests.

Each bubble is an egg, too, each a world unique into itself until lost to the atmosphere, when the air returns to the sky – but this one is just another bubble, a bigger bubble also unique into itself until lost to the vacuum of space. The mereology peeks from the shadows in the corner.

The apparent problematic, the summation question of this book could be stated, against all metaphorical simplification, by the very paradoxical notion of a doubly-articulated counter-metaphor, as: **what is the thing that crawls from a bubble? And how can we see it?**

This seems trivial at first: what crawls from the bubble is air, and we cannot see it. But this is to miss the point, to become lost in the appearance.

**Phantasy**

This previous question, being as full of content as an egg, yet as fertile as a hollowed bubble, is thoroughly examined, and by examined what is meant is developed – into what? – into a thing, a creature of its own, a novel incarnation – a perspective that nevertheless always existed in some level as a phantom waiting to be conjured. The questions in this book are themselves bubbles, and as the inquisition follows through the pages, the bubbles pop back into the integrated sky that is merely background of the insides of an egg, a new cosmological abode birthing a monstrosity waiting to be befriended. That, of course, is a phantasy.

This book talks of the invisible, but not of that – the merely plural – which is invisible and inaccessible. Instead, it goes through the elusive shadows to talk, to peer into, the mystery of invisibility itself. It is, after all, just another way of modulating light,
one we need to train our eyes to see and also learn how to see without eyes – not either/or, but both/and.

But how?

How is there some air different than what we commonly understand by air inside a bubble? Is it in the egg, too?

Each individual piece and the composition, parts and wholes, is phantasy. Air, bubble, egg, and even world are all phantasies.

But if one skips ahead a bit, one may start wondering: how is the pneuma, this air, not a form of neutral monism, and how is this notion of accretion not the newer interpretation of “becoming”?

The answer to this double-question is four-fold, both yes and no for both questions – but this multiplicity of an answer fails due to the nature of the questions here, which asks for the differences, and thus necessitates a neutral statement itself different than the simple affirmation or negation of a thesis. The pneuma indeed neutralizes everything into itself, but it also is neutralized into everything, and thus congeals atomic/structural similarity as ontology, as what there is. The perception of this solidity, of the things as themselves and not as pneuma or pneuminous, is a phantasy. That is, the umbra and umbratic are phantasies. Phantasy binds reality together.

In doing this, it also accounts for its own infinitely generative power that manifests as shadow of itself, that is nevertheless always given (immediate) and existent. The world, or reality, is this given immediate existence, and phantasy is its bubble. Once it pops, the air escapes back into the sky, and even the sky can be popped – the matter is but one of power, difference in magnitude.

The pneuma wants to gobble the plurality of monisms, digest them and spill back
the given, what there already was. Consequently, Accretion-in-itself functions as the only functor in a world neutralized by the pneuma. The chicken or the egg, the bubble or the air.

**Incoherence**

Of course such a phantastical world is incoherent.

When we think even the air as stripped of its functionality, that is, making us – and similar organisms – breath, or stabilize the environment at large, or the affective routines of the air molecules themselves, we arrive at an aberrant concept. We arrive at an incoherent notion.

By aberrant we mean something that escapes nature or the naturalizing power of the ground in which it emerged. Something akin to a magickal word: A I R, something which escapes functional definition, the loose air springing from the heart of poetry itself: each bubble of air contains the seed for a soul, a god, a monstrosity.

An egg is a world, but it is generally programmed for an effect, it is a machine: the generating of a specific creature inside an incubator-enclosure generated by a similar creature – repetition. The world itself is food for this creature that growls by consuming this world. There is no space for air, air is outside the world. And yet, this world needs air.

What happens if we hollow the egg of its functionality? We get the pure concept, the lens to peer into the notion of genesis itself. And what happens if we hollow that very concept? We get an incoherent notion of the egg-in-itself devoid of functionality and of genesis, the umbratic egg. The hollow concept, the egg devoid of functionality, is a pneuminous phantasy. The incoherent egg is an umbratic
phantasy.

It can be seen, thus, that the world is an egg, but, in fact, the world is a pneuminous egg. It can also be seen than the egg is a world, but, in fact, the egg is an umbratic world.

An egg, as a bubble, as an egg-itself and bubble-itself, are objects of magick incarnated, that is, they possess infinite difference, and are in fact Sui generis – a magickal word that means itself and cannot be described by any other word.

Phantasies are sui generis. Incoherency is Sui generis. As with the exercise in totalizing and minimalizing to find the pneuma and the umbra, here the roles invert, for phantasy correlates more with the pneuminous even though it is particular, and incoherency correlates more with the umbratic even though it is universal.

**Pneuminosity**

However, this book is not merely interested in stating this line, in categorizing things in mereological fashion. This is not set theory; the egg and bubble are not metaphoric isomorphisms for empty sets.

Building on these seemingly primordial questions, on these poetic incarnations, it asks: what is the relation between the aberrant-possible and the natural line of generality? A big jump there, which is also only appearance, for there is no jump at all, but one needs to work their way through the unfolding story to get this, perhaps.

The aberrant and the natural: the healthy chicken and the eyeless one.

Which one is the pneuminous and which one is the umbratic? The answer is neither and either, for all answers to this are phantasies. The natural and aberrant are merely disguises, and so is the chicken.
Umbratic

What, in this case, does health even mean? In this way, through peering into the perspective of aberrants and mutants, trying to map a path to a middle meeting point, this work, summarily, poses another layer to the problem of air: instead of the difference dependent on emergence, this air becomes difference itself by being that which is the common matter purveying everything. Paradoxical, but that is the point.

A magickal realism is a double pluralism, that, instead of finding joy and sufficiency in accounting for the common and the general, struggles to account for the exception, the Sui generis, since, after all, that is a key to unlocking that which is in-between the exception and the general – if not primordial – state: one of pure capacity, the egg, the bubble, and that which is nameless beyond both.

Pneuminous Accretions

This is not a conflated attempt to promote magick as the primordial state or operation running below reality, as a type of Theory of Everything, neither does it posit a continuum teleological plane. But, instead, this tries to tackle the problem of this implicit conflation already there, not of magick, since this word, here, serves as a keyword for that which escapes the order of liable generality.

The writing hand, here, investigates local phenomena through metaphysical elaborations, and metaphysical elaborations through local phenomena, much like a naturalist’s close study of bird eggs or a physicist’s catalogue of diagrams for the study of bubble symmetries; but here the work is doubled, for it happens in-between and erases its own traces.

Pneuminous Accretions, the central notion of this work, are a cure to the many diseases of plurality that congeal into an absolute; they are the doom of concept-
formation by being themselves the only disease plaguing this art. This book uncovers paths to a world of monsters, of para-forms and non-alive infections that inoculate everything. We are such things ourselves. This is a book about diseases, not particular ones, but the notion of diseases (plural) itself. This, consequently, rethinks health, abolishing it for its plural form as just another disease in conceptual form.
Tractatus Pneumatologico Philosophicus
Preface.

1) In attempting to speak of magickal phenomena we must be careful. Why? Because such phenomena are notoriously difficult to speak about. The intelligibility of words seems to turn on their shared rules, yet for experiences of this nature what is shared is what is not shared commonly. The uncommonly shared experience is a rupture in the ordinary sequence of events, not just a rupture as something life changing like losing one’s job or discovering a terrible secret that pertains to oneself. No, this kind of experience is much easier to avoid – the natural avoidance of the human is sometimes termed ‘transcendental repression’.

2) It may occur in existence that we have an experience of the kind Jung called ‘synchronicity’ – an event that seems to pertain to our life on some kind of informational level that seems improbable in the extreme. We say ‘informational’ because this is where the connections necessarily lie. The manifestation of the event is constructed out of the rational parts of reality; they are just re-presented such that their informational content can be readily interpreted by the subject as being-for-them-and-them-alone. As such, it has the characteristic of a message (that something is meant to be, for example). The message is not necessarily understandable – indeed the message is not necessarily real. It is an interesting aside to remember that the possibility that the information assembled seems pertinent to the subject does not imply that it means something that they should act upon or engage with; the possibility remains that it is no more than an inane dream-jumbling that has broken through to what is commonly taken to be a ‘solid’ state of reality – or what is often called ‘reality’.
3) There are many kinds of paranormal experience. We hope to deal with many of these herein. This is not because we are interested in creating a catalogue but rather because a concrete demonstration must be given of these, which are made more abstractly elsewhere in the Tractatus. Some of these do not have the same characteristic of ‘synchronicity’, i.e. some of them do not involve the informational content of the world being reassembled into a meaningful array (for a subject); rather they might entail the outright rupture of ‘reality’, or the experience of some part of reality not thought to actually ever occur – the ontic-mythical. Such would be the case in the experience of a phantom. In this case the informational content is the phantom; despite what other meanings its manifestation might have, its being present at all is a rupture that we were – probably – not expecting. We hope to show in the course of the descriptions within the Tractatus that these phenomena can be related to each other through other phenomena that may be uncovered in this exercise.

4) To return to (1), we must indeed be careful in attempting to speak of magickal phenomena but we must not be dissuaded from doing so. This does not mean we can write anything at all; our being careful will consist in our attempting to bracket the phenomena to their manifestation and to question appropriately about them.

5) Such phenomena are bracketed to their appearance, though this bracketing does not seek to reduce them to an appearance to be disproved – like an illusion; rather it attempts to demonstrate how the appearance is so powerful that it shows there is an epistemological tension forever lurking in this realm as the certainty of the illusory status of such phenomena is not within our grasp. As such, it shows the appearance as it appears and not as it is covered over. It will be understood from this that the work is at least partially phenomenological in character.
6) The disclosure of the matter is brought to light by the application of a sceptical point of view. That is, given that I ordinarily experience the world as consistent in a certain way, if something happens that seems to transgress this (synchronicity is the paradigm example, though other phenomena would do the same) I am thrown into an implicit doubt about this putative solidity of the world. So unless I can say with certainty that I really know something like ‘there are billions of people on the planet experiencing endless events all the time, so statistically some kind of phenomena that appear unusual are bound to happen’, then the synchronicity will make some kind of dent in the appearance of consistency. This dent will have no particularly coherent character, yet nevertheless will present itself as an aporetic void.

7) What would certainty mean in this instance (apropos (6))? We want this statistical world (which reinforces the everyday solidity) to give us the guarantee that what seemed like an oddity was in fact as reasonable a phenomenon as anything (though curiously the more magickal interpretation of reality also wants to say this insofar as an acceptance of concepts herein would make this understanding of the world commonplace for a different reason). But how can we reach behind the scenes to know the world operates in a continuity of perfect solidity? Are all the organisms, rocks, washing machines happening in one spatio-temporal framework such that the statistical appropriation is applicable? I have only this interpreted monadic sphere, which certainly has a presupposition of stretching beyond its sensual limit yet no apodicticity with regards to the status of this beyond.

8) Such phenomena (synchronicities and others) are often easily forgotten as the
manifestation of consistency flows relentlessly through us – the transcendental repression mentioned in (1); thus, without an instance of considerable force, we will be wont to give in to the lethic tendency to obscure the phenomena.

9) Whether or not this manifestation of consistency is in itself transcendental is a further matter for debate; it can be taken to be a correlate of a certain way of looking at the world that has covered over the monadic sphere of immanence (as being any kind of phenomena at all worthy of note) and instead has chosen to accept the mutual intelligibility of the ideas within it as sufficient proof that the sphere itself is not of any epistemological value. The lethic tendency too may not be spoken of as transcendental, but as possibly only a correlate of this attitude that bypasses the sphere of immanence as a phenomenon.

10) The sphere of immanence is in a sense the true synthetic a priori, for it is that which may be discovered without experience of a particular being yet is an advance in our knowing of an utterly irrefutable character. We might say that it has no value but we cannot deny the immanence of the monadic sphere.

11) Philosophies like Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s can be read to say that the quest for certainty is an epistemological dead end. In one instance, the quest for certainty has covered over the question of Being with its theoretical abstract nature, and in another, the language game of certainty has been abused – we can only speak of doubt where we can first speak of knowing. This (our) philosophy denies neither point. By allowing Being to include within it the manifestation of the ‘supernatural’ it allows the being of such phenomena to be manifested as part of
the horizon of Being and not as something covered over – this is why the sphere of immanence must reappear, for it now presents itself as a practical issue with regards to the presentation of these phenomena. In Wittgenstein we may say that in making the sphere of immanence manifest we allow the language game of it to be heard and spoken. This speaking allows the possibility of letting lie before us the phenomena.

12) There is, of course, something Cartesian to this kind of certainty, but unlike Descartes we do not seek to return the world to ourselves as knowable, rather we allow its manifestation to be manifested when we admit that this lack of certainty is a feature of a certain strict phenomenological approach to existence.

13) We have– as stated – no argument with such notions that the structures of being-embedded-in-a-reality are already within us and flow through us; however, the monadic existence creates the manifestation of non-solidity through the possibility of its imperfect access to a putative reality outside of its direct awareness (of course, there is room for imperfection even with a putative direct awareness, though what the direct awareness does supply is immediate intentional access to informational phenomena that are themselves not composite but whole as informational wholes and as such constituted apodictically). The manifestation of the aberrational effect is that it is not being perceived within the solidity of ownness – except in certain forms of experience, e.g. phantoms. Here though we dwell upon synchronicity. One implication here is that not only are the structures of a solid reality already within us in a grammatical sense but also the weirdness of reality is already also built into the same structure – or at least has been covered over, or maybe has yet to be unveiled in its greatest possibility.
14) There are, then, [at least] two ways of perceiving synchronistic phenomena. I can allow the overflowing of the world and reinforcing statistical/scientific discourse to persuade me that nothing supernatural has occurred or I can find myself in a state in which it seems very strongly that something very peculiar has occurred, though I have no coherent picture to tell me what it might be—in its being. This ‘incoherence’ that emerges has the possibility of the negation of solidity as one of its features, though no further attempt other than the speculative can dwell here and the speculations will be incoherent. Neither of these I believe can be seen to outmanoeuvre the other. The monadic nature of existence when faced with the uncanny anomaly will perpetually create the possibility of doubt no matter how rational the counter picture. The incoherence of the alternative is not phenomenologically perceived as unconvincing but rather emerging from the possibility of its truth (given the impossibility of our ability to silence it). This is sometimes referred to as the ‘transcendental pivot’

15) Section (14) above states that there are at least two ways of perceiving synchronistic phenomena. We would be foolish to imagine that there are no more accounts possible. The characteristic of (all) the accounts is that they are incoherent and speculative. The reactive fluidity of the world is one explanation of indetermination. Its opposite is the organic unfolding of the world as an intelligent unity in which the synchronistic phenomenon can be accounted for as something closer to a pre-existing harmony— the world did not react with this curious informational laden event, it was in fact presciently self-guided to this event. This is the determinate opposite of the reactive phantasy.

1 What later became the ‘agnostic disjunction’
16) The incoherence of the alternatives to the background solid reality does not imply that the phenomenon of ‘reality’ is coherent. Rather it is a characteristic of all concepts that they are ‘incoherent’. Incoherence is taken to mean ‘impossible to isolate discreetely’, as concepts are reliant, not just on opposites, but on other concepts for their meaning and are impossible to define owing to the possibility that a phenomenon may come along that belongs to the concept yet has as yet no manifestation. As such a thing in its manifestation is said to be incoherently coherent, we somehow perceive that we do see it as a coherent whole, though we make no account of this, it just is. That something just is, is of course not coherent. Analysis is the mode that attempts to tell us something else about what is. Analysis of an incoherent coherence renders it coherently incoherent as now we have gained knowledge of its parts, which themselves are presented as incoherent coherencies. We can know that its wholeness is not incoherent. A coherent coherence is an impossibility insofar as analysis belongs to the essence of language. A coherent coherence (a Goethean entelechy) is not subject to analysis and as such not subject to language.

17) What is phantasy? Phantasies manifest themselves where we do not know what is the case, even in the sense of an incoherent coherence; rather we have an openly coherent incoherence, but one that will not submit to further analysis – when the human monadic condition presents a blank epistemological wall – but rather submits only to speculation. Thus for our paradigm synchronistic event, there is an ‘explanation’ (the statistical world view), but because of the curious nature of that problem, a truly convincing access to that explanation eludes us; the alternative,

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2 Phantasy transmutes into ‘manifestation’ later on in CEO work.
however, does not spring so much directly from doubt but rather from a direct phantasy of the incoherent mutable reality. ‘Phantasy’ in this sense is not a negative term, indeed it can easily be seen that in a certain way, given that it is possible to interpret the world magickally (we have done so before and what can be called synchronicities in some circles now would in previous times have raised a less epistemologically worrying eyebrow), the scientific/statistical view is in fact also a phantasy, one that is currently transmuted into what we call ‘reality’. ‘Reality’ is, of course, a pneuminous accretion\(^3\) like everything else, but one that has a tacit sense of acceptance, the world of science merges with and emerges from and gives rise to ‘reality’ as it is particularly coherently suited to modes of thinking that we readily possess – acceptance of what can be putatively seen. Of course, this opens the doors for more phantasy as the belief of an empirically real world outside of our perception also has a phantastic nature to it. Furthermore, phantasies, it should be noted, can be observed in many philosophical directions. The mapping of these is a further project for the *Tractatus*. Phantasies also occur with any uncertain situation that has no possibility of a resolution. The events of the world at all sorts of levels also have this characteristic – though not all with the same incoherent mutable reality appearance implication. The media events portrayed to us are regularly doubted now and in their stead we create phantasies. These phantasies have this character of stronger than ‘we don’t know it isn’t the case’; they are suggested as competing possibilities still under a rational remit (a surprising feature in many ways as the same rationality is still no doubt at work in the occult explanation; it is similar to Kant and the sublime where reason is said to bring the sublime under control, except here it cannot do so [with the occult event]; it does not, however, retreat, rather it produces incoherent explanations that can receive no definite answer).

\(^3\) This first mention of the term pneuminous accretion gives little explanation. More clarity appears in later sections but for now understand that pneuma is a kind of substance of information that renders magick possible by its ability to actually affect ‘solid reality’.
18) Various theoretical structures are unveiled in the process of this work. What, we must ask, is the nature of these structures? The level of necessity of these phenomena is what is at issue here; if their necessity is lacking, then we have little more than a speculative theory on our hands. So now it is a case of feeling the kinds of issues within this realm. The previously mentioned pneuminous accretions are one answer to flesh this out that have a kind of magickal, existential necessity to them. All concepts are pneuminous accretions; they are accretions of the informational aether or pneuma.

19) But why do we need pneuminous accretions? They are the answer to the question that Wittgenstein solves with the simple epithet ‘meaning is use’. This is a panacea for philosophy, or it would be if one did not have the possibility of magick. If we have [the manifestation of] magick (which we do as we cannot extirpate it owing to the unstoppable production of phantasies), then there must be some way in which the words are not simply used in the world but rather they attach, literally, and hence there is an actual effect – or at least the manifestation of the attachment. So rigid designation can take on a magickal sense; the word reaches out through intention, it is part of the accretion – Kripke’s theory is, of course, a phantasy.

20) The pneuma as an informational substantial correlate must be postulated as existent. This is because of the manifestation of the possibility of magickal phenomena – which are irrefutable. Note, we do not need to say magick is real, it is sufficient only that it has a manifestation that cannot be rationally extirpated. The connections between phenomena – if we are to believe that a synchronicity might
be some kind response of an apparently external existence to the monad – are made by this substance. The informational pneuma has long been posited in earlier ontologies – even in a form in Bergson’s virtual. I now generally do identify it with the a-temporal/a-spatial informational spirit. This element, or something that plays its role, will always look necessary in this kind of world view. Of course, it too is also a phantasy.

21) The earnest attempt to dwell on this opens ‘the corridor’. The corridor was there all along. The corridor has been walked down many times before. It has been inhabited, indeed is inhabited, though many of the inhabitants of the corridor do not understand its nature and dwell in a naivete that the corridor is more real than the hall. The corridor is a metaphor for the place one finds oneself by recognizing this kind of implicit aporia and then reflecting upon it in such a way that it transforms from the negative motion of scepticism into positive creative phantasies – like pneuminous accretions. It has this name purely on the basis of having gone down a somewhere that leads somewhere else, i.e. we were in one place, a place of doubt, we moved somewhere and by this movement things disclosed themselves further down – the corridor.

22) The informational pneuma is accreted in the pneuminous accretions of the monad. Pneuminous accretions are reverse-engineered in a sense. Spirits – visualised entities – are accumulations of the informational aether or real in themselves (another epistemological black hole down the corridor – a bifurcating phantasy). Either way they are purely informationally-pneuminously formed from our perspective. Our own psychological selves are just accretions in this way of this same ‘spirit’, intentionally held together by other monads. If in this realm spirits
exist, they must be made of this pneuma, but the pneuma must hold together. The
holding together of the pneuma as information is thus the same all the way down;
the informational pneuma is what the plant perception, clock perception etc.
comprises – spirit and cup (as cup is interpreted as cup) and myself are all
pneuminous accretions. And of course, pneuminous accretions too are a phantasy.

23) Thus the philosophy involved cannot stay within the realm of magick. It has of
necessity rippling implications for a general ontology and epistemology. A key
principle in this expansion is incoherence. Phenomena are incoherent by their nature
– every concept is incoherent to a greater or lesser degree, the incoherence just
gets hidden better when concepts become orthodox and have usefulness.
Incoherence has a reversing principle to it. Phenomena as they present themselves
are incoherently coherent – their everyday manifestation as intentionally discrete
and embedded in the world at the same time. Phenomena upon analysis are
coherently incoherent – we can see clearly that they rely on other connections and
smaller components for their being.

24) Thus far the matter is explicated at this current time. The monadic restrictions
upon knowledge may not be transgressed and as such give the manifestation of
various phenomena to the monad. These are necessary precisely because they may
not be removed. This simple dialogue sums much of the whole business up: “but how
can you be sure it is not like the stick in the glass that has bent it by the trick of the
light?” “it is indeed as you say, but this stick I can never take out of the glass to
check!!”
The Doctrine of Pneuminous Accretions

1) Beware! Things are not as they seem; your discrete and solid world is permeated by something else. ‘What is this else?!’ I hear you cry. This else is the impossible double of all things that makes them things at all. ‘What nonsense!’ you retort. ‘There can be no double to what is!’ And yet there is; the impossible pneuma makes all things what they are.

2) What is this pneuma of which you speak and how is it the double of that which is? The truth, if we dare to use this word here, is that it is not the double of things, it is the thing itself! But it is double insofar as the shadowy and mysterious also has a kind of being to which the pneuma attaches. This shadowy behind is necessarily there yet only the pneuma shows itself.

3) This is a most amusing mystery for it was thought that the pneuma was the mysterious when in fact the pneuma is the only part we can ever come into contact with and yet it is no less mysterious.

4) The human is a pneuminous accretor. A being, that is which processes the pneuma and reforms it in infinite ways. These are the accretions.

5) The pneuminous is not solid but infinitely thin. It weaves its fine web around us. It cocoons the shadow world in glorious being and allows it to be.

6) The shadow world is severe, inhospitable, in-human, without the pneuma we cannot even say we would go mad and die for even madness is pneumiously processed—it cannot be otherwise, humans accrete the pneuma in a certain way—though some pneuminous forms are imposing themselves upon us.

7) The pneuma cradles us. It showers us in things. It gives us ourselves. We are accretions of pneuma.

8) Things in their simple manifestation may attract more pneuma; thus the pneuma accretes, it sticks together and forms great chimeras and monsters. These ethereal beasts may float freely or they may reach out towards us and attach. Beware!
9) You cannot see their threads directly but you may feel them. See that beloved thing of yours. That beloved thing is a pneuminous accretion! It may not be pernicious (yet), it may be just a relatively fine thread to your self-accretion, floating along behind you, attached by its pneuminous thread. When these threads grow thick and then are severed we may mourn deeply.

10) A favoured thing was lost. The sense of loss weakened the accretions attachment. The absence of the shadowy part to which the pneuma had become attached brought sorrow. The pneuma began to fade. We might let that accretion go or it might cling to us as accretion only, indeed the memory is a trace of pneuma we cannot easily remove forever, we might not wish to. Yet stronger accretions linger without their shadow and cause us ill.

11) Know this too! That shadowy world and the world of the pneuminous, they are not separate! The shadow world appear impervious to the pneuma, like it is but a vessel for it. This is not true, for in some instances the pneuma is so fierce and powerful that it can move this shadowy world in its likeness.

12) The human accretion is fearful and oft intrigued by this; it would wish it were not the case. ‘Give me my pneuma but let it be just the harmless showing of the shadow-world.’ Yet the pneuma will not lie down and be impotent image; in the right time and mode its claws stick firm to the world of shadows and rend it out of shape.

13) There is no escape from the pneuma for the human, for the human awareness is formed by the pneuma, even the talk of the world of shadows is the pneuma in action.

14) The pneuma does not strive, but the accretions do! The self is an accretion of pneuma formed by many forces. Many forces in turn emit from the accretion.

15) It is said that the human is made up of the shadow world, it cannot not be. From the shadow world emits something we call natural law. There are many beings like this, rocks, trees, lakes, seas, each one is restrained by shadow law but not accreted by name.

16) The restraint of the shadows suggests the names and uses of all things.
17) That which announces what it is, announces only this. All further announcements of things are never an absolute but one further announcement. Thus sand may become many types of grains. Grass becomes many types of grasses.

18) The being of awareness that we are is a rupture in the dominance of the shadow. For in this being the pneuma is rent in all manner of ways unspeakable.

19) What is the being? Is the being the pneuma also? There is a reciprocation between the seed from the shadow world and the pneuma. This seed contains within it will and desire. We are already within the loop. The seeds only awareness is within the fold of the pneuma. It is immediately taught how the pneuma forms and thus joins itself to the accretions.

20) The human may be attached to an accretion and yet not possess it with its restraining shadow. It may desire an accretion and not possess it equally so.

21) Fine and thick lines of pneuma are woven between all accretions.

22) Let us be clear. The accretion is in two places in a sense. In the intangible realm of the pneuma and visibly attached to the shadow world. Everything you can see, you understand under some idea, this idea is the pneuma. When you imagine an object, you see pure pneuma. Imagination is an act of summoning pneuma to form.

23) Does the pneuma hold the shadow world still or does the shadow world hold the pneuma still? Sure it is the shadow that holds. Then how is the bending of the shadow possible? Which is first we cannot truly know.

24) We are pneuminous beings. By the time we can reflect upon this matter it is too late to reflect upon the formation of the pneuminous self. We can say we are something which has awareness of the pneuma and as such sees other pneuminous selves. How can the self be pneuminous? How can that which is told be told?

25) When I see something we call solid, that I see something is due to the pneuma already attached to the shadow—we cannot perceive the shadow part directly, only through the pneuma. When I see it as something else, more pneuma attaches to the thing.
displacing the other pneuminous perception in time for me but as accretion both seeings are kept.

26) The being such as we are obviously processes the pneuma. We live in its light. It takes in the pneuma, processes it; the lines of what we called perception are also made up of it.

27) Of course when we perceives others, they are perceived as pneuminous forms. When I dislike someone, even if I do so for wrong reasons, I attach to their pneuminous self the concepts for my dislike of them. They may dispel this pneuminous attachment or they may feel it as injurious.

28) What are these concepts of which I speak? They are pneuminous accretions! Nebulous and yet charged with the powers that emit from the assimilator: hatred, desire, longing, ignorance.

29) The pneuminous world is beyond complex with threads extending in all ways, sensible to our spatiality and temporality and also outside of both. To note this terrifying complexity is not a reason to deny it. We may be restricted on how much we can actually say of it, yet we may approach and acknowledge its being without hubris.

30) Maybe there was a kind of time before ourselves in which pneuma and shadow existed in harmony. Possibly there was no pneuma until God brought it about. Possibly there was no shadow until pneuma became so solid it was no longer visible.

31) Is pneuma a substance? Yes it is that insofar as it is not a power of pure image. What kind of substance is this? Substance as an idea is too an accretion formed of pneuma. It is the idea of the substantial.

32) The attachment of the accretions is formed basically of our like and dislike. Both of these attitudes towards a thing will attach to it. Accretions of pneuma accrete further by the various attachments we make to them.

33) My grandmother’s cup that I now have, has her accretion attached to it. Though she may be dead, the cup may be a thing of dread that I dare not dispense with or a thing of joy, or possibly an item of indifferent emotional attachment; all of these
feelings are the lines of attachment. This does not say that grandmother’s accretion is attached just for me, just in my mind as it were; it says that there are lines that still attach to grandmother’s accretion. Her accretion does not lie nested within me but is external and floats freely in her death.

34) What would ‘just in my mind’ mean here at all? There is no ‘just in my mind’ for all the contents of thought that were perceived to have the sense within me, were in fact not so and lay within the pneuminous realm.

35) The doctrine implies that if you draw the image of a face on a piece of paper and give it a name and talk to it that face will accrete as face that knows. The more you speak to it as like yourself the more so it will be.

36) The pneuminous power to interpret anything as aware is part of the idea we attach to them. Does this awareness ability exist in its own right, in the shadow so to speak? Yes humans possesses awareness outside of pneuminous interpretation as part of their restraint.

37) This origin can only be actually assumed. But once assumed, and once the human knows the idea of awareness then it exists as an accretion and can then be applied as a way of seeing. So there are two kinds of accretive mode: affective and informative.

38) That the things of humans and the things of nature show themselves in different accretive way is clear. The lake gives itself as a lake. With the things of human craft it shows itself as different. This difference is part of a vast pneuminous shelf of unclarity.

39) Awe can be felt in the connecting lines (as the connecting lines) to the numinous. The grand interpretations of the world and its great powers ‘God’ ‘Spirit’ are too accretions, these accretions are vast and powerful. The desire is always to create the accretion that connects to the shadow world, to be at one with it. Though sometimes it creates the accretion which seems to be separate from the pneuma conflated with the shadow world. Like a transcendent God.
Conceive of the madness of this accretion! Tremble at its insane power! Its horrifying cosmic self belief in its own reality though it is but pneuma. Such beings must be torn down for the revelation of the pneuma as it is.

In this way, by this action we come to see the horrifying possibilities of what the pneuma may become. For it is all that is (being is the realm of the pneuma). Everything you wished for and did not wish for exists in some form pneuminously.

Any grouping of people that names itself has a pneuminous accretion which is its being. When things are said to be greater than their pieces, it is the whole pneuminous form that is talked about. If you become part of a group then lines of power from that group become attached to you.

The imagination is a vital tool here for we must use it to understand the threads of the pneuma, which are invisible. Think of something and you may see the accretion before you eyes. For this moment you are attached to that accretion through a connecting line, it cannot be otherwise.

Do you deny the pneuma? Then what are you seeing such that you see things as anything? Do you suppose you see the things that are there?! What madness.

This is a symbol of death, the priestess said. And so it was for Death is an accretion too!

The pneuma appears as apart from the human. The pneuma manifests the possibility of its outsideness.

The pneuminous accretion of the pneuma itself…

The Impossibility of the Extirpation of Synchronicity qua Synchronicity from Experience

1) We are commonly given a solid sense of reality by which we may reliably maneuver in the world.

2) Sometimes things can happen that present a difficulty for this sense of reality, e.g. I am focused on various synchronistic phenomena owing to having reread the Cosmic Trigger — for those who do not know this work, key elements are Sirius, its
reference as a dog star and the number 23. I then, with others, decide on the philosophy forum reading from next weeks; this is to be Chapter 10 of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus. It turns out – to my surprise – that not only is this on page 232 but it also features a plate of a dog person. I duly register this as a synchronistic phenomenon. A secondary phenomenon occurs one day later in a John Holt education book in which only a few pages in I encounter an experiment featuring 23 people and the word SPECTRA on the same page (the name of the being Geller was in touch with apparently). Maybe not quite with the same force, but this still triggers my attention in the same way.

3) If I accept that the world is a 3D spatio-temporal framework of a certain materialist cast, I can write this experience off as coincidence and reality selection.

4) But in order to make a judgement of certainty at this level I need a stronger epistemic relation than is ordinarily required. Following Wittgenstein, we can only make sense of ‘doubt’ where we can ‘know’. Ordinarily I do not doubt the world in its solidity, the grammar of the word does not arise from here. However, faced with this instance (the synchronistic event), in order to know in the strong sense that the perceived synchronous event was not ‘real’ I would have to know how reality is ‘really’ working. Hence a second kind of knowledge is required, one more akin to Cartesian certainty. It is more akin to this because the Cartesian criteria ask us to reflect upon our individual perception of the world and not to allow ourselves the presuppositions of a really existing world that will continue to behave in the way it previously did, the relevant point being that the solid regularity of it is actually in question here. Yet I have to be certain that there is no room in ‘reality’ (which here is used to mean existence as it actually is) for some kind of rearrangement of the world in order to know that the rearrangement option has no validity to it. As such, my cognitive relation with the world must be able to easily refute any arguments against the synchronistic version. I find, however, that with the requisite level of certainty I am unable to discount notions such as ‘how can you be sure that reality
did not simply rearrange itself? or that speculative notions like the ‘multiverse’ or ‘reality tunnels’ are not reasonable descriptions of the phenomenon. I can, in fact, only appeal to the solidity of the world as I originally found it and the science commensurate to that solid approach in order to refute this claim. But this attitude does not help in this instance for such approaches are predicated only on the solidity of reality. All the knowledge has been generated from subjects reporting only on this aspect. Thus there can be no refutation by appeal to this knowledge, it is just the dry reiteration that things are not really like that and an appeal to reality selection and coincidence.

5) Any other possible explanations for the anomalous event means i) either the solid reality view isn’t random (i.e. there was a connection between the phenomenon and the subject but rather at the level of predetermination) or ii) that there is something amiss with the solid view of reality and that the putative solidity, despite being reliable, is in fact subject to a kind of rearrangement not coherent to our ordinary way of looking at the world. This incoherent possibility is not one possibility but rather an open plurality of possibilities (speculations).

6) In short, because of the nature of the conundrum the synchronicity presents, I do not have access to any ordinary relation with the world to tell myself of its non-reality.

7) Hence I must just choose to believe the solid over the non-solid or determinate picture. Thus both responses are rational (or irrational) because neither are grounded in any greater certainty. The consistent solidity of the world is not an argument to tell me that sometimes it does not behave in that manner, and indeed in the synchronistic instance I have before me there is good evidence to the contrary.

8) Equally I would be foolish if I did not listen to the coincidence picture, but in listening to it I must be careful not to buy into it just because it is the explanation I am given. Statistically it might make sense but this is not a guarantee of its truth.

9) The resultant, essentially transcendental agnosticism between the informational
event (the synchronicity) having an actual (incoherent) relation to the subject and its having no relation to the subject is the key result insofar as it shows the coincidence world view to not have the necessity it would like.

10) This we believe to be the rational establishment that there is no possibility of extirpating the interpretation of a synchronistic phenomenon as synchronistic (meaningful) as opposed to coincidence. Likewise it would be impossible to remove the non-belief in the phenomena (their reduction to non-meaningful events).

11) We must highlight the possibility that even the synchronistic event as meaningful is slightly misleading, for the possibility also exists that there is an actual relation between subject and event and yet still the event is not meaningful (where meaningful means the event gives guidance in some way to the subject). This thesis is part of the thesis that says that the reality of the non-solid model does not mean things are not in a sense random. It only means that a putative external informationally constructed world is in fact intimately tied to the subject.

12) The rational establishment of the inability to discern any of these possibilities over another is important as it means all consciousness, no matter how dogmatic about one version or another, is ultimately ungrounded. As such, the possibility selected must be one taken, to an extent, on belief.

13) We call the belief projection into the ungrounded ‘phantasy’. Here it does not have a negative character but rather is just the nature of the application of belief to a model put forward (either hegemonically/subconsciously or actively/consciously).

14) ‘Reality’ as such has two senses: i) a term to attempt to refer to how things actually are (even if this is the fantasy (a different term) of knowing the unknowable) and ii) the phantasy commonly accepted in a culture as (i).
On the Genesis of the Accretive Theory

The pneuminous accretive theory as found in ‘The Doctrine of Pneuminous Accretions’ is the inspiration for the notion. Complementary to this is the observation of states in which one desires something to happen that appears to be likely. What happens then is that there is a disturbance from some unknown factor? The irritated reaction to failing to overcome the disturbance forms a kind of knot in the magicko-existential framework, such that the attempt to overcome the problem falls also badly awry – now due to the knot. This may easily set up the idea in the intentional monad that further effort is required. This, however only fuels the accreting knot further, which now thwarts attempts to achieve the original goal in any manner of strange ways that existence can muster. Such a happening is the ‘pneuminous accretion’ that works in tandem with the ideas found in DOPA. People frequently experience such things in life; philosophies of the nature of Wu Wei recognise their existence and duly caution against acting to fuel them further. Pneuminous accretions occur naturally all the time and are not all pernicious like the above described. All things are accretions yet many objects accrete very little -everyday things that pass through our hands and mouths. There are accretions that correlate to the meaning of universals, and some of these kinds of accretions give rise to philosophies like Platonism. We are epistemologically limited to their contingency upon ourselves, yet their appearance as (in some cases) may be considered harmful to the accretion that should be in charge –the self-accretion.

Pneuminous Accretions 1.01

The doctrine of pneuminous accretions says that phenomena of a mental kind acquire increasing size for various reasons. What does this mean? It regards the process of reification. Reification is a natural process by which the disclosure of the reality of things takes place; but the reality of things is one more intentional structure and not an absolute ground, rather just the disclosure itself. The inescapable intentional structure of all conscious processes discloses things as
pneuminous. Pneuminous accretion refers to nothing more than this thing structure, however it says in essence anything we ascribe any kind of discretion to – as such a thing is tautologically pneuminous. Pneuminous accretions acquire different powers within other pneuminous accretions. Selves are pneuminous accretions but in essence no different from other pneuminous accretions. Self-interpretation partially determines the accretion of the self, e.g. I am…a…b…c. The pneuminous accretions await the newly forming (pneuminous) accretion and there is a reciprocal latching onto each other in temporality. Something similar to a field of awareness is of course itself an accretion yet also an axiom for this to be the case. Such a notion also relies upon a kind of concept of a pneuminous energy rather akin to that found in psychoanalysis. To reiterate every concept (including the concept pneuminous accretion) is a pneuminous accretion, which holds together better or worse. Is this idealism? It would seem to buy into it. In this sense beyond idealism is phantasy.

**Pneuminous Accretions 1.02⁴**

Aetheric matter (pneuma) constitutes the condition of possibility for para-psychological phenomena. Some form of aether can be used as an explanation for various ethereal beings. The definition of an aether, of course, is difficult. It is invariably some kind of fine matter that, by today’s standards, is difficult/impossible to detect associated with forces of differing kinds, though often primarily life. Thus a ghost may be said to be made up of such matter because it is a deceased material being, which now carries on in some immaterial form, thus there must be some immaterial substance that can manifest itself in regular existence.

The ghost is not in itself a phantasy. The manifestation of such an entity promotes

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⁴ This somewhat confusing section is part of the genesis of the theory of pneuminous accretions. It appears as something of a backwards step though it is important insofar as it suggests that the accretive theory is phenomenological as it is the transcendental condition for various occult phenomena. Though it appears confusing, ultimately aether is just another form of the pneuma concept that has not yet clarified itself.
the phantasy of an aether. But let us remember, a phantasy is not a negative concept, but it is one that resists proof or disproof. Aetheric forces are suggested in multiple phenomena, feelings of energy (in chi gung, for example) ghosts, dowsing. It is not the reality of aether that is at stake but rather the manifestation of such a possibility in the face of certain phenomena. Such a manifestation is inevitable in the face of no coherent alternative to the monadic consciousness. Furthermore, a strategy that tells the consciousness that the phenomenon it experienced was not 'real' will not be truly acknowledged and the phantasy will re-emerge (indeed the theory of 'no phenomenon having occurred' is itself a phantasy). Pneuminous accretions are a quasi-necessary correlate of an aetheric ontology, i.e. if there is a fine matter then there is an inevitable association of it with mind. The impossible levity of mental phenomena lends to this association, as does the notion of ghosts and souls. Therefore the mind stuff/aether (though the mind stuff may be only a form of aether, yet to go there is to reach beyond the phenomenological and into the speculative) must be able to accrete into forms for the generation of such phenomena or we would not have acknowledged them as such – hence the pneuminous accretions are themselves part of the manifestation of such phenomena. What constitutes the accretions? We might say the monadic consciousness constitutes the accretions. This is a phantasy. The accretion of the monad constitutes the other accretions. I constitute you and this cup and this plant by my intentional structures, which hold these phenomena to be a certain discrete suchness, just as you constitute me ('I', 'me' and 'you', of course, are misleading terms that lead us to believe some kind of object is designated by this practice when there is no[one]).

Pneuminous Accretions 1.03
The philosophically investigated correlate of the pneuminous accretion is the notion of the word as object. Reality is assembled by pneuminous accretions, which are themselves contingent structures to the ineffable. The axiom of groundlessness tells
that our analysis does not reach an end, but rather extends endlessly into the informational aether. Here though is a curious consequence that may explain one of the issues in philosophy. The manifestation of word and the relation to its object obsessed philosophy for a long time. Understanding designation became a key issue. The notion of embedded meaning largely removes this problem as there is no object to point to, just an activity in which a certain kind of language is embedded. We had misunderstood the problem (Wittgenstein, Heidegger). However, the nagging intuition remained that surely when I say “this person” in this context, I do mean this and only this person. The result of such an intuition is, of course, a phantasy. For the connection can only exist through a metaphysical speculation, philosophically or magickally. If I have an object that had a previous usage – for which it was designed – yet I never knew this and now use it for something else, it is in that sense only my usage, it is not really something else; this is a metaphysic of original privilege. If I believe a person is embedded in their name and I can divine secrets about them using it (in this instance this person has this name), this is a magickal metaphysical attachment. If I intend a person by their name, there exists such an accretion; this is what has come into being. Over time (from the perspective of temporality), the instance of naming is seamless to the accretion, it is part of what makes it. This, of course, is a rationally groundless metaphysical phantasy, yet it is transcendently possible on the basis of the manifestation of reality as epistemologically limited – I cannot know it is not true and furthermore, as there exist phenomena that have a magickal character, I must look to something like the pneuminous accretions as a condition for their possibility, rather than simply disregarding them (as I cannot know either that disregarding them for a competing ontology would give me epistemological solace). The phantasy of the origin and of the magickal attachment occurs due to the various accretions and their ability to form thus. There exists an accretion of that person and that name is an aspect of it, inseparable from it; informationally, thus, the connection is necessary. A thing, we
might believe on some level, retains its previous usage; its informational imprint of its previous use is still somehow with it. The idea that this is possible is a phantasy that we can deny, yet it has a peculiar power belonging to the accretive idea of a thing as having a history. This stone is the stone that was on my desk and I studied for a long time. This is true of this stone and no other. A mistaken belief about another stone that was similar would not be true of it. Has anything happened to the stone in this process? A phantastical thing has happened to it by its being bathed in my awareness and intent. If I had some mystical import, this stone might then become an artefact as the stone that belonged to me, the stone that absorbed my consciousness, that was cradled in my awareness. Here one can feel the sense of what one means by this kind of phantasy. Yet it is not without rationality, for if we have indeed retained the correct thing, then the things that happened to the stone did not happen, indeed they did. The ineffable nature of consciousness generates the possibility that this kind of informational imprint might indeed have taken place and if there were such a thing as a person of real ‘mystical import’ (whatever that might mean) then the possibility exists that their awareness might have left some kind of trace on the thing that they owned; as such, this object is then deemed worth retaining. What if we have the wrong stone though? If we know no differently then we will still have an accretion ruled by a phantasy tied to the accretion of this other being. Indeed, if there were power in things, then such an accretion might still have a power as it is credited with the same force. The informational structure would be in operation. The true stone might lie then on a beach and we have no science to disclose its history and expose the fake stone, it has withdrawn from being and lies in the void.

Can we be satisfied here? No. For now a familiar line begins to emerge – one we must tread with the upmost of care. We cannot ignore the stone in the void, but neither can we say much about it earlier. We must rather take the accretive trace to see what this suggests. The intuition is that, since the informational imprint is
necessary, there exists the possibility that its accretion will be ontologically effective (magickally interactive) with other accretions that come across it – i.e. are drawn to it/it discloses itself to. So now we have a simple taxonomy of magickal things.

i) Those impressed by the origin they are taken to have and actually have.
ii) Those with a history that is unknown yet still potent to a new interaction.
iii) Those that are newly created through a historically incorrect belief now irrelevant as they are believed to be the first instance, indeed (i) and iiii) are indistinguishable from each other.

There will be more, there will be many more, and it is folly and madness to name them in this way. Yet the phantasy of taxonomy is not to be denied.

**Pneuminous Accretions 1.04**

Elsewhere we have spoken of the phantastical taxonomy of accretions. Here we must dwell further on this matter – insane as it might seem. A relation occurs here with Heidegger’s claim that physis is the highest form of poesis. Everything (concept or physical object) is some kind of accretion – it’s formed of the pneuma (or informational aether as it is known elsewhere). When there are lots of stones in front of me they are part of the accretion ‘stones’, which in turn may have links to other accretions, through personal or knowledge-based links. The stones show themselves as stones and allow that accretion to hold; phantastical happenings notwithstanding, this is their being as formed of pneuma. If I pick up a stone and it becomes ‘that stone of that fateful day’ its accretive now forms as a particular and it links temporally and emotionally to that time. Nothing can take this from the stone now. In phantasy we might say that if I lose the stone it might disappear literally in the un-pneuma, yet in reality (as a complementary principle, remember) it is still there, it lies somewhere, still having been ‘that stone of that fateful day’. And though someone else might find it and know naught of this, they may yet find it
queer (or they may never notice this quality).

When a thing is forged such that a new accretion is formed, it rests upon this other accretion and yet in a sense is separate from it – it might be possible that the new accretion could be made with other accretions (or not, a gold ring can, after all, only be made of gold). These accretions may nestle together to form again particular accretions – the gold ring given to me by such and such. All things are accretions, yet there are accretions that show themselves in the accretion of natural itself (which is, of course, also an accretion). Stones and plants, wind and water, fire and air, metal and earth are such accretions. An analysis of type may occur and unfold new accretions, but when these things are used to make other things their nature shows itself in the new accretion only (though we might flip our aspect to see only the what-it-is-made-of). A mobile phone does not give itself like a stone. Yet the properties of a plant do not give themselves like a stone either. So, then, does a stone give itself as a stone? Yes, but what is a stone (concrete could find itself as a stone accretion until someone epistemically separated it for someone else)? Only in culture does a phone give itself as a phone (but what is a phone?). In the phantasy of reality there is a difference. A stone manifests the idea of its self-giving superiority over a phone. The trees and wind and sea claim this too. But this is phantasy, a borderline situation in which we cannot tell. We cannot get out of our culture and language to say that some beings have a more primordial disclosure than others, but we can say they manifest this appearance.5

**Pneuminous Accretions 1.1**

Pneuminous accretions as a doctrine are a phantasy. Phantasy shows the realm where that which might be the case holds sway. Pneuminous accretions have a strong and a weak doctrine. The weak doctrine is essentially psychological and

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5 This problems show the issues that were dealt with by vector theory in the writings of the Centre for Experimental Ontology.
would maintain that within the individual consciousness there form those accretions that make up its totality in their interlinkings. The strong doctrine would accord to something like a panpsychism. Thus the pneuminous accretions are not particularly in anyone’s consciousness. The strong doctrine is the theory behind the existence of beings formed of no obvious physical matter and phenomena similar to this realm (synchronicities). It says that pneuminous accretions may function independently of a physical vehicle though act in various manners that affect that which we call physicality. The effects may be purely regular, in the case of poltergeist activity or causational from behind the scenes of the spatio-temporal perspective (in the instance of an event happening that is deemed likely to have been brought about by the interference of a pneuminous accretion). Magical beings are as such pneuminous accretions. Thus this doctrine still maintains an agnosticism as to whether or not they existed prior to their invocation for in both cases they class as a pneuminous accretion, just as you who reads this now also class as such an accretion.

**Pneuminous Accretions 1.2**

But this is madness. Surely we have done away with this. Pursuing the accretive idea results in an incoherent lunacy. This half-garbled Platonism with shades of Jung needs to be put to bed. But how shall we do that? If we recognise that language creates only the impression of the need for pneuminous accretions then we can agree that their necessity is questionable – to say the least. Language certainly has multiple functions of differing natures. Naming objects – insofar as that applies at all – is only one. When we talk about ‘the mind’ we do not necessarily have anything we refer to. Certainly the concept is confused and indeed we can recognise that the language game of mind has a context we should be ill advised to stray out of. But some process that we experience does direct itself this way, and that intentionally (at a conscious level and an unconscious one – intentional objects exist in dreams; what are these if not something we can reasonably call pneuminous
accretions?). The force of this philosophy lies in its incoherence and refusal to retreat, its refusal to retreat lies in its radical scepticism. But you cannot create a philosophy by saying ‘because I don’t know, it might be like this’. I can, and I am doing. It is an actual perception to see the severe lack of ground that we stand upon. This lack of ground does not support everything. But it does give rise to the inability to put to bed certain phenomena…

**Pneuminous Accretions 1.3**

Consider the self? Is this question a nonsense? Without the metaphysics of the pneuminous accretions there is no self. The reference to ‘I’ is a language game that arises in a being such that its monadic situation suggests that this language is applicable. It exists in one spatial position, on one temporal horizon, other monadic entities identify it as one entity and only one – usually; as such, when it describes its actions and thoughts it invariably uses the first person pronoun to indicate that this being is the author of the described act.

If we say that “because we say ‘I’ there must be such an entity” surely we have erred. For there is no necessity that some extra entity exists that is the ‘self’ as the words do not point to objects, and even when there is a grammar of ‘object’ (a physical thing) this does not mean this is always the case (like a ‘joke’). There is just language embedded in the world. However, the doctrine of pneuminous accretions tells us there is an aetheric force that accretes to form contingent wholes – our ‘things’. So we must double-back on the previous position in order to satisfy the designatory desire. This desire insists that in some way we do mean ‘this and only this’. This is satisfied by the fact that the pneuminous accretion of this object is tapped into by that monad on that occasion. This also satisfies imaginary objects such as the ‘present king of France’ by the forming of a simple pneuminous accretion. Pneuminous accretions accrete more by the many times they are invoked
(and phenomenologically fade in time). The strict philosophical account of things entails their essential disappearance. The pneuminous accretions are a phenomenological retrograde step made in a world that allows magickal phenomena to be insufficiently eradicable. If magickal phenomena cannot be eradicated (their appearance, not their actuality) then pneuminous accretions follow as a necessary correlate of all phenomena at an aetheric level (the aether is also a necessary postulate). The self, then, exists as a pneuminous accretion, formed by the reciprocity of self-perception and the perception of others. By self-imposed intent and the intent of others it stays in a form. This form is what is then believed to be a ‘real’ person. There exists, of course, a phantasy that no such reality exists – this can make us tremble. Even wearing the wrong shoes might call ourselves into question.

**Pneuminous Accretions 1.4**

The issue of the pneuminous accretion is most pressing. The ontology expressed needs clarity. The pneuminous accretions are formed of pneuma, which is essentially information. This, however, leads to a dualism, it leaves us with a substrate of physicality that the pneuma is attached to. In a way we have recreated the Cartesian wheel, for the pneuma is in a sense no more that *res cogitans* and the substrate *res extensa*. This is obviously unacceptable; however, what we should note here is that we have the manifestation of this dualism, *it is how things appear to be*. This manifestation has the character of a phantasy – it is impossible to say that it is definitely not the case. Opposed to this, of course, is the manifestation of the unity whose phantasy shows itself in the concept of existence à la Spinoza. But then how is anything outside of the pneuma? For anything within consciousness has some quality of being comprehended. The necessary spatiality and temporality of things is a manifestation itself, it is one more phantasy. In other words, that transcendental idealism or realism is true are both phantasies. Truth is not within our reach, there are only manifestations. The manifestation that shows itself in this realm is that of an
incomprehensible dimension to existence that shows the characteristic of continuing-in-the-pneuminous-absence. It shows this characteristic by its continued reliability in our everyday lives. But the manifestation of the things in their incoherently coherent being only shows itself within the pneuma. Does the pneuma act upon the incomprehensible being-of-pneuminous-absence? Necessarily it does, insofar as where there was one thing (the incomprehensible noumena) there is also now another (the appropriating pneuma). The pneuma, though, does not just accrete in immediate presence, it accretes at a distance in the phantastical world. Though the monad forms the accretions through its self-accretion, there is also a manifestation of locality given to us by the manifestation of spatiality. The pneuma is not outside of the totality, it is a force within it. Panpsychism is another phantasy we must note here. In this instance we might say that it is the monad that is local and that the pneuma is everything. Thus only in the local presence of the monad does the pneuma accrete into the forms of things. Yet here we have the perplexing issue (though we have it elsewhere too) of how the monad self-accretes in order that it may accrete more pneuma into other things.

**Pneuminosity/Virtuality**

There is an intersection. There must be. The incredible continual existence of being in a spatio-temporality shared by humans is such an enduring phantasy that we find their interaction outside of immanence undeniable. In this incoherent world, if the things supply themselves then they do dwell continuously in this region and talk to each other. For humans, this darkness is the ambiguous umbratic⁶. Do these relations obtain or are they just products of a phantasy of being outside of perception to within it? We cannot say what conceptuality may be exerting upon being but there exists the notion that it persists in this incoherent umbratic (two notions immediately

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⁶ This is the first place in which the term umbratic appears, though it is not explained or thought out properly. Elsewhere the term comes to mean something like the phantasy of the unperceived.
even here, one that immanence exerts a difference and two that residual conceptuality remains after immanence). The virtual is affective and autonomous. The big remaining question is: ‘do the things have pneuminosity or is there a relation that is umbratic that is different?’ Pneuma begins to look like a heuristic for the effect of doubled consciousness. The incoherent manifestations of difference between awareness strata show (possibly) the point at which radical virtual affectivity (pneuminosity) takes place.

**Pneuminous Example: Homeopathy**

Homeopathy represents the perfect example of a pneuminous interaction. The notion expressed by the homeopath is explicitly that it is the information and not the materiality of the substance that brings about the result. This does not say homeopathy is ‘real’, it seeks to clarify the implications for reality that must be the case in order for it to obtain. The claim of homeopathy, then is that pneuma interacts with umbra, i.e. that information is not an inert layer on ‘reality’ but that there is a ‘showing itself’ in which it appears that the information changes the putative solidity. In homeopathy the process of succussion is supposed to drive the information into the water so that it is retained there in various levels of potency. When people try to use these products under test conditions, scientists complain that they show no significant results. This is fair enough – homeopathy doesn’t work when subjected to this kind of standard and indeed if we take that kind of reality to be utterly dominant then we must accept this conclusion.

However, this is to have misunderstood the kind of phenomenon we’re dealing with here. Here is possibly a less controversial statement: “People have experiences with homeopathic remedies that seem to indicate the success and/or effect of sometimes extraordinary levels.” I personally have had an acute hay fever episode stopped after taking it, and have experienced quite incredible sensations of a momentary strong intoxication-like effect after some flower essences. All of these experiences
are rationally explainable in terms of the alcohol in the flower essence and the placebo effect. These explanations are good but they are not entirely satisfying. The problem lies in what I have been told the being of these phenomena were. Initially bracketing off my scepticism I am told they are these informational imprints and that these informational imprints are effective in making interactions with the body. I am aware there are no physical parts of the plant/mineral in the remedy. I then take the remedy and experience an effect.

After this fact I can rationalise it away under placebo/alcohol or whatever. I have the impression that this rationalisation is superior to the homeopathic interpretation. In the statistical view it certainly is, but the statistical view has already presupposed a solidity to the world that means it is answerable to it in this way. In essence the measurability of the spatio-temporal environment already presupposes a world (let’s say conceptual) in which information is epiphenomenal to solidity. If, however, we take seriously the implications of the interaction of pneuma (information) with a putative solidity then we do not know how great this interaction might be; we have no idea of its rules. The set of ideas that makes the most effort to understand how information can effect solidity is, of course, ‘magick’. In other words, homeopathy is a magickal operation that brings with it a minimum baggage of the possibility of unknown ability affecting reality through pneuminous manipulations. I don’t believe there are many magicians who would subject a series of operations they performed to test conditions because within this discourse it is perfectly accepted that unwanted pneuminous interferences can distort the intention/result. So as magick if homeopathy only shows up localised sporadic, curious, sometimes very potent effects, then really that’s all you’d expect from it. If you then want to say that this is just a placebo, then that’s fine and indeed it is perfectly possible. What you must be aware of in making this claim is that providing homeopaths are smart enough to retreat out of competing on a double-blind trial level and be happy in trying to manipulate
pneuminous forces to help people, then their claim of efficacy is not dented because they have already (tacitly or otherwise) accepted the possibility that reality is more fluid than one of the manifestations of its being suggests. To reiterate, if you think it is a replicable remedy that will do a certain thing every time, then certainly this is not the case. However, the same magickal possibility of it exists as for other phenomena, e.g. synchronicity. The possibility that the informational imprint obtains is not ruled out by the other explanations, it is merely made unnecessary. But we do not know that the informational imprint is not there, and neither do we know that it is not effective under certain circumstances. The situation it invokes is one in which the certain circumstances of its effectivity are non-replicable. This is its phenomenology. Even when the double-blind trials come back showing it doesn't work, the adherent clings to the bolt-hole of non-replicability. The bolt-hole of non-replicability or interference by scientific thought (literal interference in the information) is made to look unpalatable. The tension lies in someone wishing to maintain a solid world view and homopathic effectivity but this fails. Those anecdotal proofs amount to nothing in the solid world, but when the mind allows the possibility of interference in an incoherent manner (magick) then homopathy (along with a number of other phenomena) goes through. Nothing here says this is actually what happens, but it says the power of the anecdotal experience makes it impossible for the ‘rational’ narratives to extirpate homopathy as a belief because it pinpoints information and not energy as the key ingredient. In the world in which it works, the information brings about an effect. One cannot reconcile sporadic pneuminous effects with solid world restraints. Homopathy has to retreat to magickal territory essentially. This still gives it a valid epistemology, just a different one that marks it out as a stranger phenomenon that it tried to portray itself as. The next level of pneuminous interpretation of it, though, makes it that the informational effect came from the pneuminous accretions, which may or may not have anything to do with any umbratic suggestions. In metallic form, silver always looks a certain
way, but it is a contingent accretion that it be used as a cold and flu remedy. This does not stop the effectivity of the accretion, for the pneuminous theory makes (magickally) an equivalence out of any essential pneuma and any contingent accretion.

What we can begin to see is that the whole of homeopathy’s power as a magickal force is based on a powerful accretive web to empower practitioners. A series of correspondences is given, a series of rules for the functioning of the organism, a whole doctrine. These kinds of systems enable pneuminous beings to act under their auspice with a kind of authority (granted by the system). Judging such a system is difficult. Being magickal there is no need to slate it any more than astrology (which also fails under test conditions but produces powerful local effects). The question arises, given the acceptance of it as ‘real’, as to precisely what would make a good homeopath most effective. What do we gain by making the accretive contingency of such systems overt?

**Sketch of Accretion/Concept and Analysis Regarding Speculative Implications**

I was looking at the sand/grit container at the train station and contemplating how the framework accounts for this. It’s so tempting to make the notion that only the front is presented. This is true but also not true. Pneuminously the container is given to me immediately; I see directly not the yellow plastic box but the container as a grit container. But this thing is information or pneuma, I see an accretion of pneuma forming a whole new structure. As a passing thought, I see this raises the question as to whether or not there are ‘pneuminous atoms’\(^8\). As a manifestation this seems cogent. The fact that yellow has various connotations to any given individual does not mean it does not also have the abstractive possibility as an atom, an

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7 This section clearly lays the foundations for what would become vector theory at the CEO.
8 Irreducible informational elements.
informational feature further irreducible. Yellow is an accretion because it is indelibly accreted to so many other phenomena yet it also has an atomic manifestation as something pure. We might say that accretions of abstraction and purity are able to connect to certain phenomena that present themselves as atomic in this sense. But we have strayed from the point. The accretion, rather like in phenomenology, has already contained the idea that it exists in space and time and the ‘what it is’. Its constitution as spatio-temporal is a priori but not its use. But here it gets confusing for these are in some sense separate accretions held together by a conditional relation. That it is a grit container means that it is an object in space/time but that it is a spatio-temporal object clearly doesn’t mean it is a grit container. There is a lurking manifestation in here, one that separates out the solidity from the information. In one sense the information (the grit containerness) is only made possible by the spatio-temporality. In another we must feel that this is a contingency and in some sense separate, for I might not know it was a grit container. It might not have grit in it, and if no one ever knew that and thought it was a bin, then it would be a bin and that would be it. So in that sense you can't talk about autonomous objects because the thing is the information, or rather the information is the relation to us. This is what brings in the pneuminous accretions as metaphysics for this problem. It can only continue to be a grit container outside of its functionality as one (its inceptive intention) if it is imbued with this accretion in a way that is external to human influence, or rather that once the human accretion has imbued this thing with this information, this information persists attached to what I have elsewhere called the ‘umbra’. Even if spatio-temporality persists outside of human perception, without a pneuminous trace in the thing it is no longer a grit container, desolate and alone on the platform, it is in a sense not. Here Heidegger is cogent to me: the naming is the relation of being, but if we extend the accretive trace then the naming has persisted outside of our sheltering and now holds this thing, even on the desolate platform, as the faithful grit container, standing in
reserve to protect us on the icy days, and other beings might have relations with the
grit container but they must fight this pneuminous hold if they wish to claim it as their
own.
Review: we want the solid thing and information to be as one naively. But if this is
just a name for us then no designation persists and Wittgenstein’s meaning as use is
exhaustive of the situation. So then the thing that persists (outside of our use) cannot
truly be called what we have called it because that is not the relation that the other
things have engaged it in. The speculative realist might say I am splitting hairs here
but I don’t think so. If you don’t know that the naming-human relation does not add
some kind of difference to the umbratic thing then you shouldn’t call it that name in
its relation with other things. Maybe there are natural kinds of instances where the
usage seems appropriate, where the accretive idea is more harmonious from human
and other relations, but this is still problematic because any accretion like ‘fire’ is
going to have many accretive connections in the pneuma. It is from this instance
possible that we could be presented with video of a phenomenon that we could not
recognise informationally as ‘fire’ (in some strange intergalactic form) and then the
fire accretion would not be touching it. In this sense this phenomenon would not be
‘fire’, neither as use nor as thing out of our scope of understanding. But it is
interesting here and we should not shy away from it. For when the scientist somehow
understands that this phenomenon is some raging cosmological fire we accretively
appropriate it thusly and we are then presented with the manifestation that it was
somehow ‘fire’ all along.
Maybe the difference lies in that part of the accretion itself (in fire) is that such
things once recognised [as such] have always been thus, whereas in the case of the
grit container, the umbra admits to contingent relations even with its creators. This is
clearly not all the story here and I note that my attempt to summarise and review
has just opened the can wider…
**Self (Neurotic)-Accretion**

“Not to be, never to have been at all…” So says Silenus. “Know thyself,” says the Delphic oracle. What is the self? The self is an accretion or assemblage. The presupposition that all have a self in the same manner is a metaphysical fallacy. Indeed it is no less than a tyranny that I must have a real self. These metaphysics are related to the phantasy of the soul.

**On Pneuma**

I want to give the notion of pneuma a kind of concretion. Of course, it is incoherent, but this is also partially the point of the accretive theory. As stated elsewhere, Wittgenstein would be right if it were not for the manifestation of the pneuma. Let’s be clear there – essentially Wittgenstein is right, the meaning of the word can only be its use unless you have some actual metaphysical connection between umbra and pneuma. This brings to mind the possibility of needing another descriptive term, i.e. if umbra is unperceived being, chthon⁹ is being in the manifestation of non-conceptualisation and pneuma is the informational power that makes things into concepts, the missing slot will be the manifestation of being as behind pneuma. Part of the project states that umbra is affected by pneuma, but this would only happen in their conjunction; the term ‘pneumbra’ (a play on penumbra) springs to mind. But anyway, my point here was to demonstrate the reality of pneuma. I think this is simple if you just ask yourself what you are seeing as images ‘in your mind’. All dreams are pure pneuma with no necessary umbratic attachment. The magical correlate of this is that the pneuma can attach to umbra. If we imagine something floating in the air before us and have sufficient visualisation ability to perceive it in the transcendent spatio-temporality, then what is this image made up of? The

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⁹ Chthonic never properly became a utilised concept, however the notion reemerged in the CEO work as the vector field.
answer is in my terminology pneuma. The thing to note is that when I see a stone I still see only pneuma. Yet in this case the pneuma has accreted around the umbra, yet in the former there is no umbra.

Pneuminous Beings
We are pneuminous beings. This means the self is pneuminous (as has been said before). We walk in the pneuminous realm. The umbra is suggested by the pneuma and the pneuma suggests the umbra. In other words, from the pneuminous world it seems there must be something hiding behind the information available to us, and likewise the information must be suggested by putative umbratic externality.

Pneuminosity of Dirt Association
It is known that if you put some faeces in a sealed bag on a plate and then take them off again many people will not want to eat off the plate. This is pneuminosity in a nutshell. The near impossibility of ourselves to believe that information does not contaminate. It seems to me the same issue. We are told of the solidity of the world and yet in this instance we find it hard to disassociate the faeces from the plate; there is somewhere the nagging doubt that the information might have penetrated the plate. This is the essential bifurcation of the two pneuminosities (weak and strong). One is essentially psychological and says association is what has happened that then puts people off the plate, whereas the other is that there is the possibility that the information has interacted with the solidity. I take a bowl from the kitchen to wash some children’s shoes in and my wife admonishes me for taking the wrong bowl as I have taken a food bowl. I want to argue but then remember my own philosophy and that this is a perfect example of it. The shoes should not be washed in a food bowl because they are two separate accretions and we must be wary of the possibility that the pneuminous force is real. If I wash the shoes in the food bowl,
no matter how clean I then make the bowl, it is attached to a different accretion, one of garden tasks and realms outside of the culinary. This is a modern manifestation of the notion of the sacred re-emerging. The food bowl is sacred to food and this sacred relation is not to be tampered with by making it a bowl of relativism. I do not say we should have separate food bowls and garden bowls, I merely point out that such a differentiation is (in one way) grounded in a magickal speculation that is entirely rational.

**Pneuminous Connection to Solidity**

If we accept the manifestation of pure pneuma then we find the following is also true. This selfsame manifestation also contains within it the manifestation of being as solid and continuing outside of awareness. As an idea it is hence an accretion of pneuma. This paradoxical accretion we have called the ‘umbratic’. If what we perceive as reality shows itself in a way such that the pneuma can interact with the umbra then it raises the possibility that the umbratic as an accretion formed within the pneuma is actually becoming a reality that can exist outside of consciousness when it previously was not. This would be a kind of inversion of being becoming conscious of itself. It implies the notion that possibly being was aware in itself, but ironically through the generation of beings within itself that possess a self-awareness – pieces unable to process their essential connection to the whole – these beings, as emissaries of being, conceive being through epistemological restraint and in this process create a notion of externality as solid and disconnected from awareness. This very conceptualisation dialectically feeds back into being creating exactly this kind of independent solidity. Rather than existence slowly gaining in awareness, it is actually losing it through the conceptual action of its own agents. This is an interesting idea, a consequence of certain disjunctions. Of course, it has no necessity, it is an extreme possibility. Yet it remains possible if the solidity and the information interact. More interestingly we might ask: if it isn’t true then why not?
For it not to be true, either the information doesn’t interact with the externality or there are limits/conditions under which this is the case. The latter seems more likely. This means the question is: what are the restraints on the information such that it maintains the appearance of a cogent solid externality? Further questions regarding the actual conceptualisation of pneuma also arise. If being is pneuma, how does being that is not a pneuminous being relate amongst itself within the idea of the externality? You can say that this doesn’t matter, because à la Husserl everything is contained within consciousness a priori. But the pneuma also contains the idea of the solid externality (the continuous world), and as such it contains the incoherent idea of beings not ordinarily perceived as conscious interacting with each other outside of the field of awareness as we would ordinarily conceive of one. The paradoxical idea arises within pneuma that there are umbratic places in which there is no pneuma, and now we are a stone’s throw from a more regular scientific conception. If we say there are pneuminous relations going on at all levels we grant some kind of panpsychism and seem to admit that the umbratic exists externally to awareness, albeit attenuated slightly by a kind of Whiteheadian pneuminous pole. The problem clearly needs more thought, but what is said here confirms a basic sense that the notion of pneuma creates an umbratic so strongly that its manifestation is that it could be independent of it. Ontological speculation is not the aim here and hence the Whiteheadian route is barred.

**Pneuminous Constitution of Life**

This is it: when you perceive a being such that it is alive it becomes alive. This sounds errant nonsense but it is at the heart of what I want to propose. Life is not definable with recourse to some scientific criteria but rather only by *apophansis*. Accreting happens greater when things are loved, there is a pneuminous investment made in the accretion. If I see a bee and find it marvellous, a living wonder, I might yet also perceive a very sophisticated drone that amazes me. I might be able to separate
the mechanical perception from the living but after a while this drone might be more impressive than the bee, e.g. insofar as it comes when I call it. I might then begin to develop a fondness for this drone, I might name it and so on. This has formed an accretion with a kind of mirroring consciousness as part of its disclosure (the drone has a kind of consciousness but now I attribute it with more). This kind of happening occurs on all manner of occasions: a cuddly toy, a car etc. This magickal perception of aliveness might be nothing more than the transference of feeling onto cold inert matter. But it might be something else. We are faced with another agnostic disjunction. True, it is not so strong a one as there is less experience and more feeling that such beings have a ‘life’ to them. Yet the synchronicitous argument returns to haunt this occasion. If the pneuma can interfere, generate symbols related to itself in being (interact with the umbra) then it can do it in the case of such perceived-as-alive-things. This dialectic, of course, also applies to ourselves.

**Pneuminous Value**

Constantly the idea recurs that pneuma provides a sort of solution to certain nihilistic issues, though frequently the clarity of this idea evades me and I am left only with the knowledge that whatever amelioration it provides it only shifts the problem away. The shifted problem, however, sometimes seems to be enough. To make some kind of attempt to address it, the issue is something like this. When phenomena are seen to be nothing in the face of an all-encompassing physics their value decreases and we are wont to see everything as nothing in the face of the endless universe. Pneuma cannot remove this entirely but it does mean that this old toy of mine is not just deludedly filled with my memories, it really is literally, possibly even perniciously, so. This process is the same one as happens in ordinary perception, just the noesis is different and the differing noesis makes all the difference. If I buy something by a famous artist on the day they died as a souvenir then this item accretion has accreted to the death day and my own accretion; a unity of
connection is made. This is psychologically true and phenomenologically magically true. This gets to the core of the purpose of the notion of accretion. I would argue, however, that it is the magical notion that gives us the real sense of meaning for things and when they are merely psychologically true (of this kind) the emptiness pervades.

**Pneuminous Value 1.01**
To spell some of the obvious out, this means supposedly fictional characters have pneuminous reality of a similar order to magickal spirits, the essential difference being that the noetic structure of a fictional character is precisely that and as such they behave differently. If, however, we attempt to invoke a fictional character by some kind of chaos magickal means then we noetically shift them into a different kind of accretion. Pneuma is capable of self-awareness as this is what we are made of. Spirits rarely have this durability as they do not receive enough pneuminous noetic focus to sustain their being. Aspect perception is literally engendering being through the reified accretion. So the accretion is contingent and necessary. Seeing teddy as alive makes teddy alive. Does it give him organs and blood? No. But then your organs and blood aren’t what make you into the kind of thing you are. Phenomenologically this is the error. The person is a person by the same token that they are perceived as a person. The pneuma accretes by others to make them what they take themselves to be. The self is a pneuminous accretion and as such is contingent hence the umbratic form (of whatever we call a human is) can take on more accretive selves, or lose self entirely.

**Pneuminous Reverie**
The man was told “lilacs belong to the essence of death”. “How curious,” he ruminated. “How could such an association happen and what does it mean?” He
stared at the lilac tree and could not see the death inherent in it. “If…” he continued “…it is indeed a mere association and not somehow something that the tree is intrinsically connected to.” But he could clearly see that such a connection was difficult to speak about and seemed rationally highly unlikely, not to say unintelligible. Firstly death would need to be some kind of force that had a quasi-autonomous existence apart from particular deaths, and secondly there would have to be some way in which this dubious essence fused – presumably on some metaphysical/aetheric level – with the essence of lilacs. This curious fusion was then somehow discernible by certain folk with the eyes to see the connection[s]. The associative explanation seemed more rational. Everything is cultural. The interpretation of a plant as having this kind of meaning exists contingently owing to some form of qualitative association, possibly its colour, possibly its time of flowering; there were surely several options on the table. ‘I do not believe I believe in such folklore, no matter where the connection lies,’ he stated. ‘And what is more, the tree seems to have a fascinating appearance that I should like to delve into more deeply.’ Thus he delved deeper into the tree, staring at it intently, visualising its new buds, its growth structure, its peeling bark, its easily rotting wood and that absence that marked its centre. He returned again and again to the tree, always vaguely haunted by the putative ghost of Thanatos, but then pushing it to one side as irrational.

He stared, and perceived the tree again and again. Then one day soon after, one of his cats disappeared and did not return. He scarcely dared to think that the two phenomena might be connected. Indeed how really could they be? The whirling world of random events had played a card that tempted the interpretation of the link. But the truth was there was no link. There could be no link. Primitive parts of his mind must be denied their reason. So he persisted with his experiment and his holding of the lilac tree in his mind, thinking how interesting it would be to see it beyond its budding; to watch the transformation of the buds to leaves, and to see
the flowers emerge, to see the plants and insects that flourished in its wake throughout the year. Then soon after that the train he was on struck someone, and though they did not die, it seemed a death-like thing to happen. “Surely being struck by a train belongs to the essence of death,” he pondered. And he thought, “This is a curious situation, for I cannot deny that both of these events make me wonder about my lilac investigation and the information I was initially given about it. I can know nothing other than the rational appearance of the world such that it tells me it is just in my foolish superstitious mind that there is a connection here. Yet I cannot gain certainty of this separation and furthermore what kind of horrible gamble it is that I play here. If it is true – no matter how inexplicably – then these events will persist as long as I interact with the plant, yet it seems so blatantly coincidental that it would be insane to refrain from the study of a beautiful plant for this reason. Reason must triumph. There is no connection here.”

Then his other cat was killed and then the body of the first was found and he wept and cursed his own stupidity. But he had not gained certain knowledge that lilac belongs to the essence of death, though similarly it now would have seemed outrageous to persist in this endeavour. Clearly his mind was not fit to separate the two phenomena. It seemed that even the smallest, most irrational chance of a real connection existing (either intrinsic or associative) that was capable of making an interaction with lived reality was not worth taking. He turned his attention to the apple tree and found solace there.

**Pneuminous-Accretive Complex**

What is x? is answered by a pneuminous accretion formed of the informational aether. The accretion is given a name. The name is part of the accretion. A line has been attached to it from the monadic accretion—forming a pneuminous-accretive complex. It is purely heuristic to talk of a discrete pneuminous accretion in the first
place for they are all interconnected in a myriad of ways.

**The Ontological Argument and Accretive Theory**

Amongst the catalogue of observations in this realm is the notion that the ontological argument has something of the accretive flavour to it. If we say that because “I have the idea of a god therefore there must be a god” (a simplified version of the notion), we can readily see how it contains very little weight, or at least to the modern mind is unconvincing. Having the idea of something hardly entails its actuality. Saying that “because the idea is greater than me I cannot have conceived of it” does little more because I can readily conceive of many things ‘greater’ than me.

Yet from the accretive perspective it has a different meaning. Here, because I have the idea of a perfect God it does mean that there is one, for they are being accreted in the very act of contemplation. The incoherence of the notion of God is problematic, but as all concepts exhibit incoherence it is only a difference of degree and not of kind. Monotheistic gods by their noetic nature have a different flavour to polytheistic gods. Is it transcendent or immanent? Really it’s both: the monstrous montheistic god accretion is necessarily transcendent and immanent, it can act like an interfering external power, or it can be all and everything. The notion is so incoherent no one can hope to figure it out in the first place, but equally it is necessarily infinitely more powerful than us so it is hardly surprising it can behave in this way.

We have to sidestep the issue of the accretive formation of selves to talk about this because they need to be assumed to make any headway. In some sense, of course, the God accretion is the self-accretion mirrored back into the sublime enormousness of everything (a Sartrean resonance strikes here). The God idea only exists by virtue of the self-accretion, like an instantaneous artificial intelligence superior to ourselves, except unlike the overtaking of human cognitive power, which may take
decades, this happens instantaneously and purely by incoherent definition. Let us apply our caveat to be clear. Down one corridor is a being with thoughts certainly reliant on the intertwining but still with them contained in the brain circuitry. Down another corridor, the information is substantial (pneuminous). Here you can see the pneuma – look it’s there in front of you now, overlaying the umbra. When you play in your mind you play with pneuma, everything you conceive exists pneuminously and as such not within your accretion (though necessarily attached to it). The monotheistic God accretion is the botched up accretion of infinity, power, sometimes goodness, sometimes capriciousness, perfection, temporality and a-temporality. All of these abstract terms are incoherent in themselves yet formed out of some curious dialectical dance with experience from an abstract potential, then reapplied to transcendent immanence. Down here, the God is real and one of the most effective forms of magickal disclosure possible; its actions supply the perfect hermeneutic for its own omnipotence, supplying a feedback to support its parasitic accretive life. Thankfully this God, though an accretion of gargantuan age and size, is as schizopneuminous as it is powerful. Fragmented, paradoxical, dispersed and contained, the threads that accrete it rend it similarly assunder. Ironically this God manifested its accretion only through the self-accretions as a pseudo-necessary sticking together of pneuma, which, once stuck together, can scarcely be pulled apart – so hoary is its agglomerative power. After this fact this ironic God can indeed be found as an event within the pneuma that could be discovered in a manner very similar to the ontological argument and in this instance it would in a certain sense be true. Hence its accretion creation renders it now that potent monster, exceeding the human consciousness by an infinity and yet it is, for all its seeming necessity, contingent.
The Uncanny

In Freud’s essay on the uncanny he writes: “Our analysis of instances of the uncanny has led us back to the old, animistic conception of the universe. This was characterized by the idea that the world was peopled with the spirits of human beings; by the subject’s narcissistic overvaluation of his own mental processes; by the belief in the omnipotence of thoughts and the technique of magic based on that belief; by the attribution to various outside persons and things of carefully graded magical powers, or ‘mana’; as well as by all the other creations with the help of which man, in the unrestricted narcissism of that stage of development, strove to fend off the manifest prohibitions of reality. It seems as if each one of us has been through a phase of individual development corresponding to this animistic stage in primitive men, that none of us has passed through it without preserving certain residues and traces of it which are still capable of manifesting themselves, and that everything which now strikes us as ‘uncanny’ fulfils the condition of touching those residues of animistic mental activity within us and bringing them to expression.”

What Freud readily dismisses is our own position. It is, of course, precisely our contention that these ‘residues and traces’ cannot be removed, but stronger than that, that their removal is an impossibility and that furthermore their repression through rationality represents a pathological repression itself. Freud believes that rationalism can secure an apophansis that excludes the occult possibility, that this would be the mature disclosure of being, so for him it is not a repressive in a negative sense, rather only a repression in the sense of infantile amnesia – presumably.

Accretive Objects

“Found objects are always significant because of their subjective investment. This applies not only to the baby’s transitional object, but to any object that in later life arrests our attention through its having this special aura. Pebbles, pieces of
driftwood, images provided by the natural world, even people can be thought of in this way. All are ‘found objects’, in which we simultaneously ‘find’ parts of ourselves. Artists are particularly likely to collect ‘found objects’ that resonate with personal or ‘aesthetic’ significance, and the wider notion of finding oneself in, and through, an objective medium is central to understanding the artistic enterprise from this Winicottian perspective” Kenneth Wright, Mirroring and Attunement, Chapter 9. I was struck in this passage from Wright’s book by the similarity of this to the pneuminous kind of notion I want to push. Of course, it is different, but the text gives [me] one of those moments when you see how close it is to some forms of psychoanalysis. But really this should come as no surprise: psychoanalysis always treads close to phenomenology whether it wants to or not (Jung understood this). What probably is of interest to me here is not the inferential importance of the ‘mother accretion’ – though I could scarcely deny this – but rather the manifestation of things as having special auras, being attractive to us as being part of ourselves. Now I am going to maintain (under a certain manifestation) that all things are formed by pneuma, so the knife I use in the canteen and resist pocketing (hence sending it back for reuse) is no less a pneuminous thing than the special rock I find in the field. It is purely the mode of appearing that makes them different. When a theory tells us why something discloses itself as special it moves beyond a phenomenology (psychoanalysis, of course, does cross this line). Attempting to walk in this kind of bracketed magickal landscape gives us only the disclosure of the thing ‘as special’ and not the why. But this phenomenology also gives us everything as informational accretion, including the incoherent ‘self’. The ‘special’ object and the incoherent ‘self’ as such, in the moment of disclosure, are connected. In psychoanalysis this may be tacitly reduced to a purely mental level with the acceptance of no physical interaction, yet down the other corridor is precisely the manifestation of the connection, which would include the manifestation of interaction between this putative dualism.
In this realm the connection is real and a priori. Furthermore, in our imagined encounter, once the thing has disclosed itself in this manner there is here the opportunity to accrete the thing further. For after we have our ‘special object’ we may then take it with us in life and thus it will accrete further to the self-accretion. This may be a pernicious and/or rewarding relationship in which because the pneuma can interact with the umbra there is always the threat that loss of the object can be painful/damaging to the self/body-umbra. This, though, merely heightens the same effect (in a magickal kind of context) as happens through connections to the fetishised house and its adornments, the extension of a self/family-accretion. The ethical implication is there on the one hand in terms of non-attachment, but at the same time it is completely lacking because whilst we might disperse our accretions through such other accretions ultimately there is nothing to say whether this is any better than keeping the self-accretion more contained.

Art and Accretions

In the natural occurrence of the accretions we should recall that they can be formed actively. Of course, we have covered many times how the creation of spirits is exactly that, however the creation of an artistic work is also this. The combination of heterogeneous elements in a certain manner is the attempt to make them stick together. Here the natural tendency of the pneuma to accrete does not always occur for as anyone forging any kind of artwork knows, sometimes the elements do not so readily accrete. Indeed it can take many attempts at combining before the art accretion displays itself. This is a separate issue in the apophansis of art. Under this theoretical gaze there is, of course, an accretion of art as a contingent necessity. When we say something is art we immediately attach this accretion to it. The quality of the art as we deem it then is at least partially a matter of the way the elements are attached together insofar as the artist themselves have successfully welded these accretions one to the other.
Accretive Example

Let us try to look at an example of how this philosophy ‘works’. A religious colleague politely asks that I do not leave alcohol in the bottom shelf of the fridge again as this is where she likes to leave her food. I acquiesce to this happily out of respect for her beliefs. What is going on here?

Presumably there is some fiat in Islam prohibiting alcohol or at least the doctrine is interpreted in this manner. Possibly there is some notion that even the proximity of it is to be avoided. So there is a rule from a religious source that stipulates this. So this has the structure of a phantasy; this means it is (from a solid world perspective) an unlikely irrefutable possibility grounded in a metaphysical grammar (this is descriptive not pejorative). The metaphysical grammar here is the religious language, the notion that there can be rules issued by a deity that should be adhered to and the criterion for this is that such rules have been written down and accepted as such.

The problem the colleague has with the proximity is based on an incoherent conception of the problem of alcohol – again this is not a criticism, it is a description. If the problem with alcohol is only that it might interfere with moral behaviour then proximity is not a problem. But the proximity is still felt as a problem. This feeling is an informational contagion, a sense that the association of the alcohol might infect the food.

This means there is some incoherent (again this is a phenomenological term not a critical one) sense in which the alcoholic drink might somehow contaminate the food. We can say of course it doesn’t, but this isn’t to do justice to the situation. If we think of it pneuminously it makes perfect sense. The accretion of the alcohol is not restricted to just the drink, it permeates the bottle and the label. It makes an aura
of alcohol accretiveness. The proximity of the *information* of alcohol in proximity to the food gives the connection of pneuminous accretion of connection, by a kind of pneuminous conjunction: ‘food and alcohol’. But not just any food: her food. The pneuminous sense of ownership draws a line that connects directly from her accretion to the food accretion. This is not some psychological irrelevance, this is an actual connection given clearly to us by the simple fact *it has been thought*.

The fact that she is connected to her lunch in the fridge means rationally it is very reasonable for the alcohol not to be in proximity so that the pneuminous conjunction can be avoided. We might want to say that “really nothing happens by these two things being next to one another”, but this is not to understand the logic of pneuminosity. In the pneuminous realm these connections are entirely real whether or not they ever manifest something we might call a ‘physical change’ in either body. The alcoholic drink is connected to the accretion of the immoral behaviour or whatever the issue may be and thus to connect it to the food in any wise necessarily is to make a problem for the pneuminous being (the person) that is accreted to the transcendent rule (the religious fiat (another accretion)). This all turns on the incoherent possibility that the informational connection is somehow affective, which is the same possibility we find in magick.

If we ask “but what if the alcohol was in a water bottle and hence she didn’t know?” it is difficult because now the self-accretion does not know of the problem of contamination, and to this extent they are entirely protected from the pneuminous alcohol contamination. The situation might pass and they would never know any different. On the pneuminous (magickal) plane, though, they are then exposed to the effect of contamination (if there were any) i) insofar as someone knew that there was alcohol in the bottle and ii) by the pneuma that accretes outside of perception to things identified in a certain way. The pneuma can persist in its
Potato Accretion

Once I grew a potato in a small terrace house garden. The plant grew to quite a prodigious size and was positioned just outside the back door. As the foliage got larger it did grow (as I would have expected) towards the lighter part but in fact straight towards the door. The leafy stems in fact extended so much towards the door that when you opened it the potato plant would flop into the kitchen. This became quite annoying, but viewing the plant as an entity with some interest and affection I was loath to curtail its expansion. The growth, of course, only took advantage of my kindness and pushed further still. After putting up with this for some time I began to joke that the plant actually wanted to come inside to be with the people. This idea, whilst a joke, I also recognised as having some sense of possible incoherent actuality. I was undeniably less philosophically reflectively involved in magickal thinking at the time and hence ascribing a kind of spirit sentience to the plant seemed quite reasonable. The potato's self-inviting became more obvious as it relentlessly tried to extend the stems that pressed against the door. This strategy was ultimately self-defeating for the plant, as it began to get bashed around by people opening and closing the door. I began to feel some sense of resentment for its suicidal tenacity, largely generated by the mess of mashed stem and leaves that was accruing round the entrance. After enduring this for a short time I decided enough was enough and truncated the plant appropriately so that its longing to be in the house could not be fulfilled. This worked perfectly well and the plant continued growing outside. About a week later I noticed something. A potato appeared on the kitchen table and stayed there day after day. I don't know why but I didn't investigate it initially. I suppose because, knowing it wasn't mine, I assumed it was something to do with my house mate. It didn't go anywhere so after a while I examined it. It turned out not to be a potato but a stone that
looked identical to a potato (at least until close inspection). I asked my house mate about this curiosity and he replied that he had seen it lying around whilst out and had felt compelled to bring it home. He had not, however (at least consciously), spotted its similarity to the aforementioned solanaceae. My interpretive faculty flashed immediately on hearing this as it seemed quite clear what had happened: the potato power had tried to make its way into the house, initially in plant form. This avenue had been thwarted and it had rerouted itself in such a manner that its place in the house would be assured, i.e. it remanifested itself in stone format and then signalled to the other entrance route (my house mate) that he had some need for it. He had been an easy unwitting ally of the potato and had brought it straight to where it wanted to be and there it now sat in front of me.

What went on there? Obviously we can lay it out as nothing more than coincidental stone and plant and need say no more about it. What is more important, though, is, deluded or otherwise (it is impossible to say), this was not the experience of it as viewed through the corridor. The experience here is one of pneuminous interference by the potato accretion. The background of magickal interpretation makes it possible; this allows the accretive world to function. Of course, there is a degree of doubling there, pneuminosity is just a heuristic but also an accretion itself. The magickal interpretation of the potato as potato spirit accretes pneuminous awareness to this potato plant or potentially liberates its existing awareness to new teleological heights (it wants to be with its fellow beings). The possibility is given that without treating the potato in this manner it would never have sought refuge in the house. This particular end was brutally curtailed but the newly formed potato accretion was not to be stopped. This pneuminous power exercised some ineffable manipulation on whatever is to make its pneuminosity send an accretive tendril to remanifest in the pneuminous sphere of the house mate. The house mate was, as it happens, aware of my attitude even if he treated it as a humorous oddity. His awareness and being-in-the-house made him easily attached to the accretive
entities involved and hence an easy target for the solanaceous machinations. This literal accretion of stone (no doubt an accretive link to my name) and pneuminous potato spirit tapped the pneuminosity of my house mate, compelling him to bring it with him. Once in, it had no use for him and requested to be deposited exactly where it wanted to be: in the kitchen. The accretion was then noticed by myself and I was able to immediately recognise its triumph, observing it both outside the window and curiously in the house in my hand at the same time.

*The Potato Stone*

**Wednesday: Accretive Example**

What is ‘Wednesday’? It’s a day of the week. What is a week? What is a day? We can go on with this line of questioning and get nowhere. In following the method we must note the manifestations. There is a manifestation of nothingness. That Wednesday is a use term that extends nowhere but its convention. There is time passing as observed by the changing light and this repetition we divide into a system. In this system we call a part of the repeating sequence ‘Wednesday’. If I want to know what it means, I just enter the community and as soon as I’ve grasped the sequence of repeating seven days and the order in which they fall, I can then say ‘today is Wednesday’ and others will just accept that. Correlative to this is an
accretion of Wednesday. The word, the sound, the historical attachments, somehow ineffably ground into the sequence of every seven days. Impossible, nonsensical, incoherent and yet this incoherent manifestation weighs hard upon us. It can be felt that this is Wednesday in such a sense that it seems more than convention and yet rationally we can know it’s just convention. That feeling is all that is needed to give the tiny crack through which pneuminous accretive theory flows. If we feel designation, we feel pneuminosity, we feel the sense of the information attaching to the externality. We immediately might deny it yet the sensation is there. The impossible living nature of conceptuality is such that this duration of light and dark, this one in seven, is somehow impregnated with this information. Magick assumes this connection is possible. Modern life is confused by the possibility.

**A Dialogue Concerning [In]coherence**

P: Do you subscribe to the principle of incoherence?

Q: I do.

P: Do you not find something horribly troubling in this doctrine?

Q: Of course.

P: Ah, what do you mean?

Q: Is that not what I should have asked you?

P: Yes, that is of course the lead I sought.

Q: So let us out it: what is troubling is that in order to make a doctrine of incoherence we seem to rely on something coherent, i.e. the ability to talk about incoherence. Is this not — or something similar to this — the nub of the issue?

P: You have put your finger upon it.

Q: But is this not ultimately just grist to the mill of the incoherent? That incoherence is incoherent.

P: But that is not the implication. The implication is that incoherence is coherent, it is
upon this premise that we can say something about it. And hence the matter dissolves into gibberish. For in stipulating that the incoherent is coherent as a principle we surely undermine the status of incoherence itself.

Q: You do not understand the doctrine. For the doctrine states that all concepts are incoherent; as such, incoherence is but one more concept and as such it is equally subject to incoherence.

P: But then the doctrine must fail for its own ground is removed by its own principle; a self-defeating paradox!

Q: A self-defeating paradox indeed. We must learn to accept incoherence, for it is all we have.

P: But surely this is not true. Many ideas, actions are perfectly coherent. We cannot just rest upon this stipulative definition of grandiosity, we must test it.

Q: Then test it!

P: If I say something, what is incoherent about this simple fact? I have said something — not the content of it, just that I did. How could we argue about it?

Q: Without the content of it, how do we know you said anything at all? How should we call it ‘said’ if it did not have a sense to someone? You might have just shouted incoherences into the void. You must define ‘said’ first for us to understand whether or not what you have said is incoherent.

P: Then in this vocal instance we shall agree that it is that something of sense was uttered by myself. So then if I was overheard speaking to someone, the sense is presupposed by the inference of mutual intelligibility, yet they need not know what I said. The report can be made that I said something.

Q: So saying is the saying of something.

P: Unless we remove the requirement of meaning how could it not be?

Q: So we must understand ‘something’ also. What is ‘something’?

P: It is an abstraction, an x that stands in for whatever I might have said.

Q: So you cannot understand saying without its content and its content is
undetermined?
P: Yes.
Q: And you call this coherent?
P: It might be in the instance that no one heard the words, only that something was said.
Q: I feel here we must look at the doctrine a little closer, and maybe this will aid us. For in truth it tells us that there are in fact two states: coherently incoherent and incoherently coherent.
P: And which is this?
Q: In this instance, what you are trying to convey is something that is incoherently coherent; its analysis, however, renders it coherently incoherent. This is the rule of all things. Incoherent coherence is the way in which things show themselves, analysis reveals them to be coherently incoherent.
P: I don’t understand.
Q: When you insisted that your having said something was coherent, you were right, but this was only half the picture for it was incoherently coherent. When we say it, its meaning is passed as a whole that seems to require no further analysis. Yet if we analyse it, its incoherence is exposed in its reliance upon other elements. This reveals that it was incomplete in the first instance and thus only incoherently coherent. When the other elements are exposed we see it is coherently incoherent, i.e. we have gained the certainty that without the other elements there was no meaning.
P: I see what you mean, but surely your doctrine has transgressed the usage of the terms ‘coherence’ and ‘incoherence’ to a nonsense.
Q: I do not believe so; the term ‘nonsense’ is no more coherent than anything else. Incoherence is not nonsense.
P: You do not understand. If I say ‘what you are saying is incoherent’ I mean it is not properly intelligible. We do not say that about many ordinary things.
Q: Yes, and it is a technicality we must pick people up on; these ordinary things are
incoherently coherent, hence we do not pick them up on it. The doctrine tells us something new about how things are. If we must use that language it tells us that a phenomenon as it presents itself is a synthesis the components of which we do not readily comprehend, yet the necessity of the manifestation of components discloses itself when we analyze it. The components are of course syntheses in their own right as a discretion is incoherent.

P: But it presupposes itself in doing so. There can never have been the expression of incoherence without coherence. Does it not strike you as wrong that a tool from within the structure could be used to tell us something about the whole? Are you not trying to employ a reified discretion to warn against reified discretion?

Q: What you say is precisely true. There is no coherence without incoherence and vice versa. Precisely for that reason all concepts are incoherent for they exist by virtue of others, not by their own sustaining power – though some of those dread accretions of which we will not speak here make a good attempt of this. There are of course other ways we could express this matter and it has been expressed before. In saying everything manifests as an incoherent coherence that gives way to a coherent incoherence we do not abuse the homes of these words but we do expand them. Thus, though we said we would not mention the matter further, we must concede there is a degree of accreting going on here; this, though, does not diminish its power, rather it only adds to it. (Drawing himself up melodramatically) See the god of incoherence in all its accretive glory – you may know him by another name. This is the other side of language that exists in conjunction with its incoherence. The incoherent coherency has a manifestation of such deception. The coherent incoherence breaks them down only to reveal more incoherent coherence!!!

P: Iaaaaa!!

Incoherentism

Incoherentism is the theory that at the bottom of all concepts there is a failure of
sense. Incoherentism is the reflection of the failure of the ‘words mean objects’ paradigm. Incoherentism is inherent in any attempt to render what is sometimes called ineffable sensible. Incoherentism does not say that you should not say anything, rather it says that what you say will be in some way incoherent. It also says that this problem is not to be corrected by any superior analysis. Incoherentism is easily visible in opposing schools’ ability to disagree based upon some incoherence in the opposing theory. Incoherentism thus does not mean an idea should be abandoned. Often it is thought that ideas that have an appearance of ‘real’ information can be discarded once the internal incoherence is exposed. This is not true. The idea persists, powered by the appearance, at least where the appearance has the character of ambiguity. Of course, we could say incoherentism presupposes a coherentism. But this coherentism is the phantasy of the ‘words mean objects’ paradigm. In this sense, incoherentism is just an expression of the nature of language.

**Incoherence 1.0**

Incoherence is a feature of the way we exist in pneuma. The structure of incoherent coherence and coherent incoherence has been described elsewhere, but briefly let us remind ourselves that the former describes the ordinary manifestation of the concept insofar as it appears to adequately demarcate its territory, whilst the latter is what we come to know about the concept upon analysis – that it is incoherent. This notion though features in three notable places in a more general philosophy. The first of these is the perennial problem of living and non-living. True, this is just the same incoherence problem, however the case is so important that the invocation of the term must also be considered so. The issue crosses over and *might* be considered identical with conscious non-conscious, though the accretions are different. No particular answer sharply differentiating between the two is found in definition, precisely because of the borderline phantasies of the awareness of the putatively
unaware. This position says that essentially there is no answer in the sense we would like one. The borderline is incoherent and can be known to be so (with the caveat of a phantasy of knowing apodictically lurking around). Whitehead's solution of a mental pole that exists from electron to human in various scales is all well and good but it remains ontological speculation. We would be better to acknowledge that there is a manifestation of supposedly inert matter as also conscious in some sense. This receives greater or less grammatical grounding depending on what kind of accretions one is an agent for. A propos writing, the situation is confused further by the possibility that whether or not the supposedly unaware is aware or not turns on whether or not it is treated as aware or not, thereby compounding the incoherence even further. Thus a Whiteheadian theory can be seen as the rise of a competing accretion in the pneuminosity rather than as the truth. The truth would be the competing/interacting pneuminous accretions. The second incoherence involves the difference between humans and animals and the third between natural kinds and human-made things. More will be said on these accretions in due course. However, we note that between the three of them they seem to constitute the fundamental field of incoherence.

**Incoherence 1.1**

The question that discloses itself in clarity now is: Is the incoherence that I maintain exists in a conceptual formation pre-analysis on Derridean/Wittgensteinian horizons (incoherent coherence) the same as the incoherence found in the synchronistic phenomenon? This has certainly been my claim, i.e. that the sense of incoherent belief that this phenomenon has a sense of. Yet if you ask me how this sense happens I am unable to give it to you, that this sense is the same as the problem I

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10 We see here that manifestationism and pneuminosity have not yet been separated out. The problem of course is that in saying that competing accretions is a model of the true ontology we have presupposed that accretions themselves are not simply a manifestation but a ground. This of course is not the case and the accretive theory (as is acknowledged later) is itself a competing manifestation.
have when I try to account for the wholeness of the sense of a word’s functioning. If this identity does not hold then I have simply reified incoherence and then linked two things. I can, indeed would, argue that this is acceptable because the accretion of incoherence a priori links the two, but this is unconvincing unless you accept the accretions themselves as sufficient ontology.

You Don’t Know It’s Not True

I eschew this characterisation of the philosophy herein, however its simple reductive expression in ‘ordinary’ language is maybe something that should be embraced for whether I like it or not, it is essentially what all of this work is about. “Was that a synchronicity or a coincidence (a reality bend or a reality selection)?” “I think it was a synchronicity!” “Actually it wasn’t. Did you know that statistically things like that are bound to happen sometimes?” “Yes I did, but telling me that doesn’t prove to me it wasn’t a reality bend, because that would look exactly the same.” “Can’t you see that’s not true?” “No, you don’t know it’s not true because you don’t have sufficient access to reality to tell me this.”

And so on...

This, of course, leaves itself open to the accusation “then anything could be true, just because I don’t have sufficient access to deny it” (I could be an emissary of the dog god from the future). But the case against this is that of criteria; that is, in order to raise a case (here we deal with paranormal cases) we must have criteria for doing so. The synchronicity in a sense is its own criteria, it presents the world suddenly as different, which allows the phantasy to manifest itself. That which is spurious nonsense is subject to criteria against it.
**Phantasy 1.0**

When one attempts a reconceptualisation what is at stake? The renaming of a pre-existing matter? Surely that is not what is hoped for. Somehow there is supposed to be a new grouping or a new *apophansis*. What we tentatively postulate here is a notion to replace the doubtful, doleful face of scepticism. Where something was sceptical, now it is phantastic. Changing the signifier is never simply that. The perception of – if it were limited to them – just those associations of scepticism alone under a different name would create a different dynamic within the arising. The phantastic takes under its wing the epistemological abyss. How many faces does this abyss have? How can an abyss have faces? A face is a horizon of infinite meaning; the manifestation of the phantastic is no less. The abysmal phantasy is that into which we fall every time we sleep. The phantasy gives us the knowledge that we do not know what happens when we sleep; that we do not know what happens when your friend rounds the bend ahead of you. It only doubts insofar as doubt lets us know the infinite possibility around us in the limits of the disclosure of being available. My commentary on Kant\(^\text{11}\) is reminiscent to me here. What is important is the experience of the phantastic, not the working out of its conceptuality; this would be its present-at-handness and lead us down a path of dust.

**Phantasy 1.01**

Phantasy: How do we expand this? We have already said we did not wish to conceptually. But maybe this is erroneous. How can we map the loops that take place here? In other words, when a concept becomes abstract and theoretical it suffers a certain death-by-theory, it is studied *in vitro*, and yet by the very nature of what is studied we might yet find there is sufficient power in this corpse to possess someone else. This theoretical daimon might easily leap out and get you.

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\(^\text{11}\) See the sections on umbra in this volume for more on Kant.
Note how this is phantastical language. You are wont to say that no demon or daimon will leap out and get me. But observe and remember that there is nothing in these scribbles but that interpretation that tells you they mean something. Stare at them and attempt to see them as meaning-devoid lines, almost impossible. The concept as interpreted has a pneuminous life that will find a greater or lesser manifestation in your own thinking. This whole is the daimon, a truly ideal entity, autopoetic in its ability to reproduce. Phantasy is not so unrelated to its ordinary language use. But this is not a psychoanalytic use – though it might not be so far removed sometimes. What we wish to encompass in this notion, though, is the manner in which phantasy encapsulates the inability to overcome some kind of factual account of being that lays beings out in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of the phantastic.

Phantasy is fantasy understood as fantasy\textsuperscript{12}. Is there ever such a thing? Is this rarer than phantasy? There may be no sharp division here. If I daydream about being a superhero this is a fantasy. If I read a book about faeries and gain a great poetical longing for some notion of a hidden people in the forest and hills and subsequently even take up a pastime of looking for them, this is phantasy. Yet both seem like a flat contradiction of how the world is presented to me. The latter operates within a peculiar epistemological realm that we must understand to do justice to forms of belief. Another part of the claim of the phantastic is that it makes no negative claim about the kind of phenomena. Phantastic does not mean subjective and merely internal desired imaginings, it means sometimes contingent on Being being a manner that we do not understand ordinarily.

**Phantasy 1.02**

Pneuminous accretions are a phantasy. This has already been mentioned. To tread

\textsuperscript{12} The original meaning of this enigmatic phrase is completely lost. I have tried in vain to recreate my line of thought or imagine what error exists here. It remains in the text purely as an aporia.
the path of the pneuminous accretion is to have gone too far. We have wandered, erred and indulged. Yet we must wander, we must err, we must indulge, for we have nothing else but this realm. All hope of grasping is lost here in this desolate land. When we do not allow ourselves to wander and to indulge and err what do we find? We find the ground from which the doctrine of accretions grew and that ground is empirical. How can we get round this? If we believe again in a rational world view then we have also drifted into phantasy. Surely that cannot be so. Yet it is, for the rational world view can do little to dent your monadic existence; it can bolster one interpretation of its manifestation and help its solidity solidify. Reified theory is phantasy, a pneuminous accretion no less, as pernicious as any gorgon. It is not as it really is any less than it discloses itself in stranger ways and these strange ways too are part of the disclosure. As they arise they cry out for interpretation that we may disregard, yet we cannot disregard the possibility of interpreting them thus, as the monadic loneliness cannot reach out beyond its phantasy. But isn’t this more than we intended phantasy to be?

**Phantasy 1.03**

Why did we move beyond the world? What made us wish to invoke other forces for explanation? And yet Plato precedes Aristotle. When we say we derived number from the world, do we say something cogent? Like P. says, ‘here is one thing and here is another’. It comes from the gap, which then says ‘but in order to have two things, I must have the concept of twoness’, hence there must be such an essence enabling my perception of these things as such. But the *principium individuationis* guarantees this without the Platonic need. From the monad’s perspective there are seemingly separate things. The creative conceptual power of being unfolds the twoness out of the physicality. But hold on, didn’t we just hide the Platonism in the *creative conceptual unfolding of being*? We did indeed, we posited that the mind has a capacity to reformulate an understanding of existence. But then the Platonist
can say that we just accessed the forms that were already there; they were the unfolding aspect perception and the best retort we have is that the Platonism is then contingent. But is it any more contingent than the capacity of the mind to reformulate things on an empirical stream – which we can know must itself be noetically mediated?

Both sides of the bifurcation are phantasies though more clearly so the Platonic side. It adds an element of epistemological possibility that cannot be positively refuted. This failure to positively refute it with the apparent manifestation of the essence of things (a more empirical conception) is the phantasy of Platonism\textsuperscript{13}.

**Phantasy 1.04**

Phantasy can be analysed into ontic and ontological manifestations. Those ontic phantasies relate to unknowables within the world; conspiracy theories, the truth of ‘normal’ news and the like fall into the category of ontic manifestations. The philosophies themselves – idealism, materialism, realism etc. – are ontological phantasies\textsuperscript{14}. Each one attempts to answer the question of being, leaving the minimum of logical difficulty. Naturally they all fail, though may each have advocates who presumably believe in the positions. Of course, owing to the incoherence inherent in language there is no possibility of proving a given position wrong from a given phantasy. Only the affective belief from within the phantasy remains.

\textsuperscript{13} “as generative of the numerical pneuminous accretions that may be experienced in various ways” follows in the original text. The meaning of this is a rather rambling extension into the accretive notion. The point though is that Plato can be explained by the accretive theory and that his numerical conception of perfection is illustrative of this. The numbers appear as a priori platonic entities but are really (in accretive theory) abstractions from the empirical realm that then, like all accretions, become detached from people in general and float freely. This gives them the appearance of a priori entities, which they are in a sense, yet equally they are contingent.

\textsuperscript{14} We see here the proto manifestationist notion appearing more clearly.
Phantasy 1.05

When we consider foolish the self-disclosure of the object we must be quite clear as to what kind of claim we are making against this thesis. If the thing did not self-disclose then it must have been disclosed by the monad itself. But when the monadic attention is caught by the thing, what happened there? What motivated the monad to disclose the thing if not the thing? We could postulate psychological/psychoanalytic factors that might determine this but then we would be lost in the phantasy of psychoanalytical thought and not have improved the matter. Furthermore, it only creates a further recourse to a previous occasion on which the thing self-disclosed. That the thing disclosed itself is one more competing phantasy is the case, yet it is one more competing phantasy. The thing no doubt disclosed itself within the horizon of an event-complex which itself is a context of existence. An event-complex discloses itself as unity containing things in some relation – a cat and a car, for example. The event-complex occurs and discloses itself in doing so. This implies there was a state in which an event-complex did not occur. This is heuristically true of our experience: ‘it was just one thing after another.’

Phantasy 1.06

The aspect flip involved in perceiving the pneuminous accretions as part of an ontology involves the phantasy of an aether. The phantasy of aether as ontologically effective/interactive – in another sense the interaction between the substantial and the informational – helps to give rise to the aspect flip but is only a necessary condition of such an ontology. The aether in this sense is information. But information is an ontological differential. Awareness entails information and must be interpreted as altering that which is out there.

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15 This aether is what later turns into the pneuma of later work. The informational substrate of everything.
Phantasy 1.07
When we worry whether we encounter only our own reflection in the world or not we should be aware that once more we have engaged in a phantasy.

Phantasy 1.08
The phantasies compete to become reality. But both are accretions. But accretions are phantasies.

Accretive Complex
What is x? This is answered by a pneuminous accretion formed of the informational aether. The accretion is given a name. The name is part of the accretion. A line has been attached to it from the monadic accretion – forming a pneuminous-accretive complex. It is purely heuristic to talk of a discrete pneuminous accretion in the first place for they are all interconnected in a myriad of ways. Each accretion has the possibility of being proliferated through analysis. The accretion is incoherently coherently whole. Accretive forms cannot be underestimated in terms of possibility of size – where size is understood quasi-metaphorically. A religion is a kind of accretion, hideously weaving in on itself, overlapping, unfolding, concealing, disclosing. These pneuminous entities reciprocally effect their embedded monads, reinforcing literally the belief. The hypocrisies and incoherences there inherent do not undermine the existence of such accretions, though they do indeed look bewildering. This incomprehensible morass of organised informational aether is comprised of the endless lines of constituting power emitting from the attached monads. Each monad in turn hooks into other systems. Such is the understanding of this phenomena down the corridor. But being an embedded monad is not something abstract. It is this, you read the information right now, I write the information right now. Noesis binds the aether to the accretive forms.
Deficit between Accretion and Actuality

How can we speak of such a thing mired in these accretions like ourselves? The terrifying thing is we must postulate that the actual (an accretive notion in itself, a phantasy of a self-existent reality that has a manifest appearance to us, either as an impossibly accessible noumena or a scientifically accessible reality) is a mysterious base upon which the conceptual accretions accrete. Is this the admission of something beyond idealism? Only as a phantasy, one that is largely taken as reality. The possibility that we attempt to tease out is that the informational pneuma as processed by the monad is not passive to the noumena. The observable effect of such interactions is what we tend to call weyrd\textsuperscript{16}.

Umbra

Umbra means shadow – but of course you knew that. I use the term ‘umbratic’ in a sense I am not yet quite sure of, but it is something approximate to the thing-in-itself. Yet here in this philosophy the thing in itself is a manifestation. For Kant it manifests as an unknowable [p]noumenon and for Hegel it is the idea. A common modern conception is the absolute reality of the spatio-temporal framework. The universe continuing without our presence in the same manner. I’m not here to argue with this, I’m saying this is a manifestation of how things are. When this conception is held, umbra retreats. Umbra holds sway in something like a Kantianism where that darkness outside of perception is allowed to be. That shadow that epistemologically exists in the beyond of objects, in the phantasy that perception exerts an ontological effect! This is incoherent but, as has already been discussed, in its base all accretions are incoherent.

\textsuperscript{16} This curious passage foreshadows the notion of the umbratic.
Umbratic/Chthonic

Let’s dwell on these a moment and see if we understand any clearer what we’re talking about. Do we need two categories? I think so, yes. The umbratic is the never perceived at all ever, the rear side of the perceptual object and the putative behind of the appearance. An unknowable existence that presents its manifestation in exactly that impossible idea of there being something in our absence. So there is the manifestation of something that we overlay with our pneuma acreating capacities. The pneuma overlays the umbra. Is that clear? So what do we need the chthonic for? Whilst reading something about Lacan I was drawn to his notion of the real. Now the real for Lacan would probably cover both of these but I feel there is a separation to make. The passage I read said that there was no break in the real, that it was us that chopped it (conceptually) up.

This isn’t so helpful for this dark umbratic existence, which ironically partially contains the manifestation of things still being separate outside of our view. The chthonic for me would be more the sense of the given that I think I thought I could attribute to the umbratic in a recent post. The chthonic is more like a Husserlian hyle. There may be areas in my perception that are undifferentiated, that are to me a mass of approaching unconceptual space. Explanatory words given to me immediately attract pneuma. So are we saying here that there may be experiences without pneuma? I think not, just that in some instances the pneuma is so thin we have a close to non-pneuminous experience. This is not an experience of the in itself, this is closer to Sartre’s experience of a tree. The field of being is highly conceptually (pneuminously) restricted, which produces an uncanny effect.

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17 The later developed notion of the vector field is hinted at by the notion of the chthonic.
Umbra 1.01

The notion of umbra comes more and more to the (ironic) fore. I’m not sure whether all the definitions are the same; hopefully over time they will become more so. The other day I wrote this definition: “That which hides behind the pneuma. There is no possibility of a direct contact with the umbratic for all being is directly pneuminous, or possibly chthonic. As not pneuminous, nothing much can be directly said about the umbratic except the phrase that the umbra suggests the pneuma. This means that the umbratic does have a specific form that manifests in a certain way pneuminously.”
I want to consider for the moment that the umbratic is the manifestation of the idea of something outside of the pneuma. This is a better definition because it takes the notion of manifestations into account rather than actually postulating an umbratic beyond. In philosophy we are engaged in the war of manifestations, that is, of logical possibilities of how being might be. When we engage in philosophies of a more idealistic stance we make phenomena like the umbratic appear. Kant’s ding an sich is like the umbratic (though it is not identical). The notion appears as something that hides behind phenomenal appearance.
In this work the umbratic shows itself as that which is outside of awareness. Is this a coherent thing to talk about? Possibly not, but this is entirely beside the point; the manifestation that we can say something about anything outside of awareness from a kind of Kantian position is a necessary construct, a transcendental manifestation. Of course, when we engage in more realist positions this problem dissolves. The things continue to be outside of awareness in much the same way.
The problem of the umbratic turns, as in much of the rest of this philosophy, on the problem of magick – as a force for bending events to one’s will. Not all interpretations of magick entail this, but those that grant magick as magick (true reality bending) do. I hold that phenomenologically whatever is held within awareness is relatively held statically and outside of it shows the possibility that it
might be changed (the possibility of it being interpreted in this way).
The umbratic then appears as the behind of pneuminous phenomena and its nature outside of awareness (though the latter does entail the former). Despite the whole object being directly suggested by visible profiles, the hidden part remains umbratic. It must be this strict for it to be cogent at all.
This word of shadow is not accidentally chosen. Impenetrable darkness is a kind of ambiguous experience of the umbratic. Of course, as it has a context, e.g. it’s night, it’s a sealed room, it still has a thin pneuminosity to it, but its umbratic experience consists in that which is within it being completely withdrawn. If I reach into this darkness to check that the cuddly toy is still in the cupboard I employ the pneuminosity of touch to re-establish this solidity (this is still information). However, in the experience of staring into the black we are allowed (via the magickal grammar as enabled by the anomalous phenomena) to consider that we are staring into a literal flux of possibility.
This incoherent possibility is the correlate manifestation of pneuma, for within the pneuminous situation the paradoxical question will always arise, ‘what is outside the pneuma?’ It is not solidity, in itselfness, that is said to reside therein for this is all information (the pneuminous itself), though equally it is part of the manifestation of the umbratic that these notions arise. The persistence of things and their incoherent flux are both contained within this notion. It does not say things are in flux, it says they could be, and maybe the umbratic can change by itself, but in magick it is the pneuma that changes the umbratic and hence changes the pneuma. Now this is confusing because this makes it appear that the umbratic is dominant. In a sense this is true i.e. as a manifestation of something outside of the pneuminous bubble (existence looks vaster than awareness). We reach a position in which we don’t look too argumentative with modern science, we’re just interested in delineating certain experiences and what they imply.
The manifestation of things implies their externality; even if informationally
(pneuminously) held as such, their consistency begs some kind of continuity. Things outside of awareness may not be identical to things in awareness (awareness is treated as a solidifying force (pneuma)).

The big differences are that:

a) There is a postulation of difference of beings within pneuminosity and beings outside (umbratically concealed).

b) The pneuma can affect the umbratic via the actions of pneuminous beings in an a-spatio-temporal manner (magick).

This means, as has been put forward before, that any kind an-sich cannot be said to be the umbratic but must be the synthesis of pneuma and umbra as a whole. This from a pneuminous being’s point of view is an impossibility as all information would always a priori be pneuminous.

**Pneuminous/Chthonic**

The possibility arises that the pneuminous is actually the shadow world itself, or rather there is no shadow world and the pneuminous is itself the solid. Solidity is, of course, something we know about something and hence pneuminous. There is, of course, a manifestation of the notion that there is a shadow world – and this must be what the doctrine means. So the idea that there is pneumionus content of a being as yet accreted to the accretion by the assimilator has cogency as a manifestation but phenomenologically not as an ontological absolute. Yet still further thought reinforces the existence of the chthonic precisely as the manifestation mentioned above. The key lies precisely in the retained appearance of the possibility of the thing-accretion showing something else to us. Part of the showing itself of a thing is the unconcealed part. The unconcealed is the chthonic. This applies to different things in different ways. An axe is an accretion formed over the chthonic; the chthonic might disclose itself as some other function and thus wed another accretion
to the axe\textsuperscript{18}. But a rock is also an accretion; the rock might disclose another possibility of itself as a hammer (accretion) or it might differentiate itself from other rocks in a manner previously unrecorded – mineral differentiation. Thus a new accretion might be formed – in taxonomy.

Note: This writing concerns an earlier conception of the chthonic. It also seems confused to me. There is certainly a manifestation of a shadow world as potentially different from the pneuminous – the umbratic, as recently written about.

**Darkness 1.2**

Doubt and darkness have an entwined status. Doubt comes from two. Dark and light are two, both are equally primordial and thus both are as much two as they are one. Dark and light both disclose. One gives rise to the quest for certainty and discloses beings, one withdraws being[s] and in a sense discloses being.

I stand in the dark with the dog, through the holly arch it is very dark, at least here I am in the light of the house. Moving away from the house the darkness increases, it feels oppressively dark tonight, darker than usual. If I indulge slightly in those kinds of thoughts I can imagine all sorts of fearful nebulous notions in the darkness. Are they nebulous? Is it the fear of the dead? The possibility of a sudden appearance of an apparition strikes me as fearful. I have no rational grounds for supposing I will have such an encounter yet it remains a possibility for me to somehow entertain it. Where can I find solace from such an idea? Rationality can do nothing to deny such a happening for I might have a fear-based psychotic occurrence and perceive something in the dark very vividly. Was it there? Yes? Was it real? As the interpretation of madness was only an interpretation in the first place there is no ground to make an absolute assertion either way regarding the status of any such

\textsuperscript{18} What is being reached for here is the notion of the vector field which postulates a field of experienceable pneuma that is basically unaccreted.
apparition.
I retreat inside having avoided the darker recesses of the garden. I fumble with the
doors and the key falls out the lock. Something chimes in my mind in this incident.
Something suggests that this falling out is in itself symbolic. It is symbolic of the
insecurity of the house. The darkness outside, the boundary unsecure. What is
happening? Nothing in a way but my mind could be a hair’s breadth from treating
this more seriously.

Later on I must go downstairs again. I must go to the cold attached outhouse. I
retrieve what I must. But... on the way back towards the stairs I walk towards the
front door, but the front door is moving. What is happening? The front door is
opening. Blind terror: the darkness, the key, the door is opening. I run towards it
and slam it in fear of what was trying to come in.

How should I sensibly interpret these events? When events disclose themselves in a
sequence like this they make a powerful expression. Of course, the door might have
been loose and the wind may have blown it open. In conjunction with the other
events and an openness to see things under this auspice another world opens up,
and when we seek to say it is wrong, we find we have nothing by which we can do
so.

World
What are the characteristics of the world? Is not ineffability one of them?

The Axiom of Groundlessness
The axiom states that: as philosophy seeks a rigorous underpinning of our existence
it attempts to rigorously sort out the concepts used there so the matter can be properly clarified. However, few concepts (if any) can be perfectly clarified/disambiguated and this picture seems to presuppose a correspondence view of truth and no concept corresponds to a supposed exterior object – rather the relation is of the way the word is used in a certain activity (even if that activity is philosophy). Thus the attempt to refine philosophy is flawed or rather the result is illusory for the narrowing that is supposed to take place does not occur. Rather due to the irreducible ambiguity an irremovable bickering results, which goes nowhere. Did Kant mean this? Did Kant mean that? Does it matter? Rather what matters is how the monad feels in relation to its encounter with Kant. Awe at the cognitive architectonic phantasy in place, reflective experimental wonder. One of the causes of this kind of problem is the reified (pneuminous) accretive core; but the accretive core does not possess the necessity demanded of it for philosophical rigour – since they are themselves contingent. The accretion of rigour (a phantasy itself) generates the further phantasy of a pure understanding. Philosophy instead must learn this and pursue what is indicated in Deleuze and Heidegger: that philosophising should be creative and poetic, for in such language is the power to reform the accretions and invoke apophenia.

Three Horizons of the Uncanny

The uncanny raises accretive connections across the areas in which we are working. It seems clear to us that the sensation referred to as ‘uncanny’ concerns the transition from the familiar to the unfamiliar. This, of course, is the characteristic of the occult rupture. However, the occult rupture does not exhaust the uncanny, hence here we put forward the three possible horizons for its manifestation.

i) The ontic horizon: This occurs where some phenomena from within the ordinary
contents of world change from one into another – yet do not move outside of it, e.g. I thought it was a stone until it moved.

ii) The ontological horizon: This is the uncanniness of being-at-all. In other words, a response to the sudden disclosure of the facticity of being that makes it appear suddenly strange and alien and prompts philosophical responses such as: “Why is there something other than nothing?” The sheer uncanniness that one is, that there are things and people and language. The first concerns the notion of beings as a whole, the second the experience of consciousness within being. Solipsistic concerns also come under this heading, and these too give an ontological uncanny — a phantasy fuelled by scepticism, the utterly incoherent possibility that there is somehow only me as an actually conscious being.

iii) The supernatural horizon: This is the uncanniness that the Tractatus often concerns itself with. All super-natural interventions (or the manifestation of them) make the world look suddenly uncanny. Synchronicity is again a powerful example of this kind of phenomenon, though all telepathic, spiritual manifestations still unsettle a rationally perceived world into a suddenly irrational one. The problem with the notion of the supernatural horizon is a) that it is not necessary, it is possible to treat the world as if the magickal phenomena are rare but not something that doesn’t happen (are essentially natural), and b) that they are not transcendental illusions but rather aspects of reality that we do not as yet possess the abilities to comprehend. Note the difference in the two rational approaches: one says that when we experience the supernatural we are deluded and there is a rational world that underpins it; the second says that when we experience the supernatural, whilst it is possible there is a solid world explanation (a creaking floorboard that was a ‘ghost’), there is also the possibility we do not understand reality sufficiently to explain it yet there is still some unknown force in operation here. The latter option is still rational because it essentially subscribes to the principle of sufficient reason. So even if there is an
extra unexplained aspect to the phenomena we still speculate that there must be a reason for this.
This gives us a kind of Kantian sense of the power (or hubris) of reason, for we feel even in the face of the utterly strange that comprehension is still a possibility here.
What does comprehension here mean? Only this: that we can speak of the criteria for the conditions of the event in such a way that someone else can understand them.

Manifestationism and Phantasy
By means of a terminological clear-up it seems evident to me that the terms 'manifestation', 'phantasy' and 'reality' are all related. Manifestation is a way in which being can disclose itself, idealism, materialism and endless permutations thereof. Phantasies are manifestations not considered 'reality' but that nevertheless occupy a space such that they could be considered 'real'. They do not at a given time hold the power of being interpreted as dominant ideologies. Reality is just the manifestation that is dominant at a given time. This manifestation will have incoherent borders to the competing phantasies that hover around it awaiting their turn.

Manifestationism 1.01
One of the problems here can be outlined as follows. Manifestations exist as the logical possibilities of being. These war amongst themselves through the actions of their agents (the philosophers) in an impossible war. But what determines how an agent comes into being? It seems we would need a psychological determination, but any psychological determination must presuppose that the ontology is fitting to psychology, which in turn could only be determined within one or more of the manifestations.
**Manifestations 1.02**

Manifestations are philosophies. They might be more appropriately called ‘transcendental manifestations’. They are the ways that the world looks, the ways we might imagine it could be, idealism, empiricism, realism, monotheism, animism, all twists and turns of being in its possibilities of disclosure. The choice of manifestation by the desiring assimilator is a phantasy. Each manifestation, of course, accretes pneuma\(^{19}\).

**Manifestationism 1.03**

Manifestationism says the manifestations continue even if there is something objective underneath. This is why it is a product of the synchronicity argument. The synchronicity argument says you cannot remove the appearance of the paranormal world by appeal to saying some putatively solid object ontology holds. This is not possible precisely because the appearance suggests exactly that said ontology does not obtain.

Manifestationism is a wider metaphilosophical strategy that extends this point. It says that all of these philosophical appearances persist in various competing ways. This a pro and against dialectics. Warring manifestations will generate new manifestations. This, however, does not mean that the previous incarnations have gone, rather these pneuminous creatures proliferate, accreting to each other in dubious alliances to take control of the endless turmoil that is the pneuminous territory.

\(^{19}\) Here again we see the problem of having conflated the pneuminous theory with the meta-philosophy of manifestationism.
Manifestationism 1.04

It seems incredibly hard to untangle pneuminous theory and manifestationism. Not that they need necessarily untangling as such but there does seem to be a problem that is probably concerned with the manifestations as they appear if one accepts pneuminosity and if one does not. Let’s start by noting that pneuminosity is a manifestation, it is the world showing itself as an informational substance (pneuma). This manifestation is indicated by pneuminous interference phenomena. As soon as you have pneuminosity you also have the idea of its beyond, which paradoxically is immediately pneuminously rendered but is a special case. This is the umbra. The umbratic is necessarily never directly perceived but exists only as the idea that there must be something behind the pneuma: an ineffable remainder outside of consciousness.

In fact, this does not mean that the umbratic necessarily exists, it is a manifestation from within pneuminous theory. Pneuminous theory could maintain that there is nothing but pneuma; this is a competing manifestation of the theory. However, as pneuminosity is also compatible with the notion of umbra, indeed would find it hard to eradicate it, the umbratic is not to be removed. If we tried to say that there was only pneuma we would be in the position of denying that the pneuma might be overlaying something else. If we do deny this we are left with how the pneuma supports itself as only information. That the pneuminous is not just passive in relation to the umbra is accepted, but that it is self-supporting insofar as the bifurcation seems to be begged by the Kantian manifestation of being for us, which is not removable.

What the speculative realist tries to show is that absolute being as can be accessed outside of human conception. This conception as a manifestation can certainly appear and seem cogent true, but what it fails to note is that what is equally cogent is the Kantian being-for-us manifestation. The argument between these two cannot be settled as without some kind of superior science it is not possible to get past that
epistemology. The we-can-know-being-in-itself manifestation can chomp at the bit and point to all manner of physics and cosmological enormity but it still cannot bypass the possibility that all of this might be just how the universe appears to a being like ourselves and that even our most non-human seeming scientific measurements are just necessarily an extension of what is epistemically possible to us.

This is how it gets tangled, because now I’m talking about epistemological problems that occur with or without pneuminosity being in the picture. Certainly, pneuminosity is a form of correlationism, but it is a particular kind of correlationist picture. Pneuminosity means that pneuma and umbra interact. In older language (the fit is not perfect): secondary qualities affect the primary qualities.

To return to the notion that the pneuma is self-supporting, we note the following dialectic occurs. Pneuma, as information, contains the idea of its own beyond umbra; this idea necessarily exists as an accretion. Thus the accretion of the in umbratic exists, which as the pneuma is not passive means it is possible that the umbra is created after the pneuma as its perceived ineffable holder.

Manifestationism is just about pointing out that somehow different ways in which being shows itself compete with each other. We cannot even say how we choose one as subjectivising the philosophy would already have selected a certain manifestation. The space must be left open. There is being is still not unreasonable. Its disclosure is its manifestation. It all sounds quite Heidegger when it is phrased this way. It can be argued that the statement ‘there is being’ has gone too far, of course. This argument turns on whether being can be said to connote. In pneuminosity, of course, being has indeed accreted to Heidegger. But if being were just to be said to mean that some kind of existence obtains it would seem relatively uncontroversial.
Laying Out (Manifestationism)

This is such a jumble of material and yet I frequently have insights into how it all knits together and then completely lose the unity again. So we’re looking at a phenomenological philosophy that tries to say problems arise between different systems that mean the arguments between them cannot be reconciled because of the incoherence inherent in all concepts. Furthermore, the incoherent concepts are manifestations of how we take things to be. In the case of philosophy, idealism and realism are both irreconcilable manifestations, both incoherent by themselves. So we do have some kind of a meta-Kantian limitation on the whole system yet at the same time acknowledge that the manifestation of Kant’s incorrectness is also very powerful.

Umbratic is the possibility of the shadow thing outside of our perception, taken to be the same as within perception but ultimately unknown to hold this identity; indeed one phenomenological aspect can tell us a priori that it is not identical as it is perceived and this is necessarily some kind of difference. Clearly the problem is incoherent but this is not a reason for dismissing it. A realism would tell us there is no difference but the same epistemological doubt means we cannot be sure of this. So the umbratic is close to the thing in itself – maybe not identical but certainly a related manifestation. The umbratic is the phantasy of brute stuff of primary qualities without secondary qualities. Chthonic is being perceived but uncategorised. When we have no obvious concept of what is before us the chthonic is rumbling. Is the chthonic the incoherence?

The pneuminous is the information, the sense of incoherent coherence that pervades the world in its demarcation. This is a computer. Do I know what I computer is? What is everything I could call a computer? No I don’t, this is incoherence. But it is completely coherent to me that this is a computer nevertheless.

And magick? This is about pointing out that the pneuma may be capable of

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20 The vector field in the CEO work.
affecting the umbra. It’s about saying that pneuma without umbra may be capable of action in the world, i.e. a spirit or a spell. This philosophy doesn’t say that this is true, it says that you can never know if it’s true or not and that some events act as criteria for our thinking that it is true. Ethical possibilities here include reconsidering how we can just think anything about anyone and it doesn’t really matter because we are discrete creatures in a spatio-temporal holder. It means Granny’s special pen really is Granny’s special pen. It means that things that we lose that hurt hurt because we lose the pneumimous thing, which was literally part of us. We consider currently whether there is a supplementary manifestation of energia required. Apophansis seems sufficient to bypass this in one sense, i.e. if I see a stone as possessed by a spirit, so it is so. But the manifestation of a force is still undeniably one. Vitalism is also a manifestation...

**Phantasy-Manifestation-Agnostic Disjunction**

Further to the attempt to untangle some of the various terminological threads comes the insight that from an accepted manifestation other manifestations appear as phantasies. So if I buy into a materialist manifestation then the solid world appears to be a phantasy and vice versa. Phantasy, we will recall, is an epistemologically ineradicable option repressed only by greater weight being given to the accepted manifestation.

Let us create the notion of the agnostic disjunction as a helpful terminological description. The agnostic disjunction occurs exactly in a situation where the outcome is not decided definitely by any kind of certainty but rather only a preference for one criteria based option over another. The pertinent example in this work has always been the interpretation of synchronicity as either a solid world statistical possibility or a fluid world pneuminous interference. The impossibility of arbitrating this (and other similar disjunctions) is called the ‘agnostic disjunction’. There is no perfectly clear boundary between a fantasy and a phantasy, but the general idea
is that a fantasy is an engagement with something that I have no grounds for believing might happen (I might become Superman), whereas a phantasy is a possible way in which existence might actually be interpreted. It is incumbent on phantasies that they are able to demonstrate criteria for their acceptance to enable them to be competing manifestations. I did not previously spot the overlap of manifestation and phantasy but clearly the terms are related. To reiterate: when a manifestation is not accepted it is a phantasy in relation to the dominant manifestation. For example, a committed idealist has materialism as a phantasy and they spend their time trying to shore up the territory against materialist incursions. Here we can see the relation with the philosophy of agency, but this philosophy is largely functional only under the pneuminous manifestation. In the pneuminous manifestation various accretions are vying for territory. Pneuminous beings largely taken over by certain accretions (idealist ones in the example) cannot actually defeat the materialist because both positions are incoherent—they both have a variety of ambiguous holes through which they may attack each other. There does need to be a better description of the dialectic of subject formation though a preemption of it would be something like this: selves are accretions, they are constituted by other pneuminous beings. Pneuminous beings invariably have a self-accretion of some kind (though it is not necessary that this is the case, think of certain kinds of what we call ‘mental illness’). The self-accretion is, of course, accreted to all manner of different pneuminous structures. Now, accepting that a materialist would blatantly reject this explanation of things, the pneuminous description of such a theoretical adherent is that they are accreted to a solid manifestation of existence and supporting accretions. A reasonable question would be whether it is better to call the self-accretion a kind of discrete name/body pneuminous form or whether the self-accretion is an incoherent unity of the name/body and its accompanying accretions (which would manifest as beliefs etc.). The latter sounds very reasonable in one sense, as we might say “here is John, he is
a materialist”. The very predication instantiates that he is a materialist. But maybe we would also say “here is John, he has materialist views”, in which case the former looks more appropriate. Potentially there are different kinds of self-accretion anyway, some of which are deeply intertwined with political, religious, or other views, and other kinds of self-accretion where the pneuminous thread’s relation to its beliefs is weaker. This kind of multiplicity is possibly the best way to go with it.

Will
The problem of energy re-emerges in the form of the will. In other people I might well have the pneuminous experience of seeing effort expended, but the experience of expending effort myself (to a greater or lesser degree) seems to be wrongly termed as pneuminous. In the case of the sigil it seems better. I can try to see something as having power, the shift is pneuminous. There is a manifestation we should remember here, the Schopenhauerian disclosure of all as ‘will’. This is one of the competing voices for sure. I see something as desirable and this is pneuminous. I strive to achieve something because I wish a certain accretive state to occur. I wish to agglomerate some accretions or possibly to separate some. From this monadic point it seems the emanating effort acts.

Intensity/Energy
A manifestation that re-emerges constantly is that of vital-energy. This kind of notion has obviously been with us for a long time, prana, chi, orgone and vital force being some examples. The work here has not used this notion believing that information is sufficient to rid ourselves of this idea. This might still be right, yet it seems there must be some kind of acknowledgement of this issue (as a manifestation). The reason we have not employed it is because calling it energy is always a kind of explanation for various phenomena that conveniently maps along
various axes, e.g. ghosts and living creatures would be powered by the same force. It remains a supposition to then say that there must be an energy that takes these different forms (an undermining strategy in Harman’s language). The problem is at least better phenomenologically posed if we say that the phenomena are only information (pneuma), and then adjust what information must necessarily be in order for this to be the case. This has the advantage of starting with something we can know, i.e. that we see the floating mist as a ghost, and as such imbue it with a person-like quality. In the ghostly instance the pneuma that is commonly attached to umbra (we call this unity a human being) becomes uncoupled from it and persists to a lesser or greater degree. We do not say how this comes about, merely that if such a phenomenon is taken as obtaining, then this is the most we can say it is, and when we stray to energy theory we have gone into speculation. The problem that persists is the problem of intensity. This issue regards (amongst others) the notion of why one sigil is magickal and another is not. Certainly the language of energy is employed in this way – people talk about ‘charging’ symbols. We can say “but this is an accretion, and the magickal act is the act of forcing accretions together” but the question we must ask “but how is this done?”

Accepted, the willing subject is also an accretion whose coming into being as a willing subject is born out of umbratic depths (umbra suggests pneuma, but does not control it). In either instance a perception of something growing in power is a pneuminous one: I am overpowered by the perceived force of the phenomenon or I seek to give power to the phenomenon; in other words I strive to look at it as if it were powerful. Force comes from the umbratic suggestion or the controlled pneuma. Energy (in this sense of magickal energy) is certainly an accretion, but it seems from my rumination I am still unable to give it the necessity it sometimes seems to require. A feeling of increasing energy is still pneuminous, it is exactly that information, and whether I seem to manipulate this increase or have it imposed upon me, I am still
within a pneuminous frame and have no recourse to an extra ‘energy’ other than a language game employed as an explanation for the phenomenon.

Let us be clear, there are intractable mysteries here (indeed the transcendental mystery has been posited elsewhere in here as an ontological category) whose description we have by no means scratched. The pneuminous accretion that we call ourselves is one of the central issues here, for from this curious accretion emanates desire, or at least the desire-accretion is necessarily attached to it (to the extent that it has the manifestation of an umbratic suggestion). The ability to weave accretions together is the essence of anything we call creative. Whether a satisfactory disclosure of this being’s inception will occur, it is not possible to tell. For now, let us note the being of energy still as a distracting force until some greater argument compels us to reconsider the matter better.

**Discretion**

The principle of discretion is the genesis of a being with some form of awareness as constituted by an already aware entity. Whilst it is true to say that pneuminous accretion is a rather all-encompassing concept, there exists within this realm multitude of forms for them. Here what we intimate are those acts by which an object that is interpreted as alive (even in a playful manner) acquires a simple (or not so simple) form of awareness itself. The interpretation of something as such is part of the process by which such accretions form. This being alive of the stone or whatever is, of course, a phantasy. We use the term ‘discretion’ to emphasise how it is when we isolate an object (the discrete physically par excellence) that this can occur. It is less likely to occur with an event accretion.

**Ontological Effect**

The thing’s being inheres in its discretion – that we can intentionally isolate it.
However, discretion creates incoherence through the manifestation of the separate. The being of a thing is disclosed and this disclosure fixes the being as that manifestation from which it can be difficult to see it otherwise – the multiple uses of a thing. But the phantasy of *apophansis* is the ontological effect. The ontological effect is that a being becomes what we intend it to be, what we call it. When there is a pre-structure and we call things according to that pre-structure, Being hears this and greets it accordingly.

But this is nonsense for a stone will not become water, though we may call it water. No, but maybe with earnestness it will become a water-stone that may have some curious relation to water. If I treat a stone as if it were imbued with a mystery then it may respond to me in ways that are ineffable. If I treat it as a piece of inert matter, it will be likewise. But one is a delusion! Not so in this phantasy, which carries an equal weighting, though you would not wish it to be so. This is a rational animism – down the corridor.

It is possible that the individual stone has a spirit – this is one phantasy. Is the spirit existent in the stone out on the moor when only the ravens are there? But then we do not know what a spirit is in relation to a stone, we have an incoherence of some kind of power localised in the stone that may manifest in x or y ways. Or is the stone forged from the pneuma by the processing of the monadic intentionality? But then how did we obtain the pre-structure of the mysterious nature that gives rise to animistic ideas? Being in its initial opening suggests this world but correcting it with ‘knowledge’ does not help. Being-in-its-original-opening is yet one more incoherent phantasy. We cannot need such a phantastical history. In the unprocessed, powers still lurk and are but not through our pneuma. The being is immediately processed as it is processed by a pre-structure. This discloses it as such. But the being is still in operation in itself and may suggest itself; there is no *in itself*, only the between of its hidden disclosures and the pre-structure of the monad. Because we cannot pronounce absolutely on the nature of the disclosures they become phantastical and
as such potentially from the stone. When we accept this side of the phantasy then
the spirit arises (but that decision is just a decision). When this *apophanesis* is
successful the being becomes the qualities ascribed to it, hence the need for a pre-
structure to interpret it through. Being without a pre-structure (sometimes referred to
as ‘blank sense data’) is another kind of phantasy. Endlessly it suggests itself in a
similar manner to which discrete beings suggest themselves. This extra step – down
the corridor – is the one that is not usually taken, where we began: the ontological
effect. The pneuma takes over the being of the thing, which is always hidden and
only shows itself in various disclosures, which may then affect the pre-structure. In the
case of the pre-structure being that of awareness, the meeting of the depths of the
thing and pre-structure of awareness granting, join to form a kind of accretion with
awareness only due to its being interpreted as it. The functionality of this turns on
the nature of the pneuma as that which does the processing and creates an
ontological effect that may in turn have a power that then looks incomprehensible
and is only comprehensible as magick. Such an interpretation mostly requires its
effectivity from others to interpret it also as magick and feed the accretion.
Damage is easily done by a rational interpretation of inertia.

**Causation**

Causation, we might say, following Wittgenstein, would be purely those occasions
on which we saw fit to apply the word ‘cause’. The word might also lose its natural
home. A perceived cause is not an actual cause (two things might have no relation
insofar as anything in existence can be unrelated to another thing within it): ‘I
caused that to happen by the power of my mind’ *might* be true, but in the event of
that being applied to a door opening seemingly due to the wind, we have no
reason to believe this to be the case.

So if someone were to say this to us, what should we believe? That they were
joking? That they were mad? That they were gullibly indulging some form of
erroneous belief about the power of the mind? Any of these seem a possibility to us. But what if someone fixed us with a glare that cowed our person and told us this in such a manner that this had occurred for this reason? Would all of us still be able to hold fixedly to these beliefs? Possibly the accusation of insanity would rise to the fore. But then what would madness mean here? Is it the madness of delusion that frightens us or is this merely a diversion from the madness of power that the person projects? The two surely are inseparable and the fear of power will contaminate a staunch belief that might allow the secondary fear that – resonating with the fear of power – they did indeed cause the door to shut by the power of their mind. Does it help the case that we heard and felt the wind? Does it rid us of this epistemological quandary? “It was just the wind, you madman!” we might say if we were brave. More likely we do think they are mad and we are frightened of the power of madness; the wind is a salve to prove they lack this power. But we must also allow it when they say “you are mistaken, the wind answers my call’ at which moment the wind blows again with a terrible severity. What, then, are we to say? We must invoke a coincidence to defend ourselves from the terror of this possibility. The figure might have estimated the cycle of the wind and chosen his moment, he might have trusted to providence that a gust would occur as he said it, maybe the wind was blowing strongly the whole time and his mention of it again merely drew ourselves towards it. There is, if we allow it, a lurking disclosure of the possibility of truth behind the claims of the figure – if not truth, the appearance of truth under the auspice of power.

A Reminder
We must remember one of the central points of this philosophy. The interaction between pneuma and umbra almost always shows the manifestation of the solid world continuation. This is so consistent that it is possible to repress the magickal possibility. Only in certain ineffable events does the possibility of the informational
substance arise. These are the paranormal events. Only when these events are
treated as having somehow actually happened does the pneuminous come into play
and then the description that we engage with in here follow. By happened it means
the suggestion by the umbra that the events were connected.

An Issue Concerning Epistemology
The matter is frequently posited as epistemological. Everything here is couched in
terms of epistemology and the notion that reality in its various guises is always open
to doubt – or the flipside of this: phantasy. But what is the situation when we have
not had the privilege of scientific rationality in order to couch it in these terms? In
this situation the incoherent faeries and spirits are simply what is. Under these
circumstances, does a stubborn kind of soul utter phrases like “you fools, there are
no such things as faeries”?
Is this identical to the modern world solidity? It surely is related. What circumstances
allow the different manifestations to dominate? Quantum physics is not needed for
the phenomenology in the Tractatus but its cultural impact has opened an incoherent
window for people to believe there is a part of the accepted canons of knowledge
that gives them its blessing.

Bifurcation of Phantasy as Abground and Ground
There is in the generation of world a double motion of phantasy. The first phantasy
is the permanence of the object/world, this is the ground also called ‘reality’. Within
this ground there are phantasies about the incoherent possibilities. The abground is
the second phantasy. The abground is the phantasy of the unearthly possibilities
that the abysmal void that gives world may possess.
Disclosure
From whence does the disclosure arise? This problem shows again the conceptual region that we are tentatively calling phantasy. I cannot know where the arising comes from. To believe that I simply generate my ideal world is a possibility, but that it is but the reflection of an existing reality is also one — reality and ideality in a nutshell. The failure to make this decision prompts a facile synthesis, ‘it must be somewhere between the two’, an answer of infuriating unhelpfulness that fulfils none of the craving. What is required is an agnosticism that recognises the phantastic nature of any movement in any direction. That which occurs occurs, that which sojourns sojourns, that which awaits awaits. But is this less infuriating? Certainly not, and now it slides into irritating mysticism à la H, except I do not even have the fiat to write it. The call then is to the recognition of the phantasy, to the recognition of the epistemological stepping stone into the void.

External
The manifestation of the external is disclosed in the constitution of natural beings. A naive category possibly but again one that has disclosive power.

Concept Beings
When one conceives of the concepts as pneuminous forces outside of but plugged into the self-accretions we see these beings act through us. Thought arising within us is the action of concept powers. This can manifest as a kind of creativity. It is long spoken of how thoughts arise from nowhere. Pneuminously this is not the case, they arise from the pneuminous accretions whose fine filaments float freely, tapping and all and sundry with conceptual squiddity. Maybe one could conceive of something even like a cell receptor that receives some pneuminous forms and prohibits others. This kind of disclosure makes possible the conception of agency, i.e. that our
accretions are all too often just servitors for other accretive forces passing off their machinations as ‘our thoughts’. In Nick Land’s words, “can whatever it is that’s playing you make it to level 2?”

There is nothing to say what our reaction to this kind of world should be. Conceptual powers are not evil but they may be self-serving, and in this sense they ‘want’ you to harbour them. Pneuminous beings become their agents, amplifying and fighting their causes in the battlefield of manifestations. There may be some pleasure in acknowledging your complicity in being-an-agent-of-the-concept, but equally in a society that believes essentially that separate subjects are thinking up these ideas for themselves it could be an alarming, frightening and undesirable model that tries to point out that we are mere vessels for the concept gods.

Think, though a society that bought into this model as a whole would find our society incredibly strange, even stupid. The notion that the individual unit ‘contains’ the ideas is a little backwards. The individual has control over these ideas. We could readily admit that neither of these things are true. This being the case, why would we think a subject was the source of these powers? The subject is just an unknowing agent of the concept.

This begs consideration as to whether one of the sources of mind-quieting practices is the attempt to gain some control over the pneuminous accretive tentacles.

23

So that means the answer to the riddle ‘what is 23?’ (or 47 for that matter or indeed 11:11 or any of the other ones) is that it is a free floating accretion of information that has somehow become perfectly poised to become what it has become and thus to become pneuminously ‘real’ by virtue of its accretion. It may well be (inevitably is) more complicated than this, but let’s say Burroughs comes across it by something like chance (though it may have a deeper meaning even to him). The Burroughs accretion starts accreting pneuma around the 23; the 23
responds because part of its accretion is a kind of animism, a perception of the number following him. This information becomes part of that accretion. Remember in this notion we’re accepting that the information (pneuma) is in some ineffable way out there. Similar to Plato except the forms themselves are contingent accretions not pure essences.

From here on the accretion, because it exists in a cultural milieu largely rejecting occult phenomena, seeps into cracks where it is fetishised. Consider, in another society more accepting of this kind of thing, that a 23 popping up might be considered a sign; certainly a naive interpretation, but at least one that allows its anomalous manifestation to reside rather than be repressed. When it appears in the enframed technological society it is incomprehensible. The only sign it becomes is a sign that ‘your higher mind is awakening’ (to certain interpretations), but this too is more metaphysics, and utterly groundless like its being any other sign. However, its being a sign is also part of its accretion, so in a way it is a sign (I’m not going into that here).

Next here comes Wilson to accrete it further along with the rest of it (Eris, 5s, Psychic TV). Dog stars, aliens, goddesses all become accreted to the number. My accretion in turn attaches it to 47 (23.5 *2), and the spin angle of the world (amongst other things) gets involved – this is allowed because, of course, the degrees system is also an accretion that has now linked itself to the whole madness. Contingent pneuminous structures function autonomously and attach to one another at the speed of thought. This is not a psychological reduction (though it has a parallel as one) but neither does it give these numbers their special status – but neither can it absolutely deny it, there is still the phantasy that these numbers are some kind of tendril of a greater reality that pokes through in this form. This manifestation will also receive credence if you accept it but loses the phenomenological purity (it falls back on the metaphysical explanation).

Let’s reiterate: 23 is information attaching to information; the only reason we say its
independent to particular people accretions (sort of independent) is because in order for magickal effects to obtain, the information must be able to alter the putative umbra. Once the 23 accretion is up and running, it is more potent to attach to others, giving them the reality-bending synchronicity experience it is capable of. Is this experience real? There’s the point exactly again, you cannot tell; the possibility of experiencing something like 23 as a ‘real anomaly (where anomaly is cogent only in relation to a dominant solid side)’ is one side of the coin of being. In its experience as an anomaly the pneuma must be interfering with the umbra. Under this aspect we can say that much.

Accretions and Linkage
Metonymy, metalepsis, metaphor, these are ways in which the accretions are linked together. These are descriptions of lines of power that hold an accretion together, yet these lines may be severed or at least weakened. New lines of power can always be forged through the aether. Stare at the clouds, see the shapes and figures appear. The informational aether manifests itself before your eyes forging lines to other accretions. The clouds carry this essence with them, indeed it is part of their accretion that they are a gateway to these kinds of images. A metaphor presents us with an accretion immediately presented as the phenomenon in question. The previously presented accretion withdraws in its stead yet is still present under the principle of reality. A metaphor in this sense may have a phantastical element to it. Magickally through phantasy we can say that the overlaying of the metaphor can have an ontological effect.

The effect is ontological because here ontological means that realm in which phantasy has the manifestation of altering reality.

The metonym layers a name distinct from the original accretion over it. It does not touch it by the same kind of line, but travels along an associative axis, yet this too is
a line of power.
The metaleptical cause, no matter how dimly and distantly conceived, is also such a line. A line down which diabolical powers may travel – or indeed beneficial ones. The axis here may of course be not simply an associative one, but may also have this phantastical causal element to it.

**Numerology**
One implication of the pneuminous theory is the solution to the problem of numerology (which is also the problem of many occult areas), i.e. how is it that a system with contingent associations (this number means this) makes any sense at all? The answer is that the accretion of the number functions by connecting pneuminous threads. So 4 is not just contingently the number of solidity, it is attached to this concept of accretion literally in the pneuma (of course, the accretion is contingent but that’s another story, this is the meaning of the contingent a priori). This is the phenomenological manifestation of the situation anyway.

**Occult Event**
In any event, can we ever say there is a total disclosure? What would such a disclosure be anyway? Something close to Kant’s intellectual intuition? In our taking-to-be we presuppose the world has a certain nature. This presupposition level shifts in time. Disclosure occurs within this horizon; the kinds of event that are possible are displayed from within this context. Something happens: a mug is knocked off the table and smashes on the floor. The baby knocked the mug off the table. A synthetic unity has purely occurred in a manner that is eventful. It has the disclosive sense of being-an-event. Its everyday reasonableness fits neatly into the world. We do not have to go far to see the edges, though. If we stray even slightly we might note that this was our favourite mug and the baby is wont to have a dislike (in our
interpretive home world) of its colour or maybe this mug has a connotation unpleasant to someone. Did the baby break the mug deliberately? Did some occult force break the mug through the baby? Psychoanalysis will sometimes entertain possibilities close to these. Did I break the mug through my subconsciously leaving it close to the baby – knowing its destructive potential – thereby alleviating myself of whatever guilt the mug might harbour though it was my favourite… Probably the baby just ‘broke the mug’. The event’s significance can be reduced to a brief poor judgement and no more. Events do not harbinge anything else for they have no relation with anything but an endlessly complex and meaningless heterogeneity. Interpretation is made by the apophantic being. A relatively stable backdrop keeps such inanities in check; but does it correct them? No, for it cannot correct them, it can only hold them at bay until their disclosive time comes.

A woman is dying, I speak to her and discover this to be the case. I go outside and there is a single crow on top of my car. Immediately I might – owing to certain cultural connotations – make a unity of these. Is there a unity? Yes. Is the unity real? Yes. How do you know? I answer only the question as to the reality of the unity interpretively and not as if this proved reality really in itself somehow connected death and crows. No Jungian schema can guarantee this. But if I dwell even slightly in this world I struggle to utterly extirpate the occult possibility of a relation no matter how incoherent it might be.

Egregore

It is clear to me that what is called in chaos magick an ‘egregore’ is practically identical to my notion of accretion. The difference is only one of extension of use for I say if magickal entities may be constituted in this way then the same substance, or pneuma as I have taken to call it, is in operation all the time (every act is a magickal act). All concepts are egregores. They can be directed by the (itself an accretion) notion of autonomy – the formation of a spirit – but they need not be. The fact that
the *pneuma* attaches to an *umbratic/chthonic* counterpart does not mean it is not still
*pneuma* just as the pure spirit egregore is, for after the fact I might, if I so desired,
invoke the table, but this table would be purely *pneuminous* and not hold my cup of
tea.
This seems all very reasonable. Demarcating falsely between magickal beings and
regular concepts seems a bad move, however it does raise the question ‘what
activates the *pneuma* to be active, that is, in a magickal sense?’ It must be somehow
more than or different to the table (concept).
Naturally I am not concerned whether or not anything ever actually happened; the
matter is only this: what are the adequate ontological descriptions that occur, either
overtly or as presuppositions, in order for a magickal event to obtain? So given
that, I am left to wonder ‘is *pneuma* sufficient as a concept to account for this?’

**Elves in the Wood**

It is like this: when you try to look in a clearing to join in with the elves, they vanish.
The whole spectacle that you sought to be part of vanishes and you are left to
wonder whether they were ever there at all.
When we experience these things, we feel we know *something happened* there, no
matter how incoherent. But when we check, or want to check, we check with our tests.
And if the tests come up negative, if they show the bell curve, we say “nothing is
amiss here”. And we feel relieved or cheated *until it happens again*, then we say
“but there are elves there, I saw them clearly this time”. “And did you gain entry to
their party?”
“No I did not... and yet I saw them still!”

**Event 0.1**

But surely there are only events. Everything is manifest within an event. But where is
the periphery of an event? That is, madness for an event is a use term we must not reify. Yet the accretive event necessarily exists...

Events
Part of the whole problem turns on events. If there was a ceremony that marked an event then the magickal implication is that the event is actually linked to the ceremony. This linking is phenomenological, it has the character of appearance that cannot be proved or dispelled. The phenomenological hypothesis disclosed here is that the linkage must necessarily be informational (or pneuminous). The original event’s name is a use term covering a broad array of phenomena incoherently accreted to the name, and yet by these threads the accretion holds and as such through the ceremony we are connected to it.

Event P
How can I know that p is a fair interpretation of q given my limiting factors – my monadic existence as bound spatio-temporally? Probability deals with calculating the likelihood of something being the case. If we can know that randomness occurs, and we demonstrate it with a dice, and we can know that statistically curious seeming things are bound to happen sooner or later, can we process things in this light such that their curious possibility is utterly extirpated?

We must be careful in how we proceed. I do not doubt that the kitchen is still there, but I may apply my mind to the status of the kitchen somehow outside of my perception. I might use various scientific understandings I have to generate this unperceived perception, yet this worst of all problems does not go away for you cannot know the status of this realm. This is always dismissed and indeed its practical consequence seems negligible, yet what it does to thought is not negligible. Something like transcendental idealism is disclosed as absolutely the case – even if only phenomenologically-epistemologically so.
But is my interpretation of event p of this character? What is event p anyway? Event p is an event such that – from a given cultural perspective – something occurs that suggests the possibility that the order of ‘reality’, as it is usually expected to be, seems no longer the case. ‘Possibility’ is important here for nowhere do we wish to state the actuality of anything – except maybe the actuality of the appearance of this possibility.

But event p itself has multiple horizons on which it might occur. Should we lump them together so simply? Is seeing a ghost the same as a synchronistic occurrence? If my ontology includes ghosts and omens then I do not need to feel so threatened in my reality – although I may still do so from the events themselves, though then this concern becomes more ontic than ontological.

Let us stick with the synchronistic occurrence and say that is event p. I have a specific number obsession, let us say, and then I become obsessed with faeries. I see a reference to a faerie poem in a book entitled *The Song of Wandering Aengus*. I buy a book of Yeats's poetry only to discover that poem on the page number of my obsession. I am amazed at the universe. I do not make any statistical calculation, a sense of awe fills me at this possibility. But what is this possibility? Well, either it is the statistical probability answer or – or what? Or am I being so egoistic to suggest that existence ordered itself in such a manner for me? This is insane and yet it persists. And what is more, because of the first problem I am unable to correct it. I can give it no description, I can only speculate that somehow things are radically not how I thought them to be, or how they seemed to be.

But how did they seem to be? Surely they seemed to be like this. Did we try to correct an error (very reasonably) or did we gloss over a fundamental feature of existence?

**Hyperstition**

I can see serious conceptual similarities with hyperstition and some of the notions
that I’m attempting to work with. Here is a consideration of similarities of the central points.

(1) an “element of effective culture that makes itself real,”
Pneuminous accretive theory is certainly accommodating toward this notion. Real here is not just kind of empty Harman-esque ‘everything is real’ but rather a real that can interact with a putative physicality (reality distortions). What makes it real is the territory of the competing manifestations. Do we make it real or does it exist of itself? What are we in this instance? Both we and it are accretions, of course. What accretive theory would say is it would need to be hermeneutically gifted with pneuminous awareness in order for it to act with autonomy.

(2) as a “fictional quality functional as a time-travelling device,”
Pneumious accretions as the site of magickal functioning necessarily are not limited by temporality as humans experience it.

(3) as “coincidence intensifiers,”
Synchronistic activity within this realm is as a direct result of pneuminous interactivity outside of solid world parameters. If you treat the world in this way the accretions will respond.

(4) as a “call to the Old Ones”.
The acceptance of pneuminosity could easily be categorised in this way insofar as it opens the floodgates for any manner of beings to be formed. Primordial accretions could be recovered or uncovered.

What is different is that the notion of a pneuminous accretion is a much more generalised concept that applies to all concepts and not just ones exerting magickal
force. It makes it a continuous line between a magickal concept and an ordinary one with the difference being the interpretation of something as magickal instantiating the effect. The hyperstitional idea, though, fits within the pneuminous quite nicely. Of course, a hyperstition is in itself an accretion with all the CCRU filaments that entails.

The Centaur

Behind the screen there is a centaur with 8 limbs—four arms, four legs—tall as a mountain, blacker than jet, cloaked in maelstrom so fierce you cannot bear its sound. If you listen carefully you may hear this deafening cry, though listen not too closely. If you would keep this world in tact then do not aid its venture through the screen.

If all that shows itself is a silent language that we may read, what should we read when we hear the hints of this centaur or when in visions and dreams we catch sight of it?

There is a book filled with strange signs, more curious than in any grimoire can find in this world. This book is referred to in certain works of fiction, but these themselves are only in dreams.

Ontology and Magick

If we must speak of ontology and talk of a fundamental realm then we might speak of two interlocking realms in which these phenomena are manifest. The first is more clearly staked out as far as that ordinary or ontic level on which we talk of scepticism and monads, fields of consciousness as having perceptual edges and so on. It is essential that this level be understood for what it is and the concept of phantasy. However, the ontological manifestation of the phenomenon is less clearly demonstrated. It is the manifestation of the event before the logical of the rupture
of solidity has been put into place. The logic of the rupture is only possible in a certain epistemology that displays it as a phantasy. Prior to the logic of the rupture is the level at which the world is purely understood as an appearance in which anything is possible and is accepted as such. For this reason the ontological level has no need for a story of explanation, for the event simply happens as one event among others. It has no privileged status as a rupture for there is nothing to rupture, the event is just one phenomenon amongst others. But how can we justify this status when the interpreted event seems clearly the manifestation of the event through the accreted aether? It is assuredly a subtle realm, prone to be rent assunder by the slightest touch. Its existence would be phantastical were it not that its existence is prior to the possibility of phantasy – and indeed reality by that measure. It is the realm in which magick is possible without causal speculation, it is the realm in which the gods walk – not as pneuminous accretions – it is the pure acceptance of Buddhism.

**Fire**

Is the phemonological rarifier, it is fier. Pneuma is air, is mind, is the informational receptor.

**Fleeing 1.01**

Look at the sand trickle through your fingers, look at how little you have left, almost nothing. Fleeing takes place in the structure of our w[h]o-maninty. Fleeing from the possibility of being-at-all into the security of the familiar fallen state. A *familiar* analysis certainly. Fleeing also takes place when faced with the problem we created that contains the clue that cannot be solved on its own level and can only be bypassed by entering into the already-there. The problem is the gaps, the holes everywhere and the realisation that if we unthink them, we still do not have a truly
satisfying answer, and yet when we ontologically bypass them, they nag us in our epistemological bones.

What is behind you? Nothing! Reach your hand into it, nothing is there. Close your eyes and though you can feel the world beneath you and breathe and hear, recognise that you float now in a semi-undifferentiated state. Reach your arms out into this void and wonder if you might reach into some other place that your arm could never have reached otherwise, that your hand might grasp something frightful, open your eyes and return here quickly, it is much safer...

Flee in the face of this, say there is nothing to it, that it is a madness and a conceit to play on this horizon. But it will not go away, it is always available to you in many ways. But this is not philosophy! You say. What is not philosophy? What is philosophy? Know that these concepts have no stability. Reification is madness. There is no philosophy, a ragged emperor turned gypsy. Or more still, a Nyarlathotep at the edge of other disciplines. Yet this chaos is more real than they. Look at the sand trickle, trickle through your fingers, look how little you have left...

Fleeing 1.02
What would we call such an experiment? Surely nothing less than a prioricity in action. An adventure in pure philosophy disclosed on the basis of our disclosure of the world as a spatio-temporal substance. It might be true that there is something pernicious in this conception of the world, yet now mired within it, we can seek this discovery with fresh eyes of wonder, we can use our selfsame scepticism to know more of the nothing in which we ek-sist.

On the Essence of Ghosts
What we want to talk about is ghosts and their reality, but true to form we must
bracket ourselves to the manifestation of reality. The entrance of the ghost into the real has a strange sense of acceptability to it, more so than synchronicity in some ways. When people reject ghosts, do they say that no one ever experienced such a thing? If so, they say that many people talk about such phenomena but none of them ever really saw or experienced anything peculiar.

Someone was speaking and saying how her dog was barking and growling at an empty corner of the room. Then they spoke more of it to inquiring voices. Their son had seen an old woman in the house and there was a black shape that sometimes appeared. Things have fallen off tables and towels off towel rails. A visitor has been to the house and without it having been mentioned started speaking about an old woman who is here.

Is this just gibberish that comes out of the mouth of the lady reporting this story? From the rationalist's perspective (who has never been close to such an experience) the coherence of the experience is somehow repressed and denied actual reality. But the grammar of ghosts is sound and historically very real. This, of course, proves nothing, but it is fascinating how something so apparently not real, persists as a topic that people seem to be able to talk about meaningfully. “There are ghosts in my house” immediately has sense, but what kind of sense? Should we say that one does not mean anything by that and that the speaker is confused? This, though, must be incorrect. It is wrong because it presupposes that the falsity turns on the existence of ghosts, that ‘ghosts’ designates something. But ‘ghosts’ does not designate that there are any ghosts. In a sense, as in so many instances, logic does not function here at all – this, though, is not the glib statement it appears to be; this does not say melodramatically that in the realm of the paranormal there is no logic, rather it says that where the proposition about the existence of ghosts turns on whether there are ghosts or not, we cannot answer this properly because there is no way to adequately say what a ghost is (an instance of severe incoherent coherence insofar as at the simple level there is a passing over of the word ‘ghost’ that gives
the appearance of its being understood). It says only that someone experienced something they took to be something paranormal. Because of the phantastical nature of existence, this belief might always stay with the monad (I once lived in a house that was haunted). The event has retreated temporally and in its original instance happened only within the immanent sphere and as such potentially came from nowhere. A science that taxonomises paranormal phenomena and differentiates strongly between a real event and a non-event is possible, but a) this is not currently available and b) it is still subject to the sceptical issues that the monadic sphere faces in processing rupture events like these.

From a realist/rationalist perspective we know that there can have been no real ghosts and only a series of incidents that led the person to believe that this was the work of an intentional entity – a cold patch, an accident, a wind that blew fiercely, a neurological trick. But now it looks a bit like a synchronicity. The incidents are conjoined in such a way that we interpret them as a presence, and how are we able to deny this *apophansis*? Well, to deny it we must be able to know that the ground of reality prohibits this possibility. But we cannot know this ground properly – in a sense strong enough to discredit an entity of this slippery epistemological kind – so we cannot outright deny the ghost its existence (the sceptical problem again). As such, the positive ghost belief is a phantasy – as we have previously mentioned. The phantasy can be disclosed in terms of its possibilities. What we can do is describe the options available for its being. In other words, we can consider the options that explain the phenomena. These are i) the psychological explanation, ii) the souls of the dead explanation, iii) other beings manifesting as the souls of the dead, and iv) a pneuminous accretion of some kind. i) says that whilst the phenomena were actually perceived, they were purely in the subject to such an extent that even if there were someone else watching they would see nothing happening (presuming here the instance of strong phenomena and not just circumstantial). We take this to mean the affirmation of the solid reality of existence.
and the prohibition of the possibility of it being a reality tunnel occupied only by the monad – and another alternative reality. Thus the whole experience is the meaning of the term ‘hallucination’. ii) affirms that there is at least the possibility that an aspect of the human form may become disconnected from the body upon the body’s demise and carry on some form of existence that is capable of interacting with the solid physical space (such as it manifests to the monad). This does not imply that the aspect has intelligence like the actual lived person – though it may do – but it does affirm the phantasy that there is some connection. iii) affirms that there is the possibility that there exist other kinds of autonomous spiritual entities that may –for reasons unknown – take on the informational content of a deceased person. This informational impersonation can also interact with the physical space occupied by humans. iv) affirms that the informational aspect of existence, which we call ‘pneuma’, accretes in various ways to form the beings that we call ‘ghosts’. Note that in the strong theory of pneuminous accretions the pneuma is thought to interact with existence in incoherent yet actual ways (as opposed to being a passive conceptualisation/means of grasping). The monad accretes pneuma of itself and of others. The pneuminously accreted phantom could in one instance be thought of as formed by the intentional structures of the monad. In other words, possibly, for example, the bereaved self-accretion continues to form the accretion of the deceased so strongly that they persist. The accretive theory also entails aspects of (ii) and (iii) for since the accretive theory says that the self is an accretion the disconnected actual part of the self from (ii) is the accretion liberated from the physical substrate. The difference here is a) a kind of being is given to the substance of such beings (pneuma) and b) the accretion is not constituted by the other but rather thought to exist autonomously. The subsequent question as to whether or not there is any other part to the non-physical separate (commonly called the ‘soul’) to the accreted self is of course another phantasy that cannot be answered; furthermore, it is of course possible that it is the accreted self’s ability to
exist independently of the physicality which might give rise to the notion of soul. This thesis emphasises the notion that whilst magick may be actual, it in no way gives existence any more sense of meaning. The informational accretion of the self, we might postulate, only survives adventitiously and in doing so becomes what we call a ghost.

**On the Essence of Spirits**

It is long postulated in this work that the existence of certain kinds of beings (down the corridor) is in fact far more similar to the existence of the beings we ordinarily encounter than it would seem. We are wont to believe that ourselves as real selves wander around embodied or at least in some relation to this thing we call the body. There are two versions of the existence of spirits: i) tells us there are either one or many extra dimensional realms in which these beings reside and visit us or are summoned by us, and ii) in which the beings are generated by ourselves. The empirical evidence – such as it is – weighs against (i) insofar as there is little or no harmony between the various descriptions of spirit worlds. It is, of course, still a phantasy-manifestation and as such unremoveable and suddenly what I sought to write on takes a different turn. There seems to be a problem there insofar as the whole enterprise (the *Tractatus*) is predicated on the notion that certain experiences supply the criteria for radical doubt to be possible (reasonable), yet now from working within the space opened by the legitimacy of the doubt (the phantasy) we uncover another phantasy: that of the fixed spirit world with its own hierarchies etc. Furthermore, down the line of this madness the multiple descriptions could still not be the result of our forming these worlds but rather of their active external-to-ourselves existence and severe multiplicity – the multiple descriptions in fact adhere to multiple worlds.

It is true of course that this phantasy, like the one we describe, will persist as a
nagging possibility. Yet the meaning of the reality accretion currently in play is one that marginalises occult phenomena generally. We adhere to the notion of criteria as necessary to make the doubt reasonable. The criteria for the fixed spirit world are more difficult precisely because they need to invoke wilder and wilder pictures to maintain their sense. No one is pretending that what we are trying to say is acceptable to many hard-headed materialists – who will invoke the coincidence on the basis of an a priori spatio-temporal framework – but obviously we think it’s fairly reasonable and that a relativistic description à la khaos magick is what is disclosed, i.e. the previous model for the phenomena, the fixed spirit world of beings, no longer serves as adequate criteria for the phenomena, but if there is still a remainder when rational materialism has done its best then this does not reinvoke the fixed model but rather brings into play an essentially Kantian reversal. We constitute the entities rather than their having an independent existence. But this, of course, opens up the umbratic speculation of the unconscious.

On the Everyday Multiplicity of Paranormal Phenomena
What does the multitude of perceived paranormal instances that litter existence prove? Nothing, of course and the background ontology of the current science claws at each one of the phenomena, trying to drag it into its dark recesses. We must understand, though, that these phenomena constantly try to resist this dragging. Neurotically they can lodge themselves on the edge of this abyss, even when we wish to abandon them to it. Sometimes irrationally (if this is irrational) we adopt them and then re-rationalise them. Think of magpie superstitions: many people will say “Good morning, Mr Magpie” to ward off this evil, even though they would say no such power obtained. Something akin to Pascal’s wager functions here (why would you not say it?). The rationalised part will bracket the actual occult interference away, shifting the locus to a psychologically much more reasonable fear of unconscious actions (something equally uncanny when one contemplates it for
any time, yet made safe by being safely sequestered within the subject). In this safer version we should still ward the magpie off for fear we will create our own bad luck; this or at least something like it is the background intuition. We intimate that lurking behind the rationalised version is still the terrifying unacknowledged possibility that the world does respond in this kind of bizarre informationally integrative way, formed of viscous accretive pneumonia that, whilst mostly inert to it, can under the right circumstance shift the umbra in ineffable ways. When someone’s car appears not to work at all and we have no idea why, and then we might say “come on old girl, you can do it!” and the car springs to life suddenly, we are alarmed. We know, so we believe, that some mechanical fault was behind it and that coincidental to the fault’s autonomous undoing was the utterance. Yet here too, many will recognise the strange completely incoherent possibility that the car spirit (or ‘accretion’ as I would call it) has heard our emotional plea and this pneuminous interference has made the once faulty machine come to life. In this instance, everything is too late for checking; everything was hidden. It is possible a mechanic can say what the fault most likely was after the fact? But suppose he cannot, suppose he can only supply a conjecture. Of course, even more certainty of fault cannot undo this manifestation for we can still hold that the car spirit overcame the fault at that moment. We have here a problem of causation, yet a curious one. Why do we consider from just one instance that the occult answer may be the true one? The answer is simple. We don’t. What we do do, though, in cases of certain event like structure, where the clear causal factors are obscured from direct perception, the phantasy, is fail to stop this possibility existing.

The God of Washing Machines and its Agents

Power is surging through the system. There is an infection from a parallel body, bringing this work to be what it already is. Chaos magickal contemplations of being as pneuminous mean that if my washing machine is broken I should take seriously a
supplication to the deity (Zanussi: a perfect name for a god) for aid. Are there physical parameters as to when this might work? The manifestation of physicality imposes this idea. The phantasy of the possibility that the god might effect a cure is absurd of course and yet just by accepting the synchronicitous possibility we are also tied to this. The absurdity does not negate the possibility it only adds to the incoherence. When I invoked Zanussi in a simple manner, the machine did begin to work, but this was in a situation of perfect ambiguity (I don’t know that it wouldn’t have started working anyway). This kind of thinking raises the possibility of subversive magickal acts that attempt to bind corporate entities through magickal means. Naturally some of these accretions are enormous and it would be hard to do so, yet we do not really know what is possible. A fluctuating ontology might warp powerfully from one monadic place. No ground. Agency seems to emerge from this. We are agents to powers. This is one meaning of the Landian invocation of the old ones or at least one way of looking at it. But agency happens at many levels. I might be an agent of a capitalist ontic accretion like ‘The University of Lincoln’. I might consider myself strongly this agent thereby strengthening the accretive power (mirroring, doubling). I might also consider myself an agent of a manifestation. An agent of idealism, an agent of agency and an agent of philosophy. Conceptual powers (pneuminous manifestations) working through [me] to proliferate. The manifestations are at war in their desire for pneuminous territory. We then immediately become victim to the swooping hawk of teleology: What for? What do they want? Asks this power. The manifestation of ‘purpose’ is clearly a transcendental. The nihilistic vanguard retort their inevitable response in vain. Yet only as vain as the territory gained by purpose.

**Paranormal Dismissal**

The escape from dismissal that the paranormal community provides is that the phenomena do not work in the same way under scientific conditions. This is such an
easy escape route it invites derision. I think in a truly open-minded sense, though we should possibly pay more attention to it as a proposition, not least because in fact it makes perfect sense with the subject matter. This at least makes sense with magick, because any text on this will witter on about the perfection of the ritual to achieve the result and how easily this can go awry. Successful results as such through science can be attributed to apophenia and to the magickal community as success — it has been my aim to point out how this division is irreconcilable. By extension, though, if telepathy etc. whilst in the life of a pneuminous seems to be fluid and relatively frequent it does not seem outrageous that whatever level of informational transfer is happening could be being interfered with by the informational structures themselves (the experimental conditions). We must note at this point that a thesis like this does not say that this implies that the anecdotal claims are true, rather it maintains that the explanation given by the experimental dodging paranormal community is cogent within their own framework. I do not know all the history of the experiments but it seems to me it might have been as surprising to the practitioners themselves when they were unable to reproduce results.

What I would add is that this difficulty is entirely commensurate with the phenomenological results herein. These again do not state anything about anything that ever ‘really’ happened but they do say that there is nothing in the manifestation of these phenomena that can be dismissed by a thorough scientific explanation precisely because of the possibilities about reality they invoke. Any system that makes information capable of affecting a putative substance is going to be prone to being affected by another informational system. This doesn’t need to invoke any quantum physical knowledge, it is all laid out in the phenomena themselves.

**First- and Second-Order Ontologies**

Maybe there is a way we use a notion like this. Say there is smoke and in a society
yet nobody actually has anything to say what it is as such. It’s just smoke, it’s
indexically linked to fire and someone might give a definition using this kind of
indexical manner, ‘it comes with fire’, and that’s it. Then we have only a first-order
ontology. If we say “what is smoke?” and we answer “the spirit of the thing that is
burnt released into its purest form” then we have a second-order ontology. It does
not only take that thing as existent (indeed kind of the point is that there is no object
in this ontology but still the correlation of use and phenomenon begins to suggest it),
it tells you what it is with recourse to a theoretical framework. Both are accretive,
but differently so. The former accretes the word to the phenomenon (and hence to
other indexically related phenomena), the latter accretes to the framework
designation and reifies the phenomenon into a thing defined by certain constraints.
Of course, herein lies part of the problem, for the definition can never be sure that
it is complete, though it may appear as such. Is smoke ‘a visible suspension of
carbon or other particles in air, typically one emitted from a burning substance’
more true than ‘a spirit of the thing burned’?

Transcendental Pivot
The axis of being (as apophansis) turns on a transcendental pivot. The essential
question ‘are there simply paths to follow or is there an incumbency upon us to raise
consciousness?’ turns on this pivot. Thus its answer is not absolute, it is not the position
itself that is transcendental but rather the disjunction (the pivot). A primordial
transcendental disjunction thus lies at the heart of the matter.

Transcendental Capacity
The pneuminous being has the transcendental capacity to form accretions of
pneuma. What the accretions are is not restricted. We do, however, face the
potential issue of a situation in which the phantasy of spatio-temporality as created
by the accreting entity is a ground layer as given also transcendentally or the
converse of transcendental realism. Either way there is a ground posited on which the accretions form. It suggests a kind of way in which the pneuma is thin in some regions until our attention is brought to bear. This is not the thinness of the ready to hand, which is certainly a kind of accretion, though it is presentness to hand that forms durable accretive structures that in turn have the characteristic of reification – the formation of a strong accretion.

**Information 1.01**

So hackneyed to point out, yet so important. There may yet be a real (phenomenological) dualism that cannot be removed despite our best attempts. If I perceive a thing, I perceive it as such. To tell me what it is made out of tells me very little about the thing except where the question is such that what it is made out of is the required answer. ‘What is it?’ does not necessarily mean ‘only this’. Where ‘what is it?’ means an answer of function (it’s a hammer), telling me it is made of metal and wood in so and so a shape is of no use whatsoever. The information is perceived directly and as such is the direct perception of a pneuminous accretion.

**Action of Informational Comprehension**

The informational comprehension of anything (everything) is the drawing of it under a certain pneuminous accretive framework. Philosophically this should be looked upon as an active process. This way of looking at it gives it a more sensible spin that gives us a better framework. We must treat the external to interpretive perception as unknowable. Solipsism is one kind of phantasy. However, the appearance of solipsism shows us a certain kind of epistemological limit. It might not seem terribly coherent and we might need serious extra phantastical notions to prop up our solipsism, but we can do it and worry about it (on the basis that we have no proper grounding access to reality to tell us this isn’t the case (the principle from which
One aspect of trying to make sense of this is not thinking of interpreting-perception as something that is bouncing off a series of things in a spatio-temporal world. Rather, in a somewhat Kantian manner, we should think of perceptions as somehow altering the whatever it is out there – the rays of sight striking the out there already imbedded with the informational interpretation accretively creating the world. This does not deny the world is still there in a sense (we do not know in what sense), but it does state that the most likely hypothesis is that something happens to it when it falls under the awareness of a being [with awareness]. In other words, if something is happening to something, what would make most sense: that something (being informationally assimilated) is affected by that something in some way or that it isn’t? So existence unfolds around us literally in a certain way. Again we do not dogmatically state how things are, rather how it is profitable to see them in the down the corridor.

**Perception of Life [in]formation**

Perceiving existence under the auspice of pneuminous accretions releases the possibility of comprehending the information as in some sense qualifying as living. It lives because it accretes (and dissolves). The accreted information is intricately linked – indeed constitutes also – the solidity of the world (epistemologically). Yet it has ineffable ways of restructuring it (it has the apparency of restructuring it). Solidified information seeks to escape back into the aether. We are the solidified informational aether. The cup is also this. These words too. But a bifurcation is emerging that must (must it?) be resisted?. The informational processor and the processed and... the unprocessed. The unprocessed is pressing. The scrawl on the page that is meaningless sat in a book that nobody opened, dwelling in the unprocessed space, on the unprocessed page. The active relation between the processor and the processed grants the processed life. The granting of life to the
processed grants it greater life still – this is magick. But both are magickal acts, just intentional and unintentional.

Invocation
Speech is potentially devoid of image content. Representations do not necessarily occur in active speech except where this is the aim – “Imagine a red balloon, I will do so as well…” Pneuminous accretions are tapped into for every word. Reflection upon words and their meaning, however, may bring representations to mind. These are not the meaning of the word but an aspect of the accretion (a visual aspect). Furthermore, this kind of reflection is the invocation of the accretion. We ‘summon it to mind’, we literally do this. ‘But this is a mere idea…’ Yet still we do it – what is this power that calls these beings? The mind? The memory? Yet these are use terms, they designate less sensibly than the table accretion. Let us link the pieces together. All discrete entities – such as they manifest – are pneuminous accretions. All imaginary ones likewise. This, of course, includes the notion of non-material beings as found in magickal practices, i.e. spirits.

Language
All things that are disclosed in language are pneuminous accretions. Language is pure communication answering to no other order. Logical/formal structures do not give us the truth of language, only another language.

Falsification
When Popper writes that the possibility of its falsification of is the trademark of a scientific idea we must take note, for in the doctrine of falsification lies something very similar to what we are saying. Information that cannot be falsified has the character that allows the gate to phantasy to open and thus is of the most interesting character.
Meaning
The nihilistic problem is scarcely solved by pneuminosity. Yet nihilism too is an accretion, so maybe there is some insight to be had in that. It follows that all meaning is an accretion. Any meaning that is forged is forged with being. Meaning as a sound, as a word, of course, is an accretion too. We cannot say it escapes but we can say meaning and pneuma are distinctly related. Meaning is part of the clue to the existence of pneuma. When we seek the kind of meaning that might justify existence it has invariably been couched in some kind of religious doctrine. Anything other than this gives nihilism. Even the religious doctrine must presuppose that the God possesses a notion of purpose transcendent to anything we can conceive of or the question is raised as to what the God wants. Infinite continuous or simultaneous being does not confer meaning. But because meaning is constructed in pneuma – the idea of teleological meaning – a teleology is in a sense real when reified. The meaning isn’t local to the inside of a given pneuminous being, it exists within the pneuma at large. In a slightly Hegelian way, this means that the successful construction of an idea that gives meaning that overcomes nihilism would not be a repression but being realising its own meaning. When we conceive ourselves as humans, discretely bound, such an idea is just one more human construction, but when we are seen as an expression of the pneuma itself, our meaning is its meaning.

Mystery
Mystery is the manifestation of existence as incoherence. Mystery gives rise to phantasy; if existence were not inherently mysterious phantasy would not arise. Reality too emerges out of mystery as the phantasy we decide is not phantasy. This is reality. Mystery is incoherence, hence all phenomena are mysterious. They submit to the accretion of the pneuma to be rendered incoherently coherent.
Nothingness/Being

The implication of all of this accretive ontology is that terms such as the Hegelian nothingness do designate: they designate the paradoxical accretion of nothingness and/or being. Are we (because the accretions have pneuminous form) then allowed to ask what is this form and is it actually useful? For the being in itself is made up of the umbratic and pneuminous –but this is not what we mean when we ask what something is. The non-representational ‘it’s a knife’ is still true. The accretion of being, like that of some god is still an accretion. Is it a more necessary accretion than God, this may not be true as the manifestation of being as God or as ruled by a god is also transcendental insofar as it accords to the same problematic that dismissing synchronicity faces, i.e. the criteria that establish the phenomena are not dismissed by any of the tools available to scientific epistemology. This does not substantiate these phenomena but it makes their belief more rational.

Manifestation of the Uncorrelate

The key to showing the confusion in some of the speculative philosophy lies in untangling the manifestations. The key manifestation here is that of some kind of existence without an interpreter/observer. This manifestation arises quite naturally all the time; it is related to what Husserl called the ‘natural attitude’. We inhabit the world and from its seamless spatio-temporal flow we easily think of things continuing beyond the incoherent border of perception in the same way. This is a manifestation, it is the one that gives rise to the view from nowhere, to objectivity. This manifestation is incoherent, but this is to say little because so are all the manifestations. The key opposing manifestation is that the contents of the perceptual field are somehow created by the being doing the perceiving. This is the Kantian formulation, which pushes this constitutive power all the way into spatio-temporality
itself. The linguistic turn adds to this manifestation or rather curtails it, limiting the spatio-temporal metaphysical claim to that of a grammatical one. Space and time can only mean the instance in which these words are used. We agree with this up to the point of departure of the accretive nature of the pneuma, which creates a pneuminous overlay to the putative externality.

The primordial being of a thing then is its use. It is the interchangeable status of things as use items. Primordial hammers are stones. That things persist beyond perception does not turn on their thingness but on their manifestation of continuing existence as a thing (a spatio-temporal thing). In the manifestation of a pure idealism this is potentially not possible as there is no-thing out side of idealism. In a more limited idealism, there is the possibility that things outside of ideality may be identical to within it but this cannot be known with certainty (something akin to what happens in pneuminous disclosure). Here, though, language is important because it is the home of the pneuminous. When we say something ‘is’ this is an accretion, the accretion of being (a complicated accretion to say the least). Nevertheless it should be recognised, as Heidegger did, that the actual saying of being brings being about. This means that being is not the term for a putative externality outside of a hermeneutic structure. The name for this is ‘nothing’. The continual simple use of the world takes the things to be there continually, but the theoretical disclosure of the world epistemologically cuts short the ability to speak of the things as being in this way. The manifestation of a spatio-temporality allows a speculative analysis to take place but only so long as certain correlational traits are maintained. The first of these is the spatio-temporality that potentially is different outside of awareness (phenomenologically, for example, the synchronistic fluid world view), and the second of these is the individuality of each thing that may have no determinate existence is relations outside of awareness). This point turns on whether the identity of intentionality (of a being we call ‘aware’, i.e. ourselves) with the relation that we would call ‘physical’ of one ‘inanimate’ thing to another holds. This raises the
question in Harman’s scheme as to whether we are a real object or not. He says I am a real object, but what does this ‘I’ entail. If it is my body then there seems to be a problem, as my weight upon my chair is not my intentional relation to it. But if it’s not then what is it? My body as an object’s relation to the chair, exclusive of some other me? If I am not my body what am I? The answer seems simple enough: I am the uses of the word ‘I’ and nothing more and simultaneously the secondary I accretion that occurs after this primary one but is yet there to beguile us. The third of these is the belief that the naming/accretive relation is nothing. If the naming accretive process has gathered, discreted, shored up the use thing in any way then the persistence outside of awareness is unwarranted as similar. The intentionality problem then returns, for now, in order for the identity of relations to persist the putatively separate thing must consider other things as wholes, as accretions. This is more of a challenge than equating intentionality without a magickal effect with physical relations and frankly the word ‘speculative’ rises to the fore here. It seems to make more sense to say that if there is an identity between human/thing relations and thing/thing relations then this is at the primordial level of what something more akin to the ready-to-hand in which the thing has not shown itself as a theoretical object/accretion. This means something akin to the fact that being as we know it is more like the theoretical abstraction and readiness-to-hand/use is a kind of pre-cognitive level. The phantasy of returning to this is what the Buddhists seek (in part). But as the kind of being we are and become more and more of whilst we should recognize the existence of this aspect we mustn’t lose track of the importance of the linguistic turn as complementary to any speculative philosophy.

**Ontic and Ontological Analysis**

There is a problem with regards to how the analysis is conducted: we realise that we have so far recognised only the ontic manifestation of these phenomena and not their ontological status. This, however, is difficult as by our definition the ontological
would be a pneuminous accretion. The ontological manifestation of the phenomena would lie in the claim made upon the embedded monad by the occult event.

**Pursuit of Pneuma**

Is an extra phenomenological force needed as manifestation or is the rendering of *pneuma* sufficient? The notion of *energia* that fuels the *pneuma* is certainly a manifestation, but possibly its aspect perception is sufficient. It would seem that the notion here is that when I see something as something it acquires these properties – albeit slightly. Thus when I see an inanimate doll as animate it acquires a sense of consciousness – an identical process to the invocation of a spirit except there is an umbratic counterpart. In this sense, no energy theory is needed for it was the interpretation that did the altering. The notion of energy would in this sense be subsumed under the belief of the interpretation. The energy theorist might say that it is precisely this effort of interpretation that gives energy to the being, but it seems more that the interpretant expended energy themselves rather than imbued energy into the *pneuminous* entity.

**The Corridor**

The corridor is felt acutely by the working through of these concepts. If one can accept this kind of skepsis without solace and by following it through perceive anew events that one may have perceived as wrongly comprehended (the comprehension of synchronicity as coincidence for example), then now you can understand that as you are trapped in something that can have the appearance of a solipsistic bubble (what has been referred to as the ‘monadic’) your knowledge claims are limited. “But then later I wrote that it was not solipsistic even in manifestation – though solipsism is a manifestation. It was incoherent, in the way I witter on about, still connected, absolutely affirming of others wandering in reflecting, changing existence.”
So when you turn to face the other phenomena free of your desire to account for them in any previous structure we attempt to account for them in other ways. This is the corridor I feel. For down here lie the pneuminous accretions and the phantasies and whatever other concepts that may yet disclose themselves. The corridor is an opening but it is not easy to see or accept.

**Reality 1.01**

Contradiction is an important notion in the realm of philosophy. It would seem less important after the axiom of groundlessness is accepted, for then we can be less sure either concept is suitably complete such that it necessarily actually contradicts another – it may just disagree. As such, if we make a principle that we desire to oppose phantasy and call it reality then this is not necessarily the contradiction of the notion of phantasy. The two rather seem to be complementary. Phantasies occur in the boundaries of apodicticity such as it is naively manifest. When we may, using some form of entity or belief system as a reason, deny the real, we invoke phantasy. Here we have invoked our new concept into the definition of our old one. Thus we must now move to elucidate reality. Reality is that which seems apparent and coheres to induction, solidity, repetition. Reality is no doubt an accretion, but it is almost a meta-accretion. Is that really true? It exhorts us to answer with the best of our honesty that something is the case – as best as we are able to tell. Reality gives me the notion that it is folly to doubt it. ‘The kitchen is not really there when I am not there’ this is not a reasonable doubt, we must invoke a special kind of phantasy to penetrate this realm. Phantasy and reality are not opposed like false and true. The real is beset by phantasy. It hovers around it on multiple horizons. Where the present has retreated, anything might have happened. When presence has become absence it tries to sneak in. When mystery clouds a phenomenon phantasy will manifest to explain. Remember phantasy might mean an explanation that cannot be outright denied and somehow persists, through a god, through a
magickal force or some such.

**Restraint**

When I write on here I try to say something rational about some kinds of occult experience. I try to bracket the experience something like a la Husserl. I end up with the phenomena as ambiguous. This is often the character of the occult experience: an ambiguity shifted one way or the other by a cultural interpretation. The more modern shift conceals it, the older models allow these experiences to hold ontological sway. We live in the illusion that the modern concealment is the removal, but it is precisely the point, *my point*, that you can’t remove it. Whether there ever was anything like an actual magickal relation in the world matters not one jot because the world is always capable of creating the manifestation of one. Here is the relation with one of the other arms ‘manifestationism’ something I will write more on soon. But what do I want to say here? I’m not sure anymore. I feel slightly wretched as a sitter on the fence. Magick demands a decision (will) yet philosophy here demands rationality. If I purely give in to a magickal ontology I lose all ability to reflect upon it and I cannot substantiate my beliefs without some ill-conceived reference to quantum physics that I do not properly understand anyway. When we try to say ‘why’ for these phenomena we are lost. Sometimes here I sound like *I am* saying ‘why’, but this ‘why’ is the minimal ‘why’ that says heuristically if any of these phenomena obtain then an informational substance must be interacting with a putative ‘out there’. This is its disclosure.

The embarrassment comes partially in becoming misunderstood (as if I am advocating this as true but of course part of me *is* (that part that sat marvelling at the sea of synchronicitous phenomena that unfolded, that was so overwhelmed by them that it found it unbelievable that the converse, that the solid world, could be true)), but also the extreme implications of this kind of world view have been made
almost nauseating to articulate –thanks to the new-age movement. I want to say that the world equally looks like the unfolding of quasi-solipsistic tunnels as much as it looks like a giant spatio-temporal container; that the covering over of this perception is something monstrous, that we do not need quantum physical speculations to allow ourselves this manifestation -it is there built into our experience. There is a passage somewhere in a Ross Heaven book where he says as a child he was able to stand on the water until someone told him he couldn’t. Sounds ridiculous, it is ridiculous, if he earnestly believes this we could say he suffers from false-memory syndrome. Except that nagging ‘what if...’ that things have been so badly comprehended (the embarrassment of writing weighs on my words here) that down some variant this actually obtains. The new age movement has soiled almost beyond use the notion that the scientific thinking is restraining the phenomena, yet I must find a way to say this, for this is also the manifestation. Ontological doubt generates phantasy (and now I am comfortable in this language once more).

**Psychological Primordiality**

The term ‘psychological’ is inappropriate in a sense as its accretion is too theoretically derivative. However, what we wish to indicate is that we are considering the founding of a given slant in that of a philosopher as a manifestation of particularities. The positions held as such are not from pure reason (for incoherence shows us that the ground for all the positions is shaky). The inclination comes first, then the rest is the defense of the inclination. Philosophy is affectively driven21.

21 This strays very close to Nietzsche. Though of course the system is unable to ground itself as affectively driven without privileging a manifestation of affectivity. It is however one of the places one seems driven to in looking for a ground.
Relations

Pneuminous accretions exist by virtue of relations not by virtue of discretion. The relations constitute the appearance of discretion. Relations are in a sense what accretes. Relations are informational, semiotic if you will. What is curious with pneuminous accretions is their autonomy once established. This, of course, is not curious in one sense for it is just the happening of awareness to establish related pneuminous phenomena that accrete by virtue of the occurrence of awareness as temporality.

Terminology and Review

Let us reconsider the matter in the endless process of reflection that is philosophy. Let us also introduce the term ‘pneuminous interference’ to accrete around what was previously termed ‘synchronicity’. Pneuminous interference means the ability of the pneuma to interfere at the ordinary reality level to create the paranormal effect (like the omen/sign/message from existence). Let us also introduce the term ‘agnostic disjunction’ to mean those disjunctions that are generated with no reconciliation. The relevant one in this work has always been that the experience of putative pneuminous interference is either reconcilable as statistically possible (solid world) or forces the monad to accept an incoherent fluidity to being. The very nature of experience means that one cannot overpower the other. This phenomenon, then, has set up two primordial manifestations: solid world and fluid world. The notion of manifestations is very important. It sets the possibility of a meta-philosophy of disjunctive manifestations competing with each other pneuminously for accretive dominance. This accretive dominance can only be seen as the behaviour of the pneuma (it accretes) and not an active teleology. An active teleology would have to be dialectically fed back into the system. In other words, the accretion of teleology would be reapplied back to the pneuma itself as a further possible manifestation. Pneuminous theory and manifestationism seem to be deeply tied
together. Manifestationism just says there are many ways in which being shows itself. Not all of these entail pneuminosity. However, from within pneuminosity manifestationism also applies. There is, for instance, the idea of an outside to the pneuminous, an inconceivable shadow part, incoherent yet endlessly remanifesting as a notion: the umbra. It is from within pneuminosity that the manifestations become accretions competing for the territory (the picture described above). A decent question would be: how does the picture differ if you remove pneuminosity? Only on one side of the disjunction does pneuminosity apply, yet on the other there is still information. Arguably there is still something like pneuminosity, just in this instance it is limited to local subjects in a solid spatio-temporal existence and there is no pneuminous interference. Part of the claim is, I suppose, that the disjunction is maybe not a decision but more of an experience. There may be an allegiance to the solid world but the alternative possibility is always there manifest to be repressed or not. What is key is the first person experience as epistemologically generating some of these manifestations. Someone like Whitehead wants to remove the first person epistemological problems by making every event a point of view. This is fine but it ignores the manifestation problem and replaces it with speculative metaphysics. What must be acknowledged is that no mass scientific picture presupposing a continuous existence outside of the first person perspective can adequately remove the epistemological baggage that comes with it, no matter how outrageous and ridiculous it might seem. Unless science produces an outlook/philosophy that is not hostile to these manifestations, it will not be accepted because people can and do experience phenomena that make them doubt the continuous framework as exhaustive. As is endlessly stated (herein), the reality of these phenomena outside subjective psychology is entirely irrelevant as that just entails a recourse to the position that was initially disagreed with to dismiss the phenomenon in question. To reiterate again, this is either ontologically important (because it turns reality is something
more akin to the fluid world) and hence sociologically important, or it is sociologically important because pneuminous interference manifestations will continue to appear and give meaning to people.

The Ethics of Phantasy
When we consider things from a certain phantasy we can be quite worried how things might be, worried at least if we were entrenched in perceiving a world in which there was a real outside of things separate from myself – a reasonable appearance certainly. Yet one of the competing appearances we are unable to rid ourselves of is our constitution of this outside. Indeed this is of the strongest necessity in some form – informationally. Then we must presuppose some kind of substance that the information is laid over in some manner. Appealing in various ways. A monad that constitutes in a more radical manner is yet another rational option. This radical constitution – an aspect of the doctrine of pneuminous accretions – has the corollary of a certain potential ethical involvement. In other words, if we are in some sense constituting our world by our intentional awareness (in a strong sense) then we should be careful which things we direct ourselves towards, for we are not simply reaching out to ‘some set of things out there’ but actively choosing an involvement in a certain type of world, which we are allowing our intentional awareness to be tapped by. If we are content to be dragged hither and thither that is one thing. If we are not, we should care for which way our awareness is dragged.

The Name
The power of the name has phantastical associations. The answer to the question of the being of a being ‘what is it?’ is a name. This lets us know that in some sense the being is the name, for otherwise how could the name give us the satisfaction of the
answer? But of course, the name presupposes the world from which it emerges, and in some circumstances discloses. What we sometimes lose sight of is the togetherness of being and name; ‘it is a…’ is disclosive in a peculiar kind of initial tentative reification. The being may disclose itself further but this is a story we are familiar with. The simple shallow named being is also a pneuminous accretion, incoherent (of course) and yet still of this nature. The name is the axis through which the informational pneuma flows. It becomes clearer that the pneuma does not need the prefix ‘informational’ for the pneuma is already exactly that, indeed there is nothing else for it to be.

**Thing in Itself**

Yet another stating of the obvious is that if the informational process is ontologically effective, then this too is inextricably part of the in itself…

**The Grammar of Mine**

“Venture not upon your life for this is mine own wedded wife.” (Arthur Machen)

**Strange Dialectics**

The disclosure of strange things is only possible against a background of non-strange things. These things are wont to be called ‘reality’. The business herein becomes strange. Consider that for us to have laid down what is real we must make a demarcation and say this is real. An ontology expresses this. That choice, however, must take into account the non-real as that which was decided against, indeed the non-real must have preceded the decision of the real. Hence when we consider our dialectic is the real is less real than the non-real. Do you see what I mean? If we insist that the real is what truly is, then there was something before this,
the unreal. Is this gibberish? The real made an incursion into the non-real and claimed it as real but what was real, what was there, was the non-real out of which reality sprang as the fundamentally non-real to the non-real’s true reality.

**Non-representationalism**

When we attempt to sort out the vagaries of a thing the non-representationalist account is tempting. I think it is true to some extent. If I see a knife, I see a knife, I do not see a bit of metal as a knife. Because a meaning is use, that is the meaning so it is a knife, that’s all there is for it to be. The problem then becomes that this means there kind of is no knife because really ‘knife’ is just a word I use in the presence of certain bits of stuff that give me then the impression that I am talking about something. This again is where the notion of accretion kicks in for we wish to say here that there is a knife in something like the sense of naive objects, and this happens because the pneuma has accreted after the use. So we have a two-stage process: the primordial process is a use-like one and the secondary is the accretion of pneuma around the thing that has become focused on. So the pure seeing of the knife is the seeing of the pneuma, which is a knife (imagine a knife and there you can see the pure pneuminous knife; that this impression is completely contingent is utterly beside the point because all accretions are, of course, incoherent).

**Note on Meaning**

How to approach this? Meaning as use shows the incoherent coherence and also the coherent incoherence. Kierkegaard’s notion of faith is similar to our epistemological issue. One cannot, from restrictively considered subjectivity, know the true nature of anything. Indeed as the words demonstrate the necessary gap because they cannot mean objects. The only way they can mean objects as pseudo external things is by
means of a pneuma that accretes to make them. But this pneuma is highly questionable and even potentially unrequired. However, if you wish to give some kind of greater sense to the sense of meaning of words to objects then the pneuma can be seen to be necessary. Why do we need words to mean objects? What does ‘mean’ even mean there? What it means is connect to the word by some unknown means to the object it seems to be talking about (this is not as naive as it sounds and concerns the doctrine of incoherence).

**Consciousness After Death**
If consciousness survived physical death in any sense resembling discretion, there would be no reason to presuppose such a survived consciousness should be in any privileged epistemological position over ourselves. It might have various dimensional perceptions open to it currently barred from this mode of existence, however its continued intimation of separation indicates it would be in no better position to display ultimate answers any better than we can. This implication is part of the naturalising of such phenomena.

**The Importance of the Tractatus**
What worth hangs upon the Tractatus? How can we give it a value? Values can be created; I place my value here and yet I am not sure of what I do. The Tractatus says ‘you do not know what is going on at the ground of Being’ and when you say you do, still you are not sure and can never be sure. The Tractatus says ‘here is a stick bent in a glass of water and yet you may not take that stick out to check if that bend is false, it will look to you forever bent. That bent appearance will haunt you forever. The Tractatus says, because the stick looks bent and will always do so, your grammar will always reflect this and you would be wise to realise this. The Tractatus is important as an idea that cannot properly be spoken but the description of which
in certain horizons can be made. It has, if taken to heart, a restorative value for humanity. The pneuma validates things in a way that previous thought did not. Special things really are metaphysically special, and as such, ontologically special because they have accreted pneuma (this metaphysics is the manifestation of metaphysics). This pneuma is real not just to you but to anyone – though they might not know about it, because accretive content is not manifest. Every incoherently coherent idea that ever was is validated and nihilated by contingency simultaneously. Yet the validation should be sufficient to keep the wolf from the door. It opens vistas of metaphysical reality, it gives all creation the magic it longs for in its phantasy. It turns Plato's forms into contingent accretions and Jung's archetypes likewise. The contingency is a strength, we are not locked to certain archetypes, their transcendental nature is not absolute.

The importance of the Tractatus is that it places all bickering philosophical schemas where they should be: as accretions and phantasies. They are accretions because they have acquired pneuma and become globules of information in that realm. They are phantasies because people cannot prove them one way or the other and as such they remanifest over and over in similar forms – all is love, all is will, all is idea (called elsewhere ‘manifestations’).

The Tractatus is important as it gives us the proper metaphysical response to Wittgenstein, who nearly granted us a philosophy without cracks (in the Investigations not the Tractatus). The fiendish manifestation of magick though allows in the grammar of pneuma.
Appendix.

A Meeting in a Park.

I am sitting on a park bench with my colleague P., the air is peaceful but cold, the sky is overcast. There is much that is unsaid between us – he, for instance, does not know that I harbour strange thoughts. In all fairness, though, he too presents me with an enigma, thus there is an unspoken competition in play: ‘who is the greater enigma?’ I feel with considerable certainty that P. is; but then the recognition of this humility on my part might be a sign in my favour, for if P. projects the enigmatic sense so strongly and obviously, he might be doing so on purpose, i.e. to deliberately beguile me into this very state. I might then have fallen into his trap and become subservient to a fake enigma. However, if I see through that trick (if indeed a trick it is), then I can know secretly who truly possesses the enigmatic quality. But doesn’t such a recognition ruin itself? Thus the most stringent attempts must be made to put the whole business to the back of my mind.

“You harbour strange thoughts, do you not?” P. began, to my astonishment. “And by that I mean that you spend time thinking about things that are not part of what is taken to be reality (in an acceptable scientific sense).” There was only one response to such frankness and psychological aptitude. “Yes, you are right, topics of that kind have been a fascination for me since childhood. I follow them now more skeptically than the blind terror of real entities that gripped me in my younger years.”

“So your interest is purely negative, it is no longer a question as to whether one can attribute a reality to such things?” “The answer to that is not a whole-hearted ‘yes’, but rather an agnostic non-committal. But…” I added with an obvious manic fervor in my tone “…I wish with all my essence that such was the case!”

My enthusiasm seemed to startle him, so I swiftly retracted it by coughing, as though the increase in the pitch and volume of my voice had been merely a preamble to
my throat clearing, and not a signifier of anything else. As I should have realized (indeed did realize), the already proven psychological competence of my companion was not fazed by this vulgar facade, the corners of his mouth creased upwards slightly and he spoke again.

“I too have an interest in these areas, though I fear” his tone softened in deference, “that you outstrip me in enthusiasm for its existence. What have you achieved – I should be interested to know – in your endeavours which might constitute proof?” This question interested and excited me for it aroused the notion that my friend might be in receipt of a certain quality that I knew myself to lack, bravery. I could not truly say whether the word applies in the adventure into these areas, though to conceive that it does not is probably delusion. What is ‘good’ aids this delusion for what is ‘good’ is surely not to meddle in such things, thus the fear of meddling can be passed off as a ‘good’ sensible sentiment, and not a cowardly one. In turn, though, moments of further reflection upon this question indicated that I should not prostrate myself before my companion and beg for his zeal, at least not yet. If my logic was not perfect then my inference about his question might be ill placed.

“Proof?” I replied, pausing as if the idea shocked me as anathema to the topic with which it was concerned. Sadly I allowed my pause to linger for a moment too long and my companion began to speak again – this time in a manner that suggested I had either not understood him or relied upon religious precepts that prohibited proof since faith was the only verification necessary. “Yes, proof, and by that I merely mean an event that is incontrovertibly true and inexplicable to us. It could be that you have experienced such a thing – I presume this as an enthusiasm like yours is surely not built upon nothing; even if you experienced such a thing whilst alone, I should still believe you if you told me about it.”

I didn’t understand the last of these comments and yet felt that I must say something swiftly, especially after the pause that had previously created such an ill-desired effect. “Experienced something?” I hurried on. “Yes I have experienced things.”
“That would count as proof?” came the nagging question. I began to feel that the word ‘proof’ now caught at me, it snagged me as if I unsuccessfully moved from one side of a barbed wire fence to the other.

“Yes, that would count as proof, but though I feel valid in that assertion and that others – if I could locate them – would also testify to such events, the downside is that memory has clouded over the events themselves. So even though they happened I don’t believe I could recount any of them to you.”

“That’s a shame,” said P., casting his eyes downwards and sticking his lower lip out slowly like he were sulking. All speaking ceased for a moment for the sulk seemed to act as an embargo on all further comment. After a minute or so of this, he rose from the bench and pulled his coat tightly around himself.

“Come over here,” he instructed, marching purposefully across the grass to where the picnic tables were. “Why, where are you going?” But my inquiry fell strangely flat as the direction in which he was headed seemed obvious. P. did not reply, but continued to walk. I wondered whether the wind had possibly obscured my voice, but there was no wind. I caught up with him as he strode across the grass.

“Where are you going?” I asked again, but this time my voice was too loud and he looked quite hurt as if it were a reprimand. I tried to relax the expression on my face to soothe the blow, but he moved ahead so that he could not see it. I continued to pursue him in silence and he shortly came to rest by the picnic tables as if to demonstrate the superfluity of my questioning him. “Why have you come over here?” I asked, feeling at least this was a question of some legitimacy.

“I have come over here,” he began as if my presence were accidental to his purpose, “so that we might not be disturbed or observed.” This comment made me once more feel part of what was going on, but it left the query as to why we should come over here in order not to be observed or overheard, for there was, in truth, no other soul in the park but ourselves. I toyed with asking him further about this reasoning but then retracted the idea for fear of appearing too petttily inquisitive
about his actions, as an old woman might be about a child who has grown up without her noticing.

“Tell me,” he said as he sat down on one of the benches that were attached either side to the tables, “have you heard of those devices named Ouija or planchette?”

“Yes, of course I have.” My tone had a hint of irritation for the question seemed to indicate that I might have been lying before. In other words, how could I have professed to know about these areas and not have heard those terms before?

“Indeed, the two terms are not entirely the same thing,” I continued with an air of knowledgeable confidence, “for the first designates a device with a glass that moves upon already described letters on a board whilst the second is a pen on castors designed to write upon a blank sheet.”

“Oh,” came the blank response as if the extra information interested him not one iota. Then brightening quickly he remarked, “Do you think the successful use of such a device would constitute ‘proof’?” “You wield this word ‘proof’ as if you have more desperation in you than I gave away earlier. What is it you think I can say about proof that you do not already know yourself?”

“You’re quite right of course, but my question was — as you felt the need to point out — quite rhetorical. Now please come and sit down here for your standing there looking like that makes me feel more uncomfortable than you are for remaining stood up.” Again it seemed I had been outdone, so I acquiesced and sat down on the bench built under the other side of the table. “There,” he said, smiling in a genuine way, “that’s better. Do you know what I have in my coat pocket?” P.’s smile widened further and became a grin that suggested I should be following his train of thought. I replied that I did not but attempted to pull a kind of expression that showed I was following him nevertheless. “I’ll show you,” he said and then darted into his inside coat pocket, grinning all the while. “Look!” he announced with a flourish, brandishing a black biro pen and a crumpled sheet of paper “Look!” he said once more. My mind whirled, for he was now confusing me badly, even though
it was obvious to him that we were still headed down the same lines with which we began. In addition to this confusion, though, there rose a fear of ill-placed pauses that were so ambiguous they were offensive. Of course, the situation would not have been as bad if I had not set myself up as an equal competitor, but so far I had sparred with his knowledge and enthusiasm successfully—another pause now might offend him into tacit superiority.

“I see…” I said and raised my eyebrows to indicate that I wished to know where the rest of it was. “I thought of that too,” he continued unfazed. “Or rather I thought of you in regards to that.” “How do you mean?” Though I carefully avoided asking directly what I had to do with it.

“Do you have your fountain pen on you as usual?” “Why yes.” “Then I presume you have that small plastic case for cartridges about your person also?” I still did not follow him, but gave a knowing look in his direction, before reaching into my own inside coat pocket. The case was made of see-through plastic and was comprised of a separate lid and bottom. I looked at it momentarily as if to check that it was what I thought it was, before handing it over. P. took it off me greedily, smiling all the while. “I knew you were reliable; this will be perfect, don’t you think?” I nodded and said that it should serve admirably, now smiling enthusiastically along with him. He then opened the case, tipped the cartridges inside into his hand and handed them to me. Continuing my observation of him, I put them loose into my pocket. P. now sat with the lid in one hand and the main piece in the other, looking pensively at each in turn.

“Well this side is obviously of no use.” He pointed to the lid, drawing my attention to a small semicircle cut out of the front so that one could lift it up easily. “It would surely be dangerous to have a gap like that in it.” Once more I nodded and strained to demonstrate a countenance of understanding that also suggested that he should proceed. By now, though, I considered my facade to be quite out of control and began to grow desperate for some clue as to what he was referring to. I
stared at his facial and bodily motions, listened intently and mentally went over what he had said. These activities, slight though they were, required disguises themselves. For instance, I might be staring at a particular look in his eye to try to trace what it meant, and then suddenly I would have to look past him as if something beyond him had caught my own attention. These masks, in their own way, also had to be accounted for so as not to suggest that I wasn’t interested in what we he was doing. Due to these further complications, I could alas deduce nothing from his behaviour in relation to what we had previously been talking about. Still, I observed now that he had embarked upon yet another activity to add to his catalogue of ‘bizzararities’. He laid the crumpled piece of paper on the bench before proceeding to try to flatten out the creases by moving the flat of his palm across it repeatedly. This did not, however, work too well, for though it did relieve the sheet of many of the creases it had gained from his pocket, it added to it a series of horizontal lines created by the gaps between the longways planks that the tabletop was comprised of. These slight grooves, however, did not seem to offend him in the same way that the random creases had, indeed they seemed to serve as demarcation lines for the next activity. “And now the finishing touch,” he proclaimed as he reached for the biro that lay on the tabletop. He then, taking care not to press upon those parts that had gaps underneath them, began to write down in bold capitals the letters of the alphabet and the nine basic integers. Finally, in the last horizontal column, he added ‘YES’ and ‘NO’ at considerable distances away from each other. I now had the very clue that I needed to explain his actions, though admittedly this was not so much a clue as the revealing of the answer that I had, in truth, completely failed to work out – he was constructing a Ouija board. I stared at it, then back to his gleeful face as he continued once more to smooth the paper out, his task now being slightly frustrated by a small breeze that had arrived, gusting the paper up on one side whilst he smoothed it down the other, and thus the paper began to acquire a slight curve.
I gazed emptily at the situation – so confused had I been as to what he was up to that I had smiled and egged him on with a knowing enthusiasm. It seemed now that my mind had become so involved in enthusiasm that it continued with it regardless of what I thought, yet on the other hand the realisation of his activity now disturbed me, for it was foolhardy to think that he was not expecting both of us to partake in this, seemingly most wretched of seances. I admitted earlier that, despite my interest in these topics, mine has always been an interest much more of theory than practice, this being the case much more out of fear than good sense (though that too provokes further confusion). Now it seemed that I should either make a withdrawal that would look ludicrously odd or go through with his intentions.

“Do you think it will suffice?” He looked at me now with a distinct sense of deference, hoping I should give my learned blessing to his efforts. “I think we’ll need some stones to weigh it down, for the breeze is picking up and as the cup is made of plastic…” he indicated the base of the ink cartridge box “…it could easily blow away.” These remarks seemed not quite sensible in their entirety, but I understood well enough what he meant. “I should imagine there will be stones in that hedgerow,” I replied, and in doing so threw away my last chance at honest cowardice. “I’ll go and look.” Thus, with that same terrible ambivalence I made my way across to a nearby hedgerow and peered under it, in search of anything that might act as weights. The stones were not difficult to locate, and I soon returned with several medium-sized rocks. These were placed on the paper at the corners, yet the letters went right up to the edges so that in the end there was no alternative but to slightly obscure the ‘G’ in the right-hand corner. I felt this was a grave error and began to feel discomfort over the lack of the letter, yet I continued to behave as if all was well. Considering this further, I felt that the strange relationship that had developed between us obfuscated any sense that this was a problem. It seemed my knowing looks and suchlike had coerced him into a subservient, even childlike role, one that wanted nothing more than to please, thus whatever I said was fine,
obviously fine (as in the case of this letter). Whereas from my perspective, though it did occur to me to abuse his obvious deference, i.e. to feign a great depth of understanding, and instruct upon various nuances of the activity that I would make up there and then, I did not feel I could do this. Thus I continued being held as a relatively tacit superior, supervising his ever increasing progress. “These weights may actually prove beneficial from another angle.” His voice was thoughtful and his eyes flitted from stone to stone. P. cocked his head in a couple of different ways as if trying to find the angle that he had referred to. He stopped this procedure as if he had relieved a dissonance from his mind, his face screwed up momentarily, then returned with a refreshed glee. This glee, though, now looked increasingly stranger. The strangeness grew from an inexorable reflection upon what was going on; in other words, I could not but help observe the spectacle of my companion’s clear excess of delight in his tawdry, grotesque (in implication) creation. In his eyes it was now clearly a thing of wonder; indeed if P. felt any of the same fear of its potential that I did, then it was very well hidden. This led me to wonder who was more foolish in this respect. On the one hand, I must be the most foolish for assuredly any effect procured by this or a similar device could not be real and yet the sense of dread that I felt suggested that, on some level at least, it was due to the reality that I attributed to it that I feared it so greatly. He, on the other hand, seemed to hold no fear of it, which suggested to me that he could not be treating it as if it would really do anything at all and yet his face continued to distort with an unspeakable wonder that suggested it was indeed a something to him.

“Shall we start?” he inquired, turning the paper so that it was sideways on for both of us and evenly placed in the centre of the table. This adjustment also added a dimension of further absurdity to things, for the size of the table now became apparent (but unspoken of) to us, and the placing of the paper directly in the centre put it at an awkward distance to reach for any of our arms. This awkwardness became palpable when we reached to place our fingers on the plastic base, for the
stones (which were of differing sizes) furthered the problem of access. The greatest care had to be taken to curve the hand over the stones so that they would not be knocked off and thus jeopardise the proceedings. This position of psychological dread and uncomfortably outstretched arm, coupled with the oddly evolved state between myself and my grinning companion, began to make me feel quite unwell, yet still I could not relinquish my role. “Shall we begin?” he said again, and it was only then that I realised that he actually meant for me to start the proceedings. This responsibility made apparent to me exactly what that opening question was, for these activities turn on only one form of question. I tried mentally to twist it, so that it was not of the same shape. This, of course, was futile and rapidly I could feel my fear of pauses rising, feel the need to stem any further comment from my companion, and thus it was that I awkwardly and reticently uttered the words: “Is there anybody there?” My friend, who seemed to be disintegrating in sensible essence before me, now did not know where to look, such was his excitement. His eyes moved from me down to the board – where they focused on the plastic – and back up again, whilst his mouth made slight gaping movements as if it ticked in time with his state. Now that I had uttered that embarrassing question, I felt a certain relaxed excitement, and a degree of intrigue as to whom I felt embarrassed for. As that sensation passed an increasing new awareness came upon me – this new sensation was a certain disappointing relief, for in all honesty, nothing whatsoever was happening. Our outstretched arms trembled slightly from being tensed and this caused the plastic to judder minutely from side to side, but that was all. “No one heard,” he muttered to me. “Ask again.” This initial lack of response now filled me with a confidence in this activity, a confidence that, though it did not tell me that all things occult, or even simply all seances, were abject nonsense, certainly did tell me that this occult debacle was. Thus I felt capable of rising further to the level expected of me. “Is there a spirit there that would speak with us?” I spoke seriously to disguise the melodrama. It appeared too that I had read the situation correctly
for the awed excitement on his face increased. “Look!” he suddenly exclaimed. “It’s moving!” I felt now beneath my fingers only the same tense juddering as before, but now I also experienced a pang of the same fear of the reality of the thing. This fear was of course induced by his rather overzealous interpretation of it having trembled its way about half an inch downwards, a direction that could, if one strained the interpretation, be said to be heading towards ‘YES’ “Oh,” I said limply, with no sense of what was appropriate. P. did not seem to appreciate my tone and snorted to indicate that my attention should be firmly rooted to the activity in hand. The plastic, it had to be admitted, did not cease at the half-inch mark but made its way slowly, and not in the least surely, down towards ‘YES’. However, even when it had reached this destination, it was hard – if honestly pressed – to treat it as its final destination, for the same trembling motion persisted and bore the plastic past ‘YES’ and towards the edge. This event struck P. as so significant that he started suddenly. “It’s trying to escape! Stop it!” His face contorted out of all proportion to the rest of his bodily motion. This reaction created far more fear in me than any ‘result’ that the board was producing. Still, I paused myself, pressed firmly down on the plastic to ensure it had ceased and looked at him squarely in the face, only to find as I looked up that he was already staring me in the face. “Don’t take your finger off the glass,” he whispered, as if there were someone who might overhear. Then he glanced down with his eyes as if in answer to a question my own eyes had betrayed. “I think it’s safe now.” P. spoke less quietly this time and seemed to be more relaxed. This relaxation contorted again and he began to look deeply sorrowful. “I’m so sorry.” His eyes fell back deeply into his face, from where they reeled between me and the paper. “No, I really am sorry, these accusations that I keep making of you are clearly unfounded, and yet I can’t help it. I see in your face that you’ve thought something, then I act impetuously upon what I perceive. It’s only after I have acted that I become aware of what was really intended and then I know I
have to make amends, only I don’t always. Please accept this apology for all those previous and all those to come.” Once these words were out he did not wait for my acceptance but returned to his confident whisper. “Ask it something else,” he urged swiftly.

“What is your name?” seemed the most obvious choice, though it was expressed with ill-disguised distance. P.’s eyes lit up almost immediately and he became quite transfixed once more. In what may pass for truth, the tenseness of muscle once more caused the plastic to begin its journey, this time upwards, towards the main body of symbols. I began to ponder upon the infuriation of the thing in the plastic and wondered if it truly had been ‘trying to escape’, and if so why it did not now dash for freedom. Such contemplation, though, deserved a reprimand, for contemplating its ‘motive’ was yet another manifestation of ascribing to it too great a reality.

These thoughts flitted through my mind in instants and all the while the plastic made its way back up, past the numbers and up to the top centre, to a position that on a generous construal was an attempt to come to rest on ‘E’. Whether or not it would have continued to bid for freedom could not be told, for in P.’s eyes, the spirit’s decision to go to ‘E’ was a very real one, and he markedly stopped the plastic once it had reached it. Quite absorbed in what was happening, he now began to jabber to himself names beginning with ‘E’ as if he were having a further private discourse with it, gesticulating with his free hand in an attempt to access further means of expressing the words. Then, as if satisfied, he allowed the slow, painful motion to continue.

This pattern of movement and being stopped went on to spell out the extra letters ‘G’, ‘R’, ‘Y’ and ‘S’. After these he seemed to believe it had stopped – either that or (as it appeared to me) that he had stopped before the letters spelled out anything too incomprehensible, i.e. that was beyond any sensible interpretation, for at least at this stage they could still be pronounced. I noted now also how once more my presence had become incidental to his endeavors. This set in motion a series of
queries as to the nature of what I had taken as his fearlessness. Why had P., for instance, deferred so quickly to me, insisted that I start it, taken such care to follow a set of rules? These and others besides them began to make me feel resentful towards him. P., for his part, did not, or at least did not appear to, notice anything about my attitude, and so, I fancied, neither would he, so long as I remained suitably present in the activity. “Egriss, egryss, eegrys.” He muttered out loud, searching for the correct pronunciation, his hand waving once again. It further occurred to me now how much contempt I was holding this event in, a progression I could not have envisaged from the start of this encounter. Even more so, a progression I now found hard to reconcile with my own very real interest in the matter (the same matter that it now seemed I was so actively engaged in the parody of). My sense of despair grew and I felt that I had to actively strain my face back to the correct position so as to give nothing away, and I began to wish for the end of the entertainment, or if I could not end it I considered that perhaps I might improve it. “You spoke earlier of ‘proof’. What kind of proof do you think would be appropriate?” I asked him softly but attentively, keeping my head lowered to avoid any possible encounter with his eyes. “Proof, yes. But what kind of proof? Proof of knowledge perhaps?” I replied that proof of knowledge is not really substantial enough, as a piece of information might – by whatever strange means – be known to either of us, and if we didn’t know the answer then we would have nothing to check it against. No, the only kind of proof must be causal, it must cause something to happen, for only a causal proof can be experienced without the possibility of our already knowing the outcome. After I had made this speech, P. seemed more himself again, or at least he seemed to adopt a stance of equality to me once more. He considered what I had said and seemed to agree that causal proof was the only way forward. This apparent regaining of himself was though, only an apparent one, for now he directed his mind toward what should be caused to happen. At first he seemed to
want to have something to change when he got home, then he wanted something bigger in the scheme of the country to change. This was followed by the causing of physical adjustments to his pet, which in turn led him to think that his neighbour’s dog – which he loathed – should be killed by a green car. His list continued for several minutes after this, but all subsequent events seemed indistinguishable one from the next, so much so in fact that his list (presumably as it enumerated events) resembled a story more than a list. All these on reflection were unsatisfactory to him, for this proof that he willed so desperately (with a similar madness that I had been caught expressing earlier) was not required as he sat eating dinner or even as he came in the door of his home, it was required now.

Fidgeting, yet all the while keeping one finger on the plastic, he began to look around himself, clearly seeking something suitable. I happened to glance under the table and saw there a viable object for the experiment. I reached under the table with my spare hand, whilst he glared at me, though my other hand never left the plastic once. Bringing my hand back, it returned to display a perfectly undented empty drinks can. It seemed once more that I had read him right, for he seized upon it with his eyes, like a hungry animal fixated upon potential food. “It should move it,” he whispered. “But how? For if I stand it upright and ask it to knock it over outright, what if it isn’t strong enough to do it? Then it will have tried and we will not have noticed and the proof will not be there. I mean, is it fair to ask such a thing? Further still, what if it thinks that proof ought not be necessary? But how could proof not be necessary? Surely it would understand. Do you believe if I lie it on its side then this would be an adequate compromise?” “Certainly,” I replied, “and if you’re right about those other aspects, then it probably knows the care with which you’ve thought about it and doubtless appreciates it.” “That’s true, that’s true. So on its side then, but should I still ask, or do you believe it knows already my intent?” “If it does know your intent, then it also knows that there is no point answering or doing anything until it has been asked, otherwise how would we know what such seemingly
random activities were meant to be in response to?” “That's true also.” He sounded quite calm and pensive about the whole affair. His air of control persisted as he lay the can on its side on the tabletop, observing first that it did not roll of its own accord at all. As he prepared to speak, I could see the mania rising in him again. “If you are there...” he paused, for what might have been effect “…then move the can off the table.”

In an instant of bizarre coincidence, the wind, which had been breezing for a while now, caught the side of the can and blew it such that it rolled neatly off the end of the table. Horrified by this unfortunate accident, I turned away from the end of the table (where the can had rolled off) and stared dumbfounded back at P. He sat there with both hands clasped around his mouth, his eyes staring wildly from the board, to the table end and back to me.

“Proof!” he gasped “Proof!”

The Case of J.

It transpired that P had been speaking to J. This was problematic. Mostly so because the existence of J was entirely hypothetical. Now of course I have already stated explicitly that P had been speaking to J. This suggests that there is nothing hypothetical about J. However there is, if I am honest, something misleading about the notion. It could be more accurately phrased as ‘P relayed to me that he had been speaking with J’. This does not entail that J actually exists. Certainly I never met J, I only heard reports about him or her or it. P believed that after his dealings with the infamous man, he had become someone expert at conversing with powers of this kind. J was such a power that had come into contact -supposedly- with P. Indeed the infamous man’s name began with J. This complicated the matter or complicated the implications. Were J and the infamous man the same thing? P did not believe this to be the case. P was convinced that the infamous man was of the order of deceased humans and that J was something else entirely. As he said to me
in the dimly lit coffee bar. “J is of an order wholly different to the infamous man”.
“How can you be sure?” I replied. Isn’t it the case that here we are dealing with
nothing but uncertainties?” “No” P replied firmly “You reply to me and treat me as
existing, why should I not do the same for J.” I pointed out that this was not the
issue; the issue was the potential identity of the two beings. “The potential identity
of the two is neither of particular importance nor of doubt.” He replied “Do I doubt
that you are different from Q?” “I should hardly think so, especially since Q has
been gone for some time now and nobody knows where.” “Well then, there you
are. Two beings that a given being talks to can be easily differentiated. QED” he
quipped with a sly smile. I was not impressed with the reasoning, though I could not
help but wonder who E and D might be. “P” I began “If you speak to me through a
door and I am in a dark room will you know it is me?” “Yes” replied P confidently.
“How will you know?” “I will recognize the voice.” I realized that P had a point and
stalled. He pressed home his advantage “Would you mind telling me why the room
is dark? Why are you in a dark room? What bearing has this on anything?” P
certainly seemed to have me here it was true “I am in a dark room in case you
come in and try and talk to me.” Was all I could manage, P did not seem to care.
“What if I use an electronic device to disguise my voice? Then I replace myself with
another person. E or D for instance. The device masks their voices so that they sound
the same as mine. Do you still maintain you will know?” “Yes” P replied firmly “But
how?” “Simple…” he continued “I will ask ‘am I speaking to E or D etc.?” “And when
they answer how will you trust them?” “Why shouldn’t I trust them?” “Because they
might be lying.” “Why would they lie?” I paused and P pounced “The problem you
are facing is a prejudice. Your prejudice is a religious one.” I looked hurt “Please
stop your offended face and listen. You are presupposing that the beings on the
other side of the door are liars because you have been told that such beings are
always lying. This belief comes from your Christian upbringing which has left a
deep distrust in such things scorched into your soul.” I realized he was right. My
response to the possibility of such existent beings was fear based largely due to the general church fiat that one should leave such things well alone. “So you think such things are trustworthy?” I managed “As trustworthy as you and I” he said with a wink. “How do you know…” I ventured again “…that you do not simply converse with some part of yourself? In this way your proposition about trustworthiness is recognized and you comment about you and I literalized.” “This is a better question and the answer goes back to our first adventure.” I leaned in close to make sure I took in the answer. “What did we seek on that occasion?” “Proof!” I answered immediately. “Yes, proof, exactly! The problem is with proof in this realm is that it does not last. The proof of one day is soon spent and one must have fresh proof. Mathematicians also experience this. They must read their proofs regularly or they begin to doubt them.” Though P said this with confidence I was not so sure of it, however I did not press the point. “A fresh proof may be easily obtained, do you see the barista over there?” as he said this he pointed to a young lady behind the counter. I replied that I did. “Her name is Clarissa. I know this because of her badge and because I have engaged her on some occasions in an amount of small talk.” I nodded expectantly “Last night I asked J if it would make Clarissa sneeze. You should go and ask her if this was the case?” I looked at P as if this was ridiculous. It was ridiculous. I was also embarrassed to go up to a person who I did not know in the least and ask if they sneezed recently. “What if they already have a cold?” I asked P “They do not. Observe them. They are perfectly well.” Clarissa did appear to be perfectly well, she was talking to a colleague and serving coffee cheerfully. There was no trace of illness about her. I looked at P who did not seem to register my embarrassment in any way “Go on then!” he gestured to me that I should move with some urgency. Not meaning to seem to fail or even to stutter in the face of this seemingly innocuous request I got up and went over to the counter. I looked back once only to see P’s eyes glaring at me the order. I was forced to stand in line as if waiting to buy another item. I considered actually buying another item to soften the
blow of the strange question I was about to ask. I had no plan other than this and there was only one person in front of me. There were two staff serving and I smiled when I caught the name badge of the non-Clarissa, it was ‘Ed’. My time of enjoying this curiosity lasted moments as seconds later I was faced with Clarissa’s smiling face asking me “Hi what can I get you please?” I stood still for a moment staring and then said “I’d like a small black coffee and Clarissa…” “Yes” she replied in customer service mode “please can you tell me if you sneezed last night?” Clarissa’s face froze as the mode of question shifted her gear rapidly. Clarissa looked at me with extreme curiosity and no little disconcertment yet still answered in much more fragile voice “Yes, yes I did, it came from nowhere and went on for about half an hour.” My insides turned into a kind of liquid as the answer came out. It must have been a strange moment to see as both parties exteriors deteriorated with visible anxieties. “Why do you ask?” she managed to say, to which I could only answer that my friend (meaning P) thought you looked poorly. This she accepted and withdrew to make the coffee, though it would have taken little thought to see the ridiculousness of this acceptance. The question can only be reconciled with the answer if one interprets the question as one posed by, for instance, a second language speaker who uses a phrase like ‘did you sneeze last night?’ to mean ‘are you well? You look poorly’. I do not believe I offered any cues to make her think of me as such a person so the question must have been reconciled in another manner. One such option is precisely the shock of someone asking about such a particular and unusual episode as had occurred. In this case they are so shocked someone being aware of it that the minds ability to think is shut down. This prohibits any questioning of the source —myself— and drives any mental dialogue deep inside.

I sat down next to P with my fresh coffee. P looked at me sharply “Where’s mine?” he said. “Oh, I didn’t get you one.” “I can see that.” “Do you want this one?” “No.” “Frankly P I am so disturbed that you can have the coffee.” “I already said I do not want this second hand coffee.” “I have not drunk from it though. Look it is perfectly
intact.” “‘intact’ is a curious word to use with regard to coffee.” P took the coffee “What did Clarissa say?” I affected a look of slightly greater disturbance than I actually felt. I felt this appropriate because whilst the disturbance I felt was real it was not severe enough to alter my appearance much. Indeed the sensation I had in relation to the sneezing revelation did not have any definite quality to it. It was disturbing definitely, but not disturbing like bad news about, for instance, a relative or person of which one was fond. As such it did not bring about the correct level of physical change and hence my conscious manipulation. “Clarissa said that she did sneeze last night. For about a half hour.” “I see from your face that this proof is disturbing to you” said P and I felt a small inner triumph. “I must confess it is actually disturbing to me too, for up until this moment I had no idea if it would work or not.” I suddenly felt disturbed adequately to the face I was affecting “P…” I said with a sudden urgency “…what is going on here? This is disturbing.” “Yes” said P “This means that whatever J is, it can cause things to happen. It can…” P paused in a kind of frightened reverie “…see round corners! If you see what I mean.” I did see what he meant. ‘See round corner’ meant that such a thing as J was not restricted by the way we see space and time (or spacetime if you prefer), however I did not wish to seem so agreeable. “No P I don’t see what you mean.” I said, my crumpled brow oozed puzzlement (I felt). “You don’t see what I mean?” “Do you mean it can see round corners as if it had a series of mirrors?” P looked horrified “A series of mirrors?! Who told you about mirrors?” Now I was suddenly lost “What do you mean?” I asked, not having to adjust the confusion one iota “Why did you say mirrors?” “I said mirrors, because I wished to understand what you meant by see round corners. One can use a mirror to do so.” “Yes but you knew that ‘see round corners’ was not literal, thus it follows that the usage of mirrors was not literal either.” “Now I am lost P. Let us say that I did understand that you did not mean literally see round corners. It seems to me that if that is the case then yes, I did not literally mean mirrors. However you have focused on mirrors in such a way as to
imply something about actual mirrors, hence I am lost as to where to place the focus. Are mirrors well known metaphors for something or are mirrors something relevant themselves? "Relevant to what?" "Relevant to seeing round corners." "But of course they are, once can see round corners using a mirror." "Now though you make it sound almost banal. Do you mean more than just scrying?" "Yes" "What do you mean?" "I do not know what game we are playing now. I do not know if you toy with me or I with you or if we are simply two friends holding each other at a paranoiac distance." "I will try to break this impasse as I may have caused it. What does the mirror do?" "It reflects" "What does it reflect?" "Whatever light strikes it" "This definition goes too far. We can only say that it doubles. That it creates the perfect copy of this world insofar as we can tell. This image of perfection has the curious ability of creating the idea of another world. If we stare into a mirror from such an angle that we do not see ourselves we might believe that the mirror world went on and on. Is that not so?" "It certainly is." "This impression strengthens the minds ability to imagine another world. Do you follow?" "Yes" "So since the other world can only be in the mind, in follows that mirrors strengthen the existence of this other world." I looked non-plussed, something seemed awry in the conclusion but I felt there were other matters to discuss. "I see" I said with little conviction and then "But what has this to with the nature of J?" "Isn’t it obvious? This mirror world is where things like J live. Now don’t be silly, I don’t mean that we should start to become afraid of mirrors. This is partially because as stated J is probably nothing to be frightened of also because it is only the idea suggested by the mirror that gives the clue and not the everyday usage of the mirror itself." "But P, surely now we are aware of the ‘clue’ as you put it, how can we look at mirrors without considering this ‘clue’ and thus creating a disturbing effect?" "One must forget about the clue and act as normal, it is the only way." This was said in such manner as to bring an end to that discussion.
**P.'s Meditation on the Numbers.**

P is walking. P is thinking. P thinks about the essence of number. P believes the essence of number is individuation. P observes how all things in their being are each one. And in their each being one they contain themselves and themselves only. This must surely be true, or so it seems to P; there is nothing hidden to him here. Yet P is not naïve, he sees how the things do not stay close enough to each be called ‘one’, for in each’s oneness they suggest the other things around them; they withdraw into other things. It seems now to him that here there is one thing and here another and then it seems that here there is *only* one thing — a thing that allows the other things to show themselves.

But P has strayed from his thought, which was on the essence of number. What is the essence of number? This is what P thinks. Now P considers that the appearance of individuation is the essence of number. He stops that sense of the things that link together, he puts it clearly out of his mind and thus the separation is clear. Now it seems to P it is very clear; indeed now he wonders to himself how that connecting withdrawing motion ever confused him. He picks up a thing, as if to prove this to himself, and now feels how he is separate from it and it from him. P jumps up and down on the earth to indicate this is true in another way. Thus P is convinced of this separation. From here the rest of the argument follows with ease. All things are separate in their appearance. Thus in man’s looking around he sees now one thing and now another. Now it seems to P that this ‘now one thing and now another’ is a state of affairs that must be grasped in some way. This grasping ultimately is the notion that each one of these separate things may be seen in groups, groups of similar things or groups of different things. These groups are quantities.

“Here are several things,” P says out loud to himself, to convince himself of his correctness, “and these several things are” — a quick jotting up of P’s collection occurs — “five, yes five things.”
P is not so happy with his argument now, though; it seemed to him before that once one had seen that things were separate they automatically became numerical. Now P is not so sure. But now P remembers something he thought earlier. The things indicate other things. It seemed that it was impossible to think the things without other things, now it occurs to P that this might be true in a different sense. In other words, if we concentrate on the purely numerical side of things, doesn’t one thing imply another in this way too? P likes this idea. Thus every time one has one thing, there is another as another regardless of whether it is there or not.

“Here is one thing,” P says to himself holding up an apple “and its oneness tells me there is another.” And yet P does not hold another thing, “thusly there are two things and three things and so on.” It seems now he is convinced of this without the other things being here.

P’s ruminating on this matter might seem quite pointless but P is in fact laying the ground for something deeper. P felt he needed the essence of number showing to himself before he proceeded. P feels he can now proceed, though curiously P has the nagging idea that the essence of number has come no closer than before. Indeed P can no longer really remember what his conclusion has achieved or indeed what his conclusion was. P can remember that it was something satisfactory and this seems to suffice. P will proceed and hope that the conclusion is clear again later; or at least that his earlier results do not contradict what he might say further down the line.

P has an affliction. Now this affliction is not what one would call an ordinary affliction. P is not ill, though P does wonder about this sometimes. P believes he sees a certain number everywhere. P sees it continuously; it follows him like a friend or a fiend. P cannot decide which: it is not particularly auspicious but then neither does its presence denote anything particularly insidious either. P’s numerical friend is 47.
This is why it is so important for P to understand the essence of number, for without it how can 47 be understood?

“Well surely it can’t, so it’s essential” (P pardons his own pun) “that I grasp the essence of number before then moving on to understand how a number can behave in this manner.”

What manner is it that P means? Well, in truth he isn’t sure. It seems to him it’s a bit like that other problem, the one about the essence of number. He felt quite sure it was something he had, so he trusts to this sense of having had it. He imagines he’s asked to give an account of it to a body of gentlemen.

“So how is it that this number afflicts you? Tell us accurately and in detail, for as you know we’re a well-known body of scientific gentlemen and will settle for nothing less than the essence of the rigorous!”

At this thought P becomes quite flustered. He can see this terrible parliament before him now, seated and hoary, filled with questioning eyes. And my goodness, what was it they said they would require? ‘The essence of the rigorous’ — P shudders at the thought. What a terrifying idea. How can his pondering possibly match up to this inquisition? The anxiety brought to bear on P’s mind by ‘the essence of the rigorous’ is too great and he abandons the hideous interrogation.

But now P becomes unsure of his footing, so much so that he fancies he might actually fall over. This notion jars his mind into action. How had that happened? The uncertainty of his case as unsureness was the same as the unsureness of his footing. Indeed they were not separate. This seemed interesting and somehow reminiscent of the problems surrounding the 47, or ‘Mr 47’ as perhaps he ought to address him (or her). How had that thought occurred to him? Well, it seemed that… that. No, it’s all unclear again. P hasn’t a clue what he’s talking about. And now he shudders to think
what that mob of inquisitors would make of this. What if he had thought he had this instance as an example and begged their attention?

“Gentlemen, it’s like in those cases when one finds connections between a thought quite disparate and seemingly only metaphorically bearing a resemblance another notion and then they somehow come together.”

The gentlemen looked on interested, P had not foundered yet; what he was saying did seem to be making the sense he wanted it to, yet quite where it came from he had no idea.

“Thus it is with the phenomenon of numbers like the 47, the connections are impossible to delineate and yet clearly apparent.”

But now he was stuck. He wanted to end there with “and that concludes my presentation on the matter” but could see how this was a woefully inadequate dealing with of the subject; the gentlemen would never stand for that. So P abandoned them again and sat down, telling himself that he should not subject himself to “the essence of the rigorous” as it was clearly getting him nowhere.

Examples, that’s what he needed, for unless he was deluding himself he must surely have examples. The problem was that all P could think of was the fact that it quite often happened that when he looked at his watch it was the hour and 47 minutes or that when he looked at a car it said 47 on the number plate. P did not want to even begin to contemplate the presentation of this as ‘evidenz’ to that panel with their demands that a certain essence be always striven for. Though in this desire the image still emerged:
"And thus we can see that the presence of the 47 on these number plates that I noticed that other day and... well blow me, will you look at the time! As if I required a more rigorous proof!"

The gentlemen, having heard his speech about the four number plates in a row that he saw the other day and now being asked to look at his watch as it was 14:47, would not be impressed. They would shake their heads and reach for that large stamp with which to stamp the work. ‘WORTHLESS’ the stamp would say on it, and, after it had been duly dunked in the ink sponge, it would be brought to bear upon his paper. Thus would be the pronouncement from those who demanded nothing less than “the essence of the rigorous”.

This will never do, thought P. Too much toing and froing was getting him nowhere. P needed to relax. P took several deep breaths and thought about why the 47 was important to him. Well, there were things that happened, things he couldn’t remember, but in a way this was its own proof. Why would he be attached to the number at all if it hadn’t done something strange at some point? Yes, there had been things. And there were images too, great and powerful images that grew out of its contemplation. And what was more, the things and the images were linked. Thus P’s mind cleared and the phenomenon that he desired to reach seemed to open itself slightly to his mood. Lines of a rhyme drifted into his head:

“In wretched life and sweat-wracked slumber,
He seeks the meaning of that number.”

And there was more, but P couldn’t remember it. Was it something about a boat later on or had he made that part up? No, there was definitely something about a boat, but what about the boat? P had no such clue. P tried to come back to that useful mood of a second ago before the rhyme had disturbed him. What were the
things? Well, it seemed to P that it was as much to do with shapes as anything. Triangles chiefly, oh and squaring numbers – it was important he remembered that. Did that make squares important? Well, sort of, but he recalled they only had a kind of red herring role to play.

No shapes were clearly important, this much he recollected with clarity, shapes that fed one into the other with endless repetition, angle upon angle, plane upon plane. P seemed quite entranced by the geometrical reverie. But how did this occur? How did that movement come about? How was it that there was an endless oscillation between one and the other? Well, surely, it seemed to P, that the oscillation was metaphorical on the changing flow and ebb of being. But then he recalled the unsureness of his footing before and was suddenly doubly unsure. P felt a shudder of vertigo, though not from a dizzying height but from...

And P realised the same had happened again: he was going to say the vertigo was metaphorical upon that of the dizzying height, but this would return him only to what he said about the oscillation of the shapes and the ebb and flow of being, which in turn had reminded him of the unsureness of his footing as had occurred a while ago. It seemed to P he wanted to think of one as founded upon the other, but that instance of nearly falling over had somehow jarred this notion. But this was not the time to dwell upon the essence of the metaphorical. So P returned to the matter at hand.

But then again, wasn’t this directly related to the matter in hand? Hadn’t P originally tried to discern the essence of number in order to found the understanding of the 47? But no, this was different surely, for numbers are not metaphors for the quantity that they designate… are they? P was unsure. For if the senses of the metaphorical in those cases he had just experienced arose together and were not one founded
upon the other then why should it not be the case that shape, number and quantity arose together?

“Oh dear,” thought P. “But why did I differentiate number and quantity one from the other? This really is becoming very confusing. Let us see now. The ‘shape’, well that’s simply the lines on the paper, I suppose then I must have meant the name for ‘number’ 47.” P smiled to himself. “And quantity, well that’s the amount as derived from the appearance of separateness as established earlier.” In this brief moment P found himself getting quite into the “essence of the rigorous”. That move of recalling a premise from earlier, it seemed somehow proper and well, the gentlemen would have nodded with approval and ticked the box with the adjacent text: “previously established premises later returned to as proof for subsequent arguments”. Yes, this would have been very pleasing to them. But P had returned to nonsense again. The gentlemen, quantity, number, shape; all his discussion seemed to belong to nothing other than the essence of gibberish. P needed to begin again.

Well, maybe not entirely again, surely out of his ponderings he had made some progress. Though what could possibly count as progress along such a path of thought? No, a new beginning was definitely required even if it did retrace some of the old ground once more. Though now he thought about it again, a new beginning was exactly what he had learnt was not required.

“Just the thing that the doctor expressly forbid…” P said to himself about the beginning-once-more idea, and then added without knowing why “…under pain of death”. In saying this addendum to the clause P pulled a face in which he bared his teeth and his eyes grew wide with anxiety. A passer-by noticed and looked fearfully at P before hurrying past.

P decided that he needed to make his way back to that mood in which he had begun to recall things, or rather in which the whole business seemed to open up to
him again. He differentiated these two for fear that there were really no such things to recall and that the whole thing was an edifice of number plates and digital times. P found what seemed a reasonable question and asked it to himself.

“What actually made me think of it in terms of an oscillating movement?”

And what a reasonable question it seemed to be. There must be a good answer to this or where would the oscillating motion come from? He could not have thought it completely groundlessly. It seemed to P as he contemplated this ground that it had two sources and neither was even trying to be reliant upon the other and yet both seemed really quite cogent. P suddenly hoped that those gentlemen in their court of science hadn’t heard his usage of the word ‘cogent’ as he felt that they would hardly approve. Nevertheless, P thought, it was certainly true that one of the methods of oscillation was mathematical and thus deserved the title ‘cogent’ to some extent even if it did not quite accord with “the essence of the rigorous”. P began to think out loud again:

“The first way into the oscillation between the shapes is to think of the shape of the numbers themselves, in other words as we commonly draw their symbols; in this way we can observe that one 4 is similar to the upside down version of the other, i.e. 7.”

P paused as he became aware of the absurdity of the argument; it seemed that in order to make it ‘cogent’ he should add that the line that hangs vertically down from the top of the 4 should be discarded in order for the similarity to be realised, yet he was aware that the discarding of this line was so arbitrary that it compounded the ridiculousness of the argument beyond belief. He decided that the best thing to do was to ignore this slight flaw and carry on. P then realised why the vertical line was not to be dropped. Suddenly he felt that sense returned:
“It will be observed, then, that when one fuses these two symbols together in their most obvious synthesis one creates the following symbol:

It can thus be seen that 4 and 7 fuse to make two isosceles triangles joined at a single point. The single point is the point at which the oscillation takes place. Thus it will be understood that the oscillation between 4 and 7 is the oscillation between two triangles. Does this mean that one triangle is 4 and the other is 7? Well, if we posed such a question what could we possibly mean by it? The question mis-leads. But here mis-leading is not a leading astray in the sense of leading us into errancy. It is rather a question that leads us missingly into places where we can scarcely tread or breathe. We cannot say that one triangle is 4 and one is 7 for in truth in delineating this symbol we have merely entered into a chain. We cannot say one triangle is 4 and one is the 7 for we cannot say at which point we have entered the chain and furthermore we do not even know if the chain even means 4 and 7, for in merging these symbols we should understand that the rules that they once were used for have be taken up in the oscillating motion and thus have been stripped of their meaning. If each fuses into the other then the identity of both is simultaneously lost, worse than lost, trapped in a horrifying movement where it is both and none.”

The gentlemen were not impressed. They did not find the speech cogent or rigorous in its treatment of the matter. He felt he had heard them cough at the point at which he had said “their most obvious synthesis” but he had carried on nevertheless. There might be one of them, so P believed, who had actually been quite interested at one point, but the disdain of his colleagues had been so great as to quell his enthusiasm for the matter. He had shrunk to the back, deeming it not really worthwhile to quarrel with the other gentlemen. So apart from this one potential gentleman with his occasional pondering of that-which-was-without-rigour the vote was unanimous and out came the stamp to prove it: WORTHLESS was the pronouncement and that was the end of that. The gentlemen had had enough of this nonsense; indeed some
others at the back began to look angry with P. Why was he wasting their time? What was all this rubbish about the oscillation of the triangles? Did he want a demonstration on the essence of triangles? If he did they would write one for him: a long and rigorous one.

P did not know what to do. P was not entirely sure why the speech was still aimed at this ungrateful audience, who, in any reasonable sense, were not actually there. And yet it seemed that the more he tried to tell himself that he did not have to adhere to the criteria of this parliament of logic, the more they came up to listen to his every pondering upon the matter. The cheek of it, he began to think, that they had asked why he was wasting their time, when in fact it was they who were wasting his.

And yet, already he could feel the temptation to try to win them round with the second entry into the oscillation of the 4 and 7. Thusly ignoring the stamped last two papers that now littered the floor, P turned to face the body of gentlemen once more.

“And though he seeks to stay afloat,

The night and bark are slow in boat.”

This wasn’t right, this wasn’t right at all. This was the part about the boat from the poem of before. P felt a fool. The gentlemen looked on.

“Boats and night aside, though,” P continued, “let us contemplate the mathematical proof of the oscillation between 4 and 7.”

The trick worked. The words ‘mathematical’ and ‘proof’ distracted the gentlemen to the extent that they completely forgot about the boat incident. Now the gentlemen
were all ears, all of them! Eager to hear a proof, they murmured excitedly and shuffled in their seats.

“A proof…” began P “…belongs to the essence of the rigorous.” The gentlemen murmured their approval, some even clapped, whilst yet others stamped their feet. “But what, my good gentlemen, belongs to the essence of proof?” An expectant silence gripped the audience. “Well, existence in its particular material configurations is ultimately contingent, so in seeking to gain a secure epistemological grip upon our matter we must find a body of knowledge that grounds itself in the necessity of its own insights, i.e. one formed of propositions that are apodictic, that is, self-giving in their certainty, for only in this way may we proceed. The paradigm model for such a body of knowledge is mathematics, which as the ground of physics is the only secure basis upon which we may ground our knowledge about existence.”

At this the gentlemen roared their approval. The language sang as poetry to them. They stamped their feet, whooped, clapped and threw their hats in the air. Others began to reach for a different stamp in anticipation of the subsequent parts of the paper. The word VALID could be seen clearly (though backwards naturally) on the rubber stamp and already it was dunked in the ink in anticipation of the paper’s approval.

“Now, as the ground of physics we should expect mathematics to ultimately reflect the essence of material reality, thus those propositions that are true of mathematics are necessarily true of being. Furthermore, the contingency of a given number system is no proof that the propositions arising out of it are in anyway contingent. For as the essence of the mathematical belongs to the individuation of being transcendentally, i.e. that it is not merely a matter of my own being that ‘here is one thing and here is another’ – for such individuation may be said to have being
regardless of my presence – and thus the essence of mathematics belongs not merely to my manner of apprehending things but rather to being as it is.”

This part of the speech was also largely taken in by avid listeners. They seemed at least to find it an argument they could tolerate, though clearly now they were waiting for where this was all heading.

“Thus in the following treatment of those positive integers, 1 through to 9, we may allow those results acquired not to be dismissed on the basis that the system as we commonly use it (1 through to 9) is but arbitrary. As although the system partakes in the individuation as one manifestation of it, it is still equally apodictic in its belonging to the nature of existence.”

At this the gentlemen seemed less sure; it seemed a suspicion began to grow in their minds and yet for the moment they still granted the ears of science for hearing.

“We begin our discussion with the notion of squaring. Now it is commonly understood that to square a number we should multiply it by itself. Now the squaring of a number opens the number’s essence further up to us, for we have derived this second number (the square) from nothing other than a simple process and the number itself. However, should we not in this most exact science always be striving after that which is simplest and most clear? Now in our number system those numbers that are most clear are those that remain as single integers, i.e. they never become more than 9 and thus are not confused in our comprehension by the symbolic addition of an extra number to designate a new ‘higher’ number.”

The discontent among the gentlemen was quite apparent now. Some muttered amongst themselves, while others began to make aeroplanes out of their notes to show their lack of interest, and yet others turned their chairs so they faced slightly
away from P. Nevertheless it was not yet the appalled looks of before so he continued.

“We should then take this kind of scientific notion into consideration when we square numbers for it necessarily happens that the square of a number is greater than the original. The problem of the cumbersome size and inexactitude of numbers can be removed by the simple process of adding the composite digits together. For example, in the case of 16 we simply add the 1 and the 6 together. Now we might question the necessity of this addition but it is soon revealed when we consider that if we were to propose a subtraction we would not know which number to subtract from which, hence we seem guided towards this numerical essence by a hidden necessity. This same hidden necessity had previously told us that a square is the opening up of a number’s essence. We must now admit, though – no matter how much we may not like it – that the adding together of the composite integers reveals a number that belongs no less to the essence of the original number, and indeed is a number that, owing to our reduction to simplicity, is the most refined part of the essence of the square. Now, having established this we may now show how the oscillation finds its manifestation in the *apodictic* realm.”

The word ‘apodictic’ did its work and the gentlemen still continued to tolerate the speech.

“Let us now consider the basic integers each in turn. In taking a solitary 1 and squaring him, I mean it, sorry.” P pulled a strange face before continuing. “Now in the case of 1 simplicity is always our ally, for it will be noted that no amount of squaring can ever force 1 to move beyond itself. In this sense 1 contains its own essence and is complete. The case of the integer 2 is, we should not say more interesting – as what could be more interesting than the self-containment of 1 – but nevertheless more lively, shall we say. The case of 2 runs thusly. The square of 2 is
4, this much is immediately apparent. And yet when we are greeted by that 4 who belongs to the essence of 2, are we not instantly found wanting a further movement, for having arrived at 4 the wisdom of 1 is now apparent to us. For the 1, which clearly demarcates itself as whole and is determined by its own essence, is a highly fortunate fellow, I mean number, yes. What I mean is, in arriving at 4, the continuation is already suggested to us, for though 1 repeated itself endlessly, in transforming 2 into 4 we feel we should press on."

The gentlemen did not look like they felt like pressing on.

“And so, now faced with this 4 who has not yet made us feel we are on safe ground, we square him also and thusly come to the number 16. Now according to that rule that we laid down earlier as one of the important precepts of mathematics, we should add the 1 and the 6 together. And what has happened now? What is it that that philosopher's stone of a principle has achieved? Why, nothing other than the transmutation of 4 into 7! And yet do we still feel secure? We do not. The same method must immediately be brought to bear upon the 7, and in doing so, what occurs? Well, the square of 7 is 49, but this cumbersome digit will have to be reduced. Now the 49 attempts to resist our attempts to reveal himself by transforming himself into 13; he struggles in our hands. But there is no means of resistance available to the numerical ones that can overcome the inexorable reduction of adding the composite integers together. Thusly the 49, reduced to 13, now finds his essence displayed as 4. Yet how can this be? For were we not just moments ago saying how 4 was not stable ground and yet now he is back again as if he were as self-determined as the 1? But he is not, for can we forget that journey that led us from 4 to 16, to 7, to 49, to 13 and only then back to 4? No, the 4 cannot claim any such stability as the divinely complete 1. Indeed should we begin that journey once more then it is apodictically down the same path it will lead us.

The 2 does not return, but once transformed to 4, the oscillation between 4 and 7 is
eternal and the 2 in the revelation as belonging to the 4 belongs to this oscillating essence. This is similarly true of 5, who once she has become 25, then becomes 7 and so on. Thus only the numbers 3, 6, 9 and 8 escape this pattern. The group 3, 6 and 9 all belong to the same group insofar as they all come under the sway of 9 whose essence encompasses them all. Observe: 3 will become 9, 9 will become 81 and thus back to 9 ad infinitum, 6 will become 36, which will become 9 and so on. This leaves but 8 to unfold itself. Now the 8 we shall speak of in greater detail later but for now let it be shown that 8 will become 64, which will return itself to the fold of the great and stable 1. We can now see, though, how the 4/7 as an oscillating phenomenon is inserted with absolute certainty into our being. The numbers 2, 4, 5, and 7 in their particular instances all dissolve into this motion, which is neither one number nor the other. The motion of squaring as essence revealing shows the oscillation as inherent in the essence of all things as individuated things. Thus that same chain that we noticed in its symbolic manifestation reasserts itself in the numerical apodictic.”

The gentlemen did not seem to know whether P had finished or not. Though in truth P did not know whether he had finished or not. The whole speech had been a ruse clearly: the dressing up of the number revelation in words that the gentlemen might listen to. But though P now told himself that’s what it was, he once again became unsure. Had he really been so certain of the ruse-like nature of it at the time of presentation? Were there not moments at which he had actually believed in that mode of speech that he had carried with him? P had no time for such thoughts. For as the silence endured, that board of listeners and watchers finally came to realise the ordeal was over. They ceased playing chess, doodling, staring at the ceiling, tapping their fingers and feet, rattling their chairs and pulling hairs from their noses. All these things they stopped to acknowledge the end of the diabolical travesty of rigour to which they had been subjected. There were no words to be said. One of them, a particularly ancient-looking one, picked up the WORTHLESS stamp and
hurled it with a force completely incommensurate with his size. It struck P firmly on
the forehead, imprinting its design in the allotted place. P reeled momentarily and
attempted to start to splutter an explanation, only to find the gentlemen had gone
and he was back walking on his journey once more.

P raised his hand to his brow to wipe off the ink, then realised that of course there
was no ink, then realised that there was seemingly something to wipe off his brow,
then understood that it was the sweat of the presentation ordeal. It was clear there
was no way of presenting this matter in such a way that it could adhere to
something that those gentlemen wanted to hear and yet the desire to say what had
to be said in some kind of terms that could be accepted and listened to was almost
unbearable.

P reconsidered the matter, this time taking care to bracket firmly the gentlemen.
Even though they had not accepted what he had wanted to say, his speeches had
still conveyed in a sense exactly what he thought. Whether one accepted the
reasoning behind the ‘why’ of that particular mathematical process or not it was still
valid. What one could not say was that this particular set of doing things with a
number reached the highest part of the number’s essence. But insofar as each
number had an essence (whatever that might mean) the operation that was
performed did open up a part of this essence. What was more it was not to be
thought of separately from the symbolic fusion. Like those earlier thoughts of P’s,
they arose together. So the two triangles, which were each neither 4 nor 7, were
related to the oscillation of numbers through squaring and addition. They both
belonged in the same region and this belonging together was the same as when the
47 manifested itself here and there. It also came from the same region. But this was
confusing for now the symbolic and arbitrary seemed to be as necessary as the
quantitative nature of 4 and 7. Or perhaps worse than that, the quantitative was as
arbitrary as the symbolic.
“I think…” said P, and as he did so he recalled the cogito “…therefore I need a bit of a lie down.”

There was nowhere for P to lie down, no matter how much he wanted to. There was only the cold ground and the path ahead. P decided to hurry on.
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Influential Authors

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Goethe, Harman, Heidegger, Sartre,

Hegel, Husserl,

Jung, Kafka, Kant, Keel,

Kripke, Land, Lynch, Nietzsche,

Popper, Whitehead,

Anton Wilson,

Wittgenstein
Tractatus Pneumatologico Philosophicus

A Phenomenological Epistemology of Paranormality

The problem of paranormality is a thorn in the side of philosophy. It makes Cartesian doubt look like viable worry. Ensconsed in its own dream of solid world rationality, philosophy fails to pay attention to the fact that psychological explanations for paranormal phenomena are not proof that the psychological explanations are correct. Whilst the Tractatus in no way says that paranormality actually obtains, what it is does say is that we cannot extirpate the experience of paranormality from our lives. Furthermore, since we cannot remove the phenomena with a ‘solid world’ ontology, we should at least consider what the alternative would look like.

The Tractatus is largely concerned with exploring this alternative ontology - whilst accepting it is potentially just an appearance. Taking cues from chaos magickal insights and grounding itself in the experience of paranormality (taking synchronicity as a key example) the book suggests active conceptuality (or pneuma as it is named herein) is the necessary condition for such phenomena to occur. The implications of accepting this kind of ‘substantial conceptuality’ are then variously explored both in relation to paranormality and regular philosophy. The result suggests a philosophy that seamlessly fuses a magickal interpretation of existence with the regular everyday one.